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Abstract
“GOD IS NEAR:” AMERICAN THEOCRACY AND THE APOCALYPTIC POLITICAL
THEOLOGY OF JOSEPH SMITH

by
ALAN P. KOENIG

Adviser: Professor Corey Robin

The Mormon prophet Joseph Smith established the quintessentially “American religion”
according to religious critics like Harold Bloom, perhaps the last major religion to emerge in the
Western world. Founded during the rise of Jacksonian Democracy, early Mormonism espoused
many populist and egalitarian tenets, yet behind Smith’s theology of an ever more exalted path to
individual godhood lay an extraordinary politics demanding a new, theocratic hierarchy. This
dissertation will discuss how Smith’s apocalypticism and exceptional politics of continual
revelation confronted a pluralistic Protestant society with the superseding aim of creating a
uniquely American kingdom. As a political theorist, Smith’s apocalyptic theology challenges
liberal pluralism both in its inception (by emerging out of pluralism itself from a seemingly
integrated populace), through prizing unremitting revelation over reason in political discourse,
and in the isolating peculiarity of its theocratic tenets. The intensity of these theocratic
challenges illustrates that liberal theories have misperceived the true, protean nature of American
theocracy and how best to engage it.
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This dissertation will follow the tradition of scholars like Fawn Brodie, Marvin Hill, and
Richard Lyman Bushman in referring to Joseph Smith as “Joseph,” and the primary focus herein
will be on his political theology and the resulting religious movement of his time.
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For Felix and Oliver:

in hopes of a better tomorrow.
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Introduction
The Devil was closing in on Joseph Smith. Though he would later waiver, Joseph
sounded exuberantly defiant preaching before his flock on May 26th, 1844, one month before his
assassination: his public faith was proudly unshaken, his apocalyptic vision of ultimate triumph
undimmed. Besieged by anti-Mormon forces encircling his Church and apostates plotting within,
Joseph delivered a scorching sermon exulting in the apocalyptic clash to come with enemies he
had long assigned to Satan.1 Satan had persecuted his people, the chosen people, throughout
history, and the trials born by Joseph were a testament to his role as leader and true prophet of
the Elect. That day in May Joseph proclaimed:
The Lord has constituted me so curiously that I glory in persecution . . . I shall always
beat them. . . In all these affidavits, indictments, it is all of the devil – all corruption.
Come on! ye Prosecutors! ye false swearers! All hell, boil over! Ye burning mountains,
roll down your lava! for I will come out on the top at last. I have more to boast of than
any man ever had. I am the only man that has ever been able to keep a whole church
together since the days of Adam . . . I boast that no man ever did such a work as I. . . .
How I do love to hear the wolves howl!2
Amid the hyperbole and lupine swagger are elements of fact. Joseph, more than any other
American political theologian and actor, established both a new major world religion and an
actually existing theocracy, one that would prove the largest and most enduring since the
founding of the republic. At the time of his murder he was not only Prophet, Seer, Revelator and
President of the Church of Latter Day Saints, but also judge of the municipal court, Mayor of
Nauvoo, “General” to over 5,000 troops, candidate for the President of the Unites States, and the
secret “King, Priest and Ruler” of the incipient Kingdom of God on Earth.3
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Despite incarceration, mob violence, mass expulsions of his followers, and at least two
small wars lost against the state of Missouri, Joseph persisted in his theocratic drive for unified
religious and secular power -- an unceasing practice of an extraordinary politics -- until his brutal
death. He strove to achieve a more virtuous and compliant society under prophetic rule, one
prepared for the imminent and total transformation of all the earth into the millennial kingdom of
Christ’s final resurrection. Founded during the social dislocations and political ruptures of the
Jacksonian and Industrial Revolutions, Joseph’s Mormon movement was tribal, prophetic, and
profoundly patriarchal. To charge against the prevailing tides of greater democracy and
Protestant pluralism in America required audacious innovation, bold new ideas of political
theology to justify a series of theocratic city-states on the American frontier. How did Joseph
accomplish this remarkable feat of political thought and action, what ideas and visions of a new
society did he deploy to establish his counter-revolutionary political order and its cities of refuge
and reaction? Why examine Joseph as a political theorist?
For this study, Joseph serves as an exemplar of American theocratic theory, a political
theology that in its critiques of democracy, promotion of exceptional politics, and advocacy for
the supremacy of a religious elite, seeks to supplant liberal pluralism. As I will demonstrate,
Joseph deployed anti-democratic arguments and ideas that are strikingly similar to those of the
political theorists Carl Schmitt and Joseph de Maistre as he sought to reverse the flow of political
history in 19th century America and the world. His mission was to reassert the primacy of an epic
age of the Hebraic Prophets and return to a culture and politics based on mystery and sacred
order.4 Joseph’s aspirational world was one of re-enchantment in the midst of the Industrial
Revolution, his political ideal a prosperous kingdom were righteous patriarchs ruled over a
chosen tribe with secret polygamous practices, and he established its theocratic foundational
2

polity during the same decade as the Seneca Falls Convention.5 Like the French reactionary
Joseph de Maistre, he believed that “only sacred institutions based on the supernatural would
survive. All others were “only a passing phenomenon.”6 And much like Carl Schmitt’s probing
queries on the bases of legitimate authority, his tendency in political thought was to contest the
constraints of the legally and socially normative in favor of the exceptional. For both Joseph and
Schmitt, key problems of modern political theory could be overcome through the power of
myth.7
In this dissertation, I posit three primary claims in service of my broader argument. First
that Joseph’s political theology and theocratic project are paradigmatic of an understudied
phenomenon: that in America’s secular system theocrats arise in reaction to -- and from within –
pluralism, amid the very sort of liberal accommodations that were originally thought to foster
tolerance and prohibit theocracy. American theocracy is a different, more modern creature from
its historical precedent in Europe, and political theory should pay more heed to its unique
anatomy since much of pluralist theory still retains that first form as its imaginary other; much of
American political thought has yet to engage with the actually existing gestalt of modern
theocracy and its peculiar relationship to pluralism.
Second, the relationship between American theocracy and liberal pluralism that Joseph’s
theocratic theology serves as a paragon of is a synthesis of both elements of liberalism and
authoritarianism – with the ultimate aim of superseding Lockean pluralism in America. I will
define this theocratic mode of synthesis in the service of overcoming its host as antagonistic
symbiosis. In order for theocracy to accommodate itself to, with the intent of supplanting, the
dominant liberal order, Joseph’s theology introduces forms of democratic adaptability (e.g. in its
populist appeals) and doctrinal flexibility. These paradoxical aspects make the nature and aims of
3

theocracy difficult for a liberal state and society to fully grasp and respond to. American political
theory often takes the integrity of theocratic theologies for granted, believing that they are
composed of deep traditions, comprehensive doctrines.8 I will argue that American theocracy is
better characterized but its secrecy, fluidity, and doctrinal adaptability, traits that provide a mask
to protect from liberal scrutiny and skepticism. This mask is not merely instrumental but integral
to modern theocratic theology.
Third, American theocracy relies on the reassertion of ontological privilege in politics.
Central to Joseph’s exemplary political theology was the restoration of the social and political
power of his revelations. This form of ostensibly archaic revelatory politics is disruptive to
liberal pluralism not only because its permissible role in public discourse was long ago forbidden
throughout Europe and therefore largely forgotten, but also for reasserting ontological claims
into political contestations that cannot be respectfully handled within the public sphere. As this
dissertation will demonstrate, the return and persistence of Joseph’s mode of revelatory politics
strikes against basic secular assumptions that undergird the normative order of modern pluralist
society, a challenge well described by the exceptional politics advanced by Carl Schmitt.

The Anatomy of an American Theocracy
As a form of modern political theology, Joseph’s theocratic drive and the apocalypticism
that impelled it are remarkable, for they constituted a profoundly anti-liberal form of religious
politics that relied on religious pluralism and religious liberty in order to incubate and spread.
Founded on a rejection and intolerance of all other forms of Christianity, Joseph demanded
tolerance and the rights of religious liberty from the Jacksonian America he preached his
4

Mormons would inherit, and he did so while openly situating his movement within the symbolic
frame of America’s tolerant, liberal civil religion. Joseph would publically laud the constitution
and its republican values and deftly deploy the language of national providence and divinelyguaranteed liberties described by Robert Bellah as America’s civil religion, while privately
plotting the outlines of a theocratic empire.9 As the religious scholars Robert T. Hughes and C.
Leonard Allen observed, the “two dominants threads” in early Mormon theology were a
“coercive, sometimes even violent antipluralism, along-side a ringing affirmation of the right of
all people to freedom of conscience.”10 In terms of American political theology and its actual
theocratic practice, Joseph’s thought and ministry are significant for the way they spin against
the main drive of the liberal Protestantism that his religion emerged out of -- and should be
considered more influential for foreshadowing the forms of American theocracy to follow.
Joseph’s innovations in challenging American pluralism, for all their fabulous novelty,
drew on modes of crisis already present in an American apocalyptic tradition. Parallel strands in
this apocalyptic tradition posit historical moments of spiritual and political crisis that the state
alone cannot answer, and the onset of these recurrent crises draw a sharp friend and enemy
distinction between the pious and the profane. In his classic exploration of the Puritanical origins
of the American jeremiad, Sacvan Bercovitch wrote in The American Jeremiad that the rhetorical
cycle of apocalyptic lamentation and recommitment in early American sermons “made anxiety
its end as well as its means. Crisis was the social norm it sought to inculcate. . . The future,
though divinely assured, was never quite there, and New England Jeremiahs set out to provide
the sense of insecurity that would ensure the outcome.”11 According to Bercovitch, the
jeremiad’s impelling assumption is that America’s providential mission must yet be fulfilled, and
the norm of crisis it inculcates is a recurrent call for spiritual rearmament and political renewal.
5

Richard Slotkin’s Regeneration through Violence: The Mythology of the American Frontier
1600-1860, in a thematically overlapping theory American mythic narrative, portrays the
Puritans encounters with the frontier and Native Americans as the genesis of a “myth of
regeneration through violence [that] became the structuring metaphor of the American
experience.”12 Through violent conflict with frontier “savagery,” American society created new
histories of a mission to revitalize civilization, a mythic aspiration that expressed their national
desires for territorial expansion and autonomy.
Joseph’s promises of apocalyptic deliverance were also premised on this very American
style of crisis: spiritual refinement was to be achieved on the frontier through persecution from,
and in conflict with, Satanic forces (i.e. gentiles) -- an age-old battle that would, notably in his
early revelations, culminate in the annihilation of all outside the Mormon covenant.13 However
initially similar, Joseph’s political theology deviates from the civil religious throughlines
described by Bercovitch and Slotkin in that its eschatology applies to a far more specific Elect,
an emergent nation that breaks off from, and will ultimately triumph over, the American
republic, while their jeremiads and regenerative dynamic are broader national tropes of
republican renewal rooted in a more conventional Christian culture. The Book of Mormon and
Joseph’s later revelations inspired Mormon settlement efforts for an American Zion, crusading
endeavors which, at their most grandiose, resembled imperial projects of Westward expansion.14
Separatism from mainstream culture in America is also its own tradition, having been a
frequent social tactic for embryonic movements contesting conventional Christianity and
forming new religions in America. Louis Hartz noted in his The Liberal Tradition in America
the existence of a deep strain of a “curiously Hebraic kind of separatism” that “saturated the
American sense of mission” and existed in tension with Christian universalism. Hartz perceived
6

this trope as a form of ethno-nationalist withdrawal from Europe, and in its specific notion of
chosen-ness, an exemption from the sort of global crusades that had typified Europe. The
historian of religion Philip Jenkins has described a more apocalyptic and internally contentious
conception of American separatism, asserting that “The doomsday theme has never been far
from the center of American religious thought. The nation has always had believers who
responded to this threat by a determination to flee the wrath to come, to separate themselves
from the City of Destruction, even if that means putting themselves at odds with the law and
their communities and families.”15 Similarly, the scholar of religion R. Laurence Moore observes
that new religious identities have emerged in America through a sense of antagonism. “[Many
Americans] gained that sense [of what is meant to be an American] by turning aspects of a
carefully nurtured sense of separate identity against a vaguely defined concept of mainstream
culture . . . New religions, which have often been linked to ethnic identifications, have served as
vehicles through which people have nurtured a sense of antagonistic culture.”16 Joseph would, in
a parallel with Hartz’s version of separatism, develop his own theological form of Hebraic
separatism as an integral part of a very American mission, one that would also contest the more
established theories of Christian universalism with a vision of his own. But similar to Jenkin’s
and Moore’s conceptions of separatism, Joseph’s form would be more explicitly apocalyptic, and
therefore antagonistic towards mainstream culture in lieu of helping to define it.
As the historian Dan Erickson has emphasized about the evolution of Mormon
distinctiveness and separatism, the epic battles in ancient America fought by the children of light
and darkness in Mormon myth prefigured conflicts with non-Mormons during the early decades
of the Church. “Smith and his early followers believed the Book of Mormon’s description of two
main factions – true Christians under a theocratic government, and atheists who waged war
7

against the righteous – prophesied the reality of their day . . . Written from a Christian prophet’s
perspective, dissent and pluralism were always destructive and evil.”17 Joseph’s prophecy of a
Zion for his people would have to be wrested from its current inhabitants in Missouri, and with
its militant rhetoric of damnation for non-Mormons, the early millenarian movement was
ideologically primed for conflict with “gentiles.” Erickson notes that “Viewed as the refiner’s
fire, persecution both fulfilled prophecy and was necessary prior to Christ’s return. This in turn
led to a siege mentality. When the Saints’ early mistreatment validated their dualist philosophy,
a cycle of apocalyptic belief and rhetoric led to additional persecution which further fed
millennial anticipation.”18 Persecution led to a deepening desire for separation, a place of refuge
in which the full doctrine of Mormonism could be safely revealed and its peculiar practices
safely performed. Separation, in turn, would provide the distance from legal authority for the
Mormon theocracy to usurp the individual rights for religious dissidents otherwise available in
Jacksonian America, and intensify the more authoritarian aspects of social power in Joseph’s
theocracy. That project, in his lifetime, would achieve its greatest degrees of political and social
control under the legal autonomy of the Nauvoo, Illinois city charter and then, after Joseph’s
death, in the Deseret Kingdom (the future state of Utah) on America’s western frontier.

These inherent elements of apocalyptic separatism and antagonism illustrate that the
emergence Joseph’s theocratic theology from its pluralist seedbed poses a challenge to pluralist
theories of a state of relative religious tolerance and comity in America, both on the theoretical
level and within certain American historical accounts. Robert Putnam and David Campbell’s
American Grace: How Religion Divides and Unites Us, for example, portrays America’s history
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of religious diversity as remarkably tolerant: “From its founding, America has had religious
tolerance coded in its national DNA. In saying this, we must recognize that at the time of the
Founding magnanimity towards different religions was contained in various Protestant sects . . .
the early years of the republic were informed by John Locke’s conception of religious
toleration.”19 Similarly, Samuel Huntington wrote in Who Are We?: The Challenges to
America’s National Identity that
The “separation of church and state” is the corollary to the identity of religion and
society. . . It was spectacularly successful. In the absence of a state religion, Americans
were not only free to believe what they wished but also to create whatever religious
communities and organizations they wished. As a result, American have been unique
among peoples in the diversity of sects, denominations, and religious movements to
which they have given birth, almost all embodying some form of Protestantism.20
If such tolerance is truly coded in American DNA as Putnam and Campbell suggest, then how
did a home grown anti-pluralist faith emerge from the diversity of tolerant Protestant sects? And
for Huntington’s premise that secular separation was the corollary to the very identity of
American religion, then why was the theocratic unification of state and religion integral to what
Bloom has labeled “The American Religion”?
The conventional shorthand for America’s Lockean arrangement links religious freedom
to tolerance as a both a guarantor and key component of liberal politics. As we shall investigate,
the whole liberal Protestant historical evolution of political theology from Luther to Locke
actually contains more complicated and rigorous qualifications for inclusion into the field of
religious tolerance, and has consistently sought to contain the very elements of revelation and
apocalypticism that Joseph would employ to break away from the liberal legacy of the
Reformation. Perez Zagorin in his How the Idea of Religious Tolerance Came to the West traces
the influence of religious thinkers like Erasmus, John Locke, John Milton and Thomas More in
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arguing that concern for the spiritual welfare of religion itself promoted norms of toleration and
allowed diverse Christian faiths to flourish together, yet a Protestant offshoot in a land of
unparalleled religious freedom declared all of Christianity an abomination and prophesied the
end of the “gentile” world.21 The political philosopher Elizabeth Pritchard, among others,
cogently argues that Locke’s conception of religious pluralism, and its extension of tolerance and
freedom, relies on the public circulation and scrutiny of religious doctrines, a sharp limit to just
how private a faith could be in order to gain tolerance, a qualification which is often forgotten in
conventional summaries praising America’s vaunted secular success.22 The theocratic
characteristics in Joseph’s political theology not only reintroduces us to those neglected
qualifications, but exposes the modern limits and deficiencies of religious tolerance, as well as
how theocracy can emerge from within a liberal consensus demanding its freedoms.

Theocracy and Theocratic Paradoxes
Whereas the political theorist Lucas Swaine defines theocracy as “a mode of governance
prioritizing a religious conception of the good that is strict and comprehensive in its range of
teaching,” I will define theocracy as a mode of governance that strictly prioritizes a religious
conception of ontological privilege as the ultimate source of sovereign authority.23 To clarify this
definition, I advance two qualifying explanations. First, only a select group within a theocratic
polity possesses the ontological privilege to a degree significant enough to make governing
decisions. A more egalitarian access to revelation or miracle sufficient for governing decisions
would diminish clear lines of authority, a quality that I will elaborate on in chapters one and four.
Second, the fluidity and adaptability of Joseph’s theology illustrates the difficulty of synthesizing
anything either comprehensive or doctrinaire in a theology being guided by ever shifting
10

“revelation adopted to the circumstance in which the children of the kingdom are placed.”24 As
will be discussed in chapters four and five, the pace of Joseph’s revelations placed doctrines and
even fundamental tenets in flux. The liberal attempt to discover an overlapping consensus with
such a protean faith is made more difficult by the assumption that it does in fact constitute a
comprehensive doctrine. The political theorist Sarah Song touches on the frequent oversight of
this aspect when she writes that certain identity groups “do not necessarily share a
comprehensive worldview,” an observation that should qualify assertions to the contrary
throughout political theory.25
In discussing how fluid Joseph’s political theology was, how secretive and slippery it
could appear, a caveat is in order: part of the paradoxical challenge that American theocracy
poses to liberalism is the contrast between the deep grounding of its claimed tradition and the
true dynamism of its doctrines and tenets. Joseph’s theology epitomized this paradox: one of his
first revelations declared that all other faiths were an “abomination,” later in his ministry Joseph
would proudly embrace religious liberty and declare that all faiths were welcome to be practiced
under his protection in Nauvoo. The early Mormon movement was strongly anti-Masonic in its
sacred texts and doctrines, the later movement covertly embraced Masonic membership and
ritual. Joseph stridently preached against abolitionism in 1836 and proposed abolishing slavery
as part of his presidential platform in 1844.26 Both the Book of Mormon and an early Church
commandment explicitly prohibited plural marriage, a later secret revelation commanded its
practice on pain of death. Joseph initially derided the “priestcraft” of established denominations,
promising that his faith offered a more egalitarian access to spiritual gifts and authority – before
beginning to “restore” complex orders of priesthood allegedly tied to ancient Israel. Joseph
would frequently praise the US constitution as being divinely inspired, and declare his fervent
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support of it, while his later proclamation of “The Government of God” (1842) and
Theodemocracy (1844) argued that republicanism was doomed, while his Theocratic Council
plotted to establish an autonomous kingdom that would shortly supersede the republic. While his
revelations were advertised as the word of God, Joseph would frequently edit them, sometimes
establishing a form of retroactive continuity with newer doctrines.27

Structure of the Dissertation
In investigating American theocracy’s historical origins and unique theological path
through American liberalism, chapter two will begin with European states closing down
revelations, a political necessity as the Bible became more democratically accessible, a
development that ultimately helped form the rough outlines of Lockean tolerance. From there I
will demonstrate how the Mormon antipathy to pluralism in all its forms was remedied by the
authority of a prophet promising the ‘true religion,’ a religion that paradoxically required the
liberties and freedoms of the American frontier in order to thrive.
Chapter three will examine the paradox that though Joseph perceived pluralism as a
spiritual and political catastrophe, American religious and cultural pluralism also equipped him
with the diverse cultural sources and materials to forge his own theological heterodoxies and
populist religious appeals. Pluralism was both opponent and resource, providing him with the
mythic resources to enact his own Exodus. In particular, 18th century occult millenarianism
would provide Joseph not only the appropriate eschatological stage for the emergence of “latterday” saints with a new covenant, but serve as a capstone between for the long-running
subcultural effort to unite the occult folk practices common in rural American and Joseph’s
family with a restored Christianity. At the conclusion of this chapter, I will return to Locke’s
12

political theology to see how these imaginative extravagances of Joseph’s apocalyptic theocracy
appears as a haunted iteration of the liberalism it seeks to overcome, in effect, a Lockean
nightmare.
Once I have established the historical roots of Joseph’s political theology and its
antagonistic symbiosis with Lockean liberalism, chapter four will investigate how it operates
within its host by engaging Joseph’s political theology with contemporary liberal theorists.
Through that theoretical engagement we can better grasp both the protean aspects of its
theocratic nature and how it participates in the rights and freedoms at the core of liberalism while
cultivating a secrecy and authoritarianism that operates outside of the peripheral vision of the
liberal state.
Chapter five will first recount how Thomas Hobbes and John Locke’s arguments
attempted to divorce disruptive religious concepts like the miracle and sacrifice from politics.
The theories of Hobbes and Locke helped to establish modern secular safeguards against
theocracy within liberalism, and in reaction, later theorists like Joseph de Maistre and Carl
Schmitt aspired to circumvent them in order to reconceive authoritarian political theology.
Joseph Smith would actually do so, and in this chapter I will demonstrate how his prophetic
authority was a form of Schmittian exceptional politics operating in 19th century America.
Chapter six details how, once Joseph was securely established in his theocratic city-state,
he more aggressively promoted the peculiar perogatives of his rapidly evolving theology in order
to form his own ethno-nationalist people out of the pluralist array. His antagonistic symbiosis
with American pluralism best functioned by fusing theocratic precepts analogous to those found
in Schmittian and Maistrean political theology with demands for religious liberty. The peculiar
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doctrines that made early Mormonism distinct from its Protestant origins struck against key
concepts of liberal political theory, and they overlapped in complex and subtle ways that
American pluralist society found difficult to legally regulate. Finally, I will diagnose some of the
idiosyncrasies of modern revelatory politics that Maistre and Schmitt did not have to confront in
their theories: how faith in revelation, when challenged by public skepticism, must remain
secretive to survive, and how, in chapter seven, the constant evocation of the sacred in quotidian
politics inevitably turns revelatory politics banal.

14

Chapter 1: Political Biography
“We have learned through sad experience that it is the nature and disposition of almost all men,
as soon as they get a little authority, as they suppose, they will immediately begin to exercise
unrighteous dominion. Hence many are called but few are chose.” – Joseph Smith, prophesying
from the Liberty Jail, March 20, 18391

Born in Vermont in 1805 and raised in a region of upstate New York where religious
revivals “by their very excess deadened a normal antipathy towards religious eccentricity,” 2
Joseph Smith claimed to have received his first vision of angelic prophecy in 1820.3 Subsequent
visions throughout the 1820s emboldened him to restore an Old Testament mode of testimony,
condemnation, and prophecy to an age of newspapers, daguerreotypes, and telegraphs. He
marries the former Emma Hale in 1825 and in September of 1827, he claimed to have extracted
golden plates with ancient hieroglyphics from a hill near Palmyra, New York while guided by an
angel.4 In between his first vision and the translation of the plates, his regional reputation as a
practitioner of folk magic led to a career as a “treasure-digger,” a searcher for buried gold or
magical artifacts, which ended in his being charged for fraud in Palmyra in 1826. Joseph
confessed in court records to using a “seer stone” to search for buried treasure, an adventure he
claimed to weary of.5
After abandoning money digging, Joseph’s most famous work, the Book of Mormon was
“translated” by him during 1827-28 from the gold plates, and in 1830 he formally organized his
small movement into the “Church of Christ of Latter Day Saints.”6 Joseph’s early Mormonism
was a religion rife with apocalypticism, in which its adherents are, literally, “Latter Day Saints”
steadily working toward the future Kingdom of God in America, and he compared his mission
15

and intended empire on earth to that of Mohammed, warning that he would spread his new faith
through the “the Alcoran or the sword.” He was, through the power of his revelation, a “rough
stone rolling” that would smash any country, opponent, or unjust law in his path, and whenever
he felt himself politically thwarted, his visions and proclamations invoked apocalyptic license.7
The backbone of the early church consisted of the initial “Three Witnesses” to the Book
of Mormon (Oliver Cowdery, Martin Harris, and David Whitmer), and the former Methodist
priest Sidney Rigdon, who all joined with Joseph in Kirtland Ohio after increasing controversy
and harassment in New York and a revelation from Joseph that instructed them to “assemble
together at the Ohio.”8 Missionary efforts spread rapidly throughout the United States, Canada
and Great Britain, and while visiting Jackson County, Missouri in July of 1831, Joseph would
later reveal that the site was the original Garden of Eden.9 The Mormon settlement to be built on
it would be “The City of Zion,” a “New Jerusalem” to serve as both a refuge for the Mormons at
the millennium, and the foundational site for the future Kingdom God where the Lord would
“consecrate the riches of the gentiles, unto my people.”10 At this stage of his ministry, Joseph
appeared to be primarily fixated on congregational and local control, seemingly uninterested in
the United States as a political entity or specific prophetic setting; the republic had no unique
place among the nations of the world in the first few years of his early apocalyptic schema.11 His
first revelations of the fiery demise of the American republic came in December of 1832, during
the South Carolina nullification crises, when he foretold a cataclysmic battle between Northern
and Southern states that would destroy the Union and engulf the world. When the crisis waned,
the prophecy was quietly suppressed for nineteen years, until Joseph’s successor, Brigham
Young, reintroduced it to great acclaim among the faithful in 1851 as a vision of the coming
Civil War.12
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Joseph prophesied that his latter-day Saints would soon rise to inherit America after the
corrupt and invidious republic had fallen. In the interim, his overarching political strategy
focused mainly on two tracks: advocating on behalf of greater religious liberty for him and his
persecuted people and the stealthier promotion of a proto-nationalist, and ultimately ethnoreligious, separation. This separation from an American society of largely Protestant pluralism
was all the more remarkable since the vast majority of his converts came from Protestant
denominations. (Joseph himself was raised in a household split between Presbyterianism and
Methodism.) The enmity towards these “Gentiles” was expressed in many revelations early in
the formation of the Church.13 Before Mormon settlers had even set out for the promised land of
Missouri, a revelation delivered in February of 1831 from Kirtland, Ohio declared: “For it shall
come to pass, that which I spake by the mouths of my prophets shall be fulfilled; for I will
consecrate the riches of the Gentiles, unto my people which are of the house of Israel.”14 In June
of 1831, about a month before Joseph arrived in Missouri, another revelation elaborated: “And
thus, even as I said, if ye are faithful, ye shall assemble yourselves together to rejoice upon the
land of Missouri, which is the land of your inheritance, which is now the land of your
enemies.”15 Arriving with such a millenarian assurance, the Mormon settlers were primed for
conflict with their new Missouri neighbors.16
After establishing Zion in Missouri, the main portions of the Mormon movement were
now divided between the border states of Missouri and Ohio, and local persecution grew in
response to expanding Mormon populations in both locales -- notably their growing political
power through block voting, antagonism over the issue of slavery (the Mormons were opposed),
commercial insularity, and the antagonistic rhetoric of repossessing the land of the gentiles for
the Mormon faithful.17 In 1832, Joseph and Rigdon were beaten, tarred and feathered in Ohio,18
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and mobs began to attack the Missouri settlements in early 1833, forcing the majority of
Mormons to abandon the state by the end of the year.19 This expulsion radicalized Joseph’s
politics, introducing a new focus in his thought and preaching on the limits of secular law to
contain religious authority, while new revelations promised divine retribution upon the Gentiles
for their apostasy and arrogance:
the Gentiles received the covenant . . . but the Gentiles have not continued in the
goodness of God, but have departed from the faith that was once delivered to the Saints,
and have broken the covenant in which their fathers were established; and have become
high-minded, and have not feared; therefore, but few of them will be gathered with the
chosen family. Have not the pride, high-mindedness, and unbelief of the Gentiles,
provoked the Holy One of Israel to withdraw His Holy Spirit from them, and send forth
His judgments to scourge them for their wickedness?20
The mob attacks in Missouri also convinced Joseph that though his own authority should
not be constrained by secular law, an appeal to the federal government was the only means to
redress the Mormon losses in land and property, and a revelation soon followed on August 6th of
1833, advising “the Saints to befriend constitutional law.”21 Bushman and R. Laurence Moore
note that from that point forward the Mormon’s public story focused much less on their saga of
new scriptures and dramatic revelations that superseded traditional Christianity, and far more on
the religious persecution they experienced at the hands of bigoted mobs. Joseph would complain
to visitors that “In this boasted land of liberty [the Mormons] were brought into Jeopardy, and
threatened with expulsion or death because they wished to worship God according to the
revelations of heaven, the constitutions of their country, and the dictates of their own consciences.
Oh Liberty, how art thou fallen!”22 The revelation in August 1833 also provided an increasingly
theocratic approach to secular law according to the Mormon historian Michael D. Quinn, one
that first theologically “established Mormonism as imperio in imperium – a religious sovereignty
within the civil sovereignty of the United States of America.”23 Three years after the founding of

18

his Church, Joseph already conceived of religious liberty as not merely a constitutional
protection bounded in the more conventionally liberal sense, but as a theocratic freedom for
greater autonomy for him and his Church. Throughout his ministry, Joseph ran into repeated
trouble with courts and local authorities, conflicts in which he frequently framed his opponents
as agents of Satan and his persecution as further evidence of his prophetic role.24 Guided by
Joseph, Mormons would contest the legitimacy of the state most frequently over issues of
Mormon counterfeiting and polygamy, but most directly over – notably during the Missouri War
and Joseph’s final arrest in June of 1844 – fears that secular law would arrest and unfairly try the
Prophet.25
Guided by a prophetic vision, Joseph briefly organized and led a militia force of nearly
200 called “Zion’s Camp” to “redeem” the holy land in Missouri in the spring of 1834, but
heavily outnumbered, fractious, and cholera-ridden, the small force headed back to Ohio with
shots unfired and much grumbling. The apparent defeat both precipitated an outbreak of open
dissent over the failed prophecy of reclaiming Zion and charges against Joseph’s inept leadership.
Simultaneously, those loyalists who stood by Joseph formed a tighter nucleus around the Prophet
that would become the core of his reorganized Church hierarchy.
Despite the discontent and growing fractures in the Missouri settlements, the local
economy prospered in Kirtland for three years during the national land speculation boom, and
the Mormon movement continued to grow until the financial crash of 1837, when debt and sour
business deals contributed to internal frictions. During the economic boom, Church elders had
acted on a revelation from Joseph to establish a Mormon-run bank in Kirtland, but since they
were unable to secure verifiable assets, the state of Ohio denied them a charter. Citing gentile
prejudice and God’s will, Joseph printed out currency notes regardless, calling his fraudulent
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institution an “Anti-Banking Company” and he appeared to believe that “his debts, along with
those of his followers, could be wiped out by merely printing these notes and using them to pay
creditors.”26 Joseph had prophesied that the bank would soon grow to consume all other banks
and “survive when all other should be laid to ruins,”27 and its crash during the panic of 1837
resulted in yet another schism, as well as his conviction for illegal banking and an outstanding
warrant for bank fraud in Ohio.28
Rigdon and Joseph fled from Ohio to Missouri to avoid creditors, lawsuits, and
unanswered warrants, but the struggling colonies in Missouri encountered the same frictions with
their neighbors as had the previous settlement ventures. The outside threats and internal
murmurings and divisions inspired the formation of the Danites among the loyalists in Missouri,
“a secret society, several hundred strong, organized in June of 1838, to drive out dissenters,
using violence when necessary.”29 Despite their efforts at secrecy, the Danites’ militant
reputation grew nationally during and after the Missouri War of 1838. Mark Twain would report,
almost four decades later, that it was open knowledge that these “Destroying Angels” were set
apart by the Church to conduct permanent disappearances of obnoxious citizen.”30 Even some of
the more sympathetic Mormon scholars, like Bushman, regard the Danites as “an example of
religious power run amok.”31
Danite veterans would later assist Joseph in the establishment of his theocratic Council of
Fifty, a secret cadre working towards building the post-apocalyptic Kingdom of God. The
formation of the Danites in the late 1830s presaged a political route the Mormons would
increasingly travel in Illinois in the early 1840s; that of “creating [their] own alternative civil and
political institutions as the basis of theocracy.”32 According to Fawn Broadie, justifications for
the formation of both the Danites and the Council of the Fifty emerged from Joseph’s revelations
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to organize and lead the elect in the final days, that “one man empowered from Jehovah has more
influence with the children of men than eight hundred million led by the precepts of men.”33
Though numerous Saints would testify that Joseph attended Danite meetings and that the
organization was established on the basis of his revelations, Joseph later denied explicit
knowledge of the organization and kept a low profile in founding and managing the Danites. A
mysterious British ex-patriate, Dr. Sampson Avard was their public founder and face. Avard
would lecture new recruits that “You have been chosen to be our leading men, or captains to rule
over this last kingdom of Jesus Christ,”34 and his apocalyptic rhetoric was not anomalous;
speaking of the intensifying conflict with their Missouri neighbors, Sidney Rigdon warned on
July 4th, 1838: “That mob that comes upon us to disturb us; it shall be between them and us a war
of extermination, for we will follow them, till the last drop of their blood was spilled, or else they
will have to exterminate us.”35 Marvin Hill finds that many Church elders were very much aware
of Danite “extravagances,” and he remarks that “it does not seem likely that in a town made up
of Mormons, where Smith’s word was law, that the Danites could have done very much without
Smith hearing about it from one of these men.”36 Michael D. Quinn argues that “Avard was a
stalking-horse” for Smith and Sidney Rigdon, and the Danite constitution specified that Smith
was the commander-in-chief.37
The consolidation of political power in Missouri around Joseph was too much for many
of his oldest allies within the Church hierarchy, and the remaining Book of Mormon witnesses
were excommunicated and warned by loyalists, many of them Danites, to flee the Missouri
settlements immediately, “or a more fatal calamity shall befall you.”38 Outside of Joseph’s own
family members, those early Church members who were most pivotal in certifying and
publicizing the Book of Mormon all quit the movement in the schisms of 1837 and 1838. After
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their defections, Joseph would become increasingly concerned with enforcing loyalty and
curbing apostasy.39
The rapidly growing Mormon population in Daviess County, Missouri, and their
penchant for bloc voting, led to skirmishes during local elections followed by the forcible
extraction of an affidavit of impartiality from a justice of the peace by Avard and a party of fifty
mounted Mormons.40 The justice complained of Mormon intimidation to a circuit judge and
another warrant was issued for Joseph’s arrest for allegedly masterminding the thuggery.
Concern over whether the Mormons would abide by criminal complaints resulted in the
mobilization of state militia, and a rapid exodus of Mormons from Daviess County, as tit-for-tat
vigilantism and plundering erupted on both sides.41 When a colonel of the Mormon militia
beseeched Joseph to stop the looting and march to war, Joseph replied that he was like the rough
stone rolling from Daniel’s prophecy, and would crush all enemy kingdoms in his path.42 A few
weeks later with crises worsening, the governor of Missouri, in a rhetorical echo of Rigdon’s
Fourth of July speech, declared that “the Mormons must be treated as enemies, and must be
exterminated or driven from the State if necessary for the public peace – their outrages are
beyond all description.” Bushman notes that the citizens of Northern Missouri were already
“fixed on expulsion” even before the governor’s legal sanction. 43

The Mormon War consisted of a series of small militia skirmishes, followed by a
massacre of roughly 20 Mormon settlers at Haun’s Mill on October 30th, which quickly
convinced Joseph to surrender to the superior forces of the state militia. He was charged with
treason, arson and murder.44 During the trial, Sampson Avard testified as a chief witness for the
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prosecution that Joseph had “compared the Mormon church to the little stone spoken of by the
Prophet Daniel; and the dissenters first, and the State next, was part of the image that should be
destroyed by this little stone.”45 Like Avard, the majority of the state’s witnesses were or had
been leading Mormons, and their testimony placed Joseph “squarely at the center of a plot to
erect an independent government that planned to wage war on the state of Missouri.”46 Denying
that the Danites were a legitimate part of his Church, Joseph blamed Avard for leading Mormons
astray, and would later repudiate them as “frauds and secret abominations.”47 Joseph, and those
Church leaders that did not turn state’s evidence against him, were confined to jail in Liberty,
Missouri for several months during the trial, but after a couple of failed attempts all of them
managed to escape in April of 1839 and flee to Nauvoo, Illinois.
While in the jail Joseph had written letters to his followers denying that he was a fallen
prophet, and oddly took the time to refute rumors of polygamy that weren’t germane to the
trial.48 He also resumed his lectures on the importance of religious liberty. “The Constitution of
the United States,” he enthused, “is a glorious banner; it is to all those who are privileged with
the sweets of liberty, like the cooling shades and refreshing waters of a great rock in a thirsty and
weary land.” Joseph wrote that he planned to keep the Constitution, for the Framers (though
Gentiles) were divinely inspired, and their work was of such tremendous importance that he
placed it between God and the Bible in a ranking of the sacred.49 Its best components,
particularly regarding religious liberties, were to be enhanced over time, built upon and
expanded through new prophecies.50 Joseph’s innovation in American political theology was to
nestle his exceptional politics within liberal arguments for liberty, rights, and privacy. He would
continually laude the constitution and its protections, declaring, “I am an advocate of
unadulterated freedom,” while covertly building a theocracy as an extension of that freedom.51
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Once free and settled in Illinois, Joseph was determined to win back some form of
reparations from the federal government for the persecutions Mormons had suffered. Joseph left
for Washington DC in late October, and on November 29th, accompanied by an Illinois
congressman, knocked on the door of the White House. According to his congressmen (later
Governor of Illinois) John Reynolds:
When we were about to enter the apartment of Mr. Van Buren, the prophet asked me to
introduce him as a “Latter-Day Saint.” It was so unexpected and so strange to me . . . that
I could scarcely believe he would urge such nonsense on this occasion to the President.
But he repeated the request, when I asked him if I understood him. I introduced him as a
“Latter-Day Saint,” which made the President smile.52
Despite this and another meeting two months later, Van Buren could only assure Joseph
that though his cause was just he could do nothing for the Mormons. To do so would put him in
conflict with the entire state of Missouri.53 Stung, Joseph turned to Congress, lobbying many
individual members, including a fruitless interview with Senator John C. Calhoun that turned
into an extended epistolary exchange on American political theory and the power of the federal
government to redress grievances in states.54 Calhoun was unpersuaded by Joseph’s attack on
states’ rights and his expansive view of federal power to overturn state laws that trample
religious liberty.55 Unable to win over Calhoun or any other substantive support, Joseph
temporarily retreated from the federal arena back to Nauvoo, Illinois. (Peter Barnett, Joseph’s
attorney in Missouri became the Governor of California, while a sympathetic Illinois judge,
Steven Douglas, would become the famous Senator and debating partner of Abraham Lincoln.)
Nauvoo, or “beautiful place” in Joseph’s understanding of Hebrew, was the last of his
holy cities, and the place where his theocratic thought and authority most thoroughly developed.
Having no faith in due process from the state of Missouri, and denied any possible federal
redress for his grievances, Joseph was now determined to protect his people and his ministry by
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“neutralizing any future opposition to Mormon settlements in Illinois.”56 Bloc voting and a and
well-connected new recruit, the roguish John C. Bennett, assisted Joseph in obtaining a unique
city charter for Nauvoo from the closely divided state legislature of Illinois, one that granted the
Mormons an unusual degree of municipal rights in relation to state law, particularly against outof-jurisdiction warrants, a key protection for the still fugitive Joseph and Sidney Rigdon.
Containing a curious clause for capacious executive legal interpretation, city officers were
empowered to "pass ordinances that contradicted state law, as long as those ordinances did not
conflict with the state or national constitution."57 Joseph believed that the charter granted him
expansive executive power, enough to nullify state and national law when he thought it
necessary to protect local autonomy and religious freedom: “I concocted it for the salvation of
the church, and on principles so broad, that every honest man might dwell secure under it
protective influence.”58
The city charter also granted the right to organize a “University of the City of Nauvoo”
and a Mormon militia, the Nauvoo Legion, supposedly under the ultimate command of the
governor, though Joseph was designated its commanding officer and “Lt. General.” The sheer
size of the sectarian militia, which quickly grew to the largest armed force in the state, “made the
prophet the focus of intense fear and hatred” among neighbors in Illinois.59 Joseph’s willingness
to trade the Mormon voting bloc for political favors did nothing to further endear him and his
people. Disdaining any ideological or partisan loyalties, he proclaimed “we care not a fig for
Whig or Democrat . . . We shall go for our friends, our TRIED FRIENDS, and the cause of
human liberty, which is the cause of God.”60 Vacillating between the parties only managed to
annoy both of them.61

25

From Nauvoo, a revelation in January 1841 commanded Joseph to write a proclamation
“to all the kings of the world . . . to the honorable president-elect [William Harrison], and the
high-minded governors of the nation in which you live, and to all the nations of the earth
scattered abroad.”62 Addressing them both “in the spirit of meekness and by the power of the
Holy Ghost,” Joseph was tasked with explaining the will of God to diverse political authorities
across the world. This revelation, like earlier ones, assumed an unbounded concept of sovereign
authority, but now secure in Nauvoo, it is far bolder in challenging political authorities to
listen.63 The following month, Joseph -- who had once prophesied that all other forms of
Christianity were an abomination -- enshrined protections for religious liberty in the Nauvoo city
ordinances, offering sanctuary to all faiths, and criminalizing the ridiculing of anyone’s religion
for up to a $300 fine and six months imprisonment, as judged by the city’s mayor.64 As noted by
the historian Patrick Mason, the statute “conveniently provided the first line of defense” against
dissenters for Nauvoo’s Mormon leadership.65
That July, Joseph wrote in the Mormon newspaper Times and Seasons that Mormon
political power, as guided by his revelations, had global sovereignty. “It has been the design of
Jehovah, from the commencement of the world, and is his purpose now, to regulate the affairs of
the world in his own time; to stand as head of the universe and take the reins of government.”66
Though busy applying God’s will to political matters of local and global import, Joseph found
time to declare bankruptcy in 1842, taking advantage of the brief legal window for a federal
bankruptcy law passed by the Whigs that would be repealed the next year.67
Not satisfied with the independence granted by the Illinois legislatures, in December of
1843 Joseph petitioned the US Congress to declare Nauvoo an autonomous federal territory so
that the empowered mayor (himself) could mobilize his militia and US troops in its defense.68
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While publically committing to maintaining national law and order, Joseph had been cavalier
about state laws regarding monogamous marriage since the mid-1830s, and in 1841 he quietly
informs the governing Church body, the Quorum of the Twelve, that plural marriage is a secret
commandment ordered by God to fully restore the ancient priesthood and deliver celestial glories
in the afterlife.69 Joseph weds another wife in April of 1841 and over the next two and half years,
marries at least another thirty women, ten of them already wed to other men.70 These were often
portrayed as Abrahamic tests of his closest disciples, proposals that they share their wives with
him in “celestial marriage.”71
Limits, when they did come, arrived from outside the Mormon community in Nauvoo. In
May of 1842, Joseph’s former chief aid and the Church’s First President, John C. Bennett, is
excommunicated, partly on allegations of sexual impropriety (his polygamy was apparently
freelance, unapproved by Joseph), and he retaliates with a nationally distributed exposé that the
Mormon elite are covertly practicing polygamy. Joseph denies this publically but continues to
expand the practice among his most trusted apostles in private. That March he secretly organizes
a theocratic Council of Fifty, an organization charged with: deciding which secular laws
Mormons should honor, initiating the grand enterprise of Western exploration and settlement,
and serving as a nucleus for the future government of the Kingdom of God to rule over all
temporal and spiritual affairs.72 In turn, the Council ordains him a “King, Priest, and Ruler over
Israel on Earth.”73 Though these various strategies of expansion were covert, not all of his more
grandiose plans were; already in October of 1842, Joseph had publicly proposed in a Mormon
newspaper to lead 100,000 Mormon soldiers and scouts into the American West for exploration
and settlement. 74
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Joseph sent ambassadors to Washington, DC, England, France, the Republic of Texas,
and Russia in March and April of 1844 with private instructions to coordinate Mormon interests
in establishing large colonies in Texas California and the Oregon territory. As he had
successfully played off Whigs against Democrats in Illinois state politics, so too was he ready to
repeat the strategy on the international stage by exploiting international rivalries for the advance
of his nascent kingdom.75 By January of 1844, confident in the political and military power he
had amassed, Joseph declares himself a candidate for President of the United States, and that
April he openly advocates for a:
Theodemocracy, where God and the people hold the power to conduct the affairs of men
in righteousness. And where liberty, free trade, and sailor's rights, and the protection of
life and property shall be maintained inviolate, for the benefit of ALL. To exalt mankind
is nobly acting the part of a God; to degrade them, is meanly doing the drudgery of the
devil. Unitas, libertas, caritas-esto perpetua! With the highest sentiments of regard for all
men, I am an advocate of unadulterated freedom.76
Mason asserts that this Mormon conception of freedom did not perceive “their
theodemocratic ideas as competing with the principles of American constitutional democracy,”
so much as “fulfilling them, in much the same way that Jesus taught that his gospel fulfilled, not
destroyed, the Jewish law.”77 Joseph’s more precise political expectations in seeking the
presidency that election year appear unclear. On one hand, in announcing his candidacy he
declared that if he were not elected the nation would be doomed.78 On the other hand, he
discussed his political possibilities with visitors in a slightly more practical tone, discussing how
much leverage was to be gained as a third party spoiler – at least for the election cycle of 1844.79
Joseph’s secret polygamist and theocratic practices were further publicized and
scathingly condemned by Mormon dissenters who had set up an opposition press in Nauvoo in
June of 1844. Their single issue effort, the Nauvoo Expositor, decried the “yoke of tyranny” that
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Joseph had imposed on the community along with his “complete apostasy” and monarchic
pretensions.80 The resulting scandal ignited another internal rebellion that Joseph sought to crush
through expulsion, censorship, and violence.81 After he ordered his loyal Nauvoo police force to
smash the printing press established by his rivals, the dissidents appealed to the state of Illinois
for legal redress, leading to another arrest warrant for the Prophet. Joseph flees for a day, relents,
then turns himself over to a state militia and is murdered by a mob while detained in a make-shift
jail in Catharge on June 27th. At the time of his murder the 39 year-old Joseph was not only
Prophet, Seer, Revelator and President of the Church of Latter Day Saints, but also judge of the
municipal court, Mayor of Nauvoo, “General” to over 5,000 troops, candidate for the President
of the Unites States, and the secret “King, Priest and Ruler” of a theocratic kingdom on the
American frontier that would survive almost five decades after him.82
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Chapter 2: American Theocracy and the Crisis of Pluralism

A growing body of academic scholarship has deliberated over how Western pluralism
will respond domestically to the theocratic drive in the various forms of radical Islam, but those
discussions, particularly within American political thought, have yet to thoroughly examine the
complexities of a home-grown form of theocracy.1 In the first half of the 19th century, out of the
most pluralistic Protestant society at that time, a self-described American Mohammed arose out
of Protestantism. Castigating all other forms of Christianity as an “abomination”, he threatened
that, if interfered with, “we will establish our religion by the sword. We will trample down our
enemies and make it one gore of blood from the Rocky Mountains to the Atlantic Ocean. I will
be to this generation a second Mohammed, whose motto in treating for peace was ‘the Alcoran
[Qu’ran] or the Sword.’ So shall it eventually be with us – ‘Joseph Smith or the Sword!’”2
Pluralism, as it developed in the North Atlantic world is in large part a reaction to the
threat of theocracy, a historical arrangement that was the antipodes of Lockeanism. In America,
pluralism permitted a wider array of religious diversity to thrive than in Europe. Ironically,
however, for the religious freedom granted by liberalizing state governments and the frontier
allowed for far greater expression from schismatic revelatory faiths with theocratic tendencies
than did the relatively tolerant states like England. In comparison, the sociologist John Hall has
written about Western Europe that, “two centuries after the beginning of the Reformation, the
book of prophecy was largely closed: both within establishment national religious confessions
and in heterodoxical religious movements, the range of permissible revision to religious doctrine
became circumscribed in ways that discouraged radical new messiahs from stepping forward.”3
Under the Westphalian system, it was European states themselves that assumed the delineation
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of internal pluralist arrangements and decided which disruptive churches and movements fell
outside the tolerable and could be subject to repression. Joseph, however, shows that in America
theocrats also arise in reaction to -- and from within – liberal pluralism, the very sort of liberal
accommodations that, with so little state oversight or interference, are supposed to foster
tolerance in the first place. As the political theorist Lucas Swaine acknowledges, intolerant new
religions still emerge from a tolerant society: “. . . new theocratic groups continually burgeon
forth in democratic societies as new flora in the simple pluralistic array.” 4
American theocracy is a different, more modern creature from its historical precedent in
Europe, and political theorists should take note because much of pluralist theory still retains that
first form as its imaginary other. As Andrew March writes, “I suggest a sympathy for theocratic
doctrines as traditions which rely in large measure on integrity and continuity.”5 Yet, traditions
in modern theocracy need not be time-honored, or reliant on integrity or continuity. The Mormon
scholar Richard Bushman has written that Joseph’s Mormonism debuted in the 19th century with
an “instant history,” an allegedly ancient tradition that was entirely novel and uniquely
American. A good deal of American political thought hasn’t really engaged with the real,
peculiar nature of modern theocracy and its curious relationship to pluralism. In showing through
the Mormon example how discontinuous, thoroughly modern, and inventively flexible theocratic
traditions can be we better understand its real relationship with pluralism.
The relationship between American theocracy and the pluralism that fosters it is a
uniquely synthetic one that blends authoritarianism with elements of the very pluralism it rejects,
and this antagonistic adaption is undertaken with the ultimate aim of superseding Lockean
pluralism. I call this relationship “antagonistic symbiosis.” In order to accommodate itself to the
dominant liberal order, Joseph’s theocracy introduces a form of democratic adaptability (e.g. in
31

its populist appeals) and doctrinal flexibility (as per what Bushman has labelled Mormonism’s
“instant history”) into a secretive priesthood hierarchy. This combination makes Joseph’s
theocracy appear paradoxical in its blending of modernity and the allegedly ancient, the
putatively egalitarian and the hierarchical, the apparently democratic and the deeply theocratic . .
. what Joseph would ultimately label his politics of “theodemocracy.”
What makes Joseph’s project authoritarian, what provides it a consistently anti-liberal
grounding, is its theocratic hierarchy with a revelatory prophet at its summit. It is the very
rigidity of its core priesthood organization that allows for such ideological flexibility and
nimbleness, traits that better equip it to strike against liberalism with demands for tolerance and
the liberal language of religious rights. As an authoritarian organizational structure spiritually
mobilized by apocalyptic visions, it bears a strong anatomical resemblance to the ideals of the
German conservative revolutionaries of Jeffrey Herf’s “reactionary modernism,” an analogy that
will be further developed in the chapters six and seven. In investigating American theocracy’s
historical origins and unique theological path through American liberalism, this chapter will start
with the political necessity of European states closing down revelations as the Bible became
more democratically accessible, a development that ultimately helped form the rough outlines of
Lockean tolerance. From there we’ll see how the Mormon antipathy to pluralism in all its forms
was answered by the authority of a prophet promising the “true religion,” a religion that
paradoxically required the liberties and freedoms of the American frontier in order to thrive.
Chapter three will examine the paradoxical phenomenon that though Joseph perceived
pluralism as a spiritual and political catastrophe, American pluralism also equipped him with the
diverse cultural sources to forge his own theological heterodoxies and populist religious appeals.
Pluralism was both opponent and resource, providing him with the mythic assets to enact his
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own Exodus. In particular, 18th century occult millenarianism would afford Joseph not only the
appropriate eschatological stage for the emergence of “latter-day” saints with a new covenant,
but also serve as a capstone for the long-running subcultural effort to unite the occult folk
practices common throughout rural American with a restored Christianity. At the conclusion of
this chapter, we’ll return to Locke’s political theology to see how these imaginative
extravagances of Joseph’s apocalyptic theocracy appears as a haunted iteration of the liberalism
it seeks to overcome, in effect, a Lockean nightmare.
Chapter four will investigate how Joseph’s political theology works against its host by
engaging Joseph’s political theology with contemporary liberal theorists. Through that
engagement we can better grasp both its theocratic nature and how it operates by asserting its
faith and participating in the rights and freedoms at the heart of liberalism, while cultivating a
secrecy and authoritarianism that operates outside of the peripheral vision of the liberal state.
A brief caveat: in discussing Joseph’s contestation of pluralism it is important to note at
the outset how he blurs the very axis of differentiation in American pluralism within his political
theology: political affiliation, ethnicity, religious choice, and even familial boundaries and lines
of descent all become melded in his effort to forge a tribal people out of the dislocation and
atomization of Jacksonian America. His early critiques of American pluralism applied to all of
the various forms of plural identity that he perceived to be in a confusing and fractious flux, and
his intended solution was to combine secular authority with religious power over a newly formed
people with a unique ethno-religious identity. This political theological strategy was a challenge
to the theories of John Locke, who, as will be discussed, sought to circumvent the deeper
attachments of religion in his political theology, to make Christianity an exercise of reasonable
faith, even allowing liberal subjects to change religion --denominations, really -- as easily as
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“fashion”. The Lockean subject is supposed to be a consumer of religion, while, in militating
against this perceived spiritual shallowness and the social atomization of the American frontier,
Joseph created an American millenarian tribe suffused with a divine mission.

From Luther to Locke: Opening the Gospel, Closing the Book on Revelations

The Protestant emphasis on evangelizing began with Martin Luther and his fervent belief
that sharing the real word of God would win over converts. This required an enhanced public
space for religious instruction, a church far different in setting and approach to commoners and
permissible discourse than that of Catholicism, one that would encourage an openness among
fellow Christians to share the gospel and preach it to others, the essence of what Luther referred
to as Christian liberty. The Bible was to be translated into vernacular languages to increase
knowledge of scripture and broadcast its good news. Given the importance of spreading
salvation and winning converts, the Latinate esotericism of the Catholic Church, so essentially
elitist, was rejected for open worship services and the printed, public circulation of Protestant
doctrine in local languages.
From an early Protestant perspective, the increasingly sophistic and mercenary
theological justifications for unscriptural practices, alongside the inherently aristocratic Catholic
priesthood, had corrupted and concealed the message of Christ’s salvation, obscuring the basic
right of Christians to access the divine behind pharisaic ritual. Luther preached that, “Not only
are we the freest of kings, we are also priests forever, which is far more excellent than being
kings, for as priests we are worthy to appear before God to pray for others and to teach one
another divine things.”6 Among true (reformed) Christians, a “priesthood of all believers” could
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all partake of their Christian liberty, which meant for Luther that the Word of God was not to be
mediated strictly through a priestly class, as the ministry was only “functionally, not
ontologically distinct.”7
At his most optimistic, Luther seemed to believe that simply hearing the real Gospel
would be enough to win over the fallen: “What man is there whose heart, upon hearing these
things will not rejoice to its depth, and when receiving such comfort will not grow tender so that
he will love Christ as he never could by means of any laws or works?”8 Cleansed of its Catholic
fripperies and defilements, the true message could be found by anyone who honestly searched
the Gospel for answers. For “the entire content of Scripture has been brought to light, though
some passages which contain unknown words remain obscure,”9 no real mysteries remain to be
explained. Therefore, the easily accessible Gospel should be taught to boys and girls, an early
form of public education.10
The almost monomaniacal fixation on scripture alone for salvation led Luther to rail
against outbreaks of revelation that distracted from Christ’s already completed message, as well
as the enthusiastic followings they attracted. In seeking to contain these outbreaks of fervor,
Luther would not be so fortunate with his former disciple Thomas Müntzer. Müntzer had studied
under Luther in the winter of 1517-18 but, believing that his mentor was both moving too
cautiously in reforming the Christian community and was far too deferential to the tyranny of
princely authority, Müntzer began to preach a radical proto-communist political theology
premised on the apocalyptic arrival of Christ’s kingdom in 1523.11 Luther first denounced his
former disciple in his Letter to the Princes of Saxony Concerning the Rebellious Spirit, and
sought to lure the millenarian revolutionary to Wittenberg to debate him, were he was confident
that “if the conflict was left to words alone, truth -- Luther’s interpretation of the Bible-- would
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win out.”12 At the center of the conflict was whether or not the message of the gospel, as
perfectly contained in the New Testament, could be seen as the authoritative word or God, or
whether it could be supplemented by further revelation, what Richard Marius refers to as “the
greatest single issue of the Reformation.”13 That Müntzer’s enthusiastic ministry could win
adherents among the peasantry drove Luther into one of his infamous furies, and when the
zealous movement erupted into the Peasant War of 1525, Luther viciously denounced them and
condoned the slaughter of the peasant army by an alliance of German princes. Müntzer was
captured, tortured, and made to renounce his millenarian heresies. 14
Luther’s advocacy of Christian liberty clearly had its heretical limits. Perez Zagorin
writes that before the modern development of religious freedom and tolerance, the Catholic
Church, Christian governments they were intertwined with, and the Protestant state churches that
broke from them, all utilized a “Christian theory of persecution” to warrant the repression of
dissenters and heretics. “Religious intolerance and persecution, therefore, were seen not as evils
but as necessary and salutary for the preservation of religious truth and orthodoxy and all that
was believed to depend on them. What chiefly rendered persecution commendable was a set of
doctrines and an underlying rationale that explained and justified it.”15 Though political
expediency and exhaustion following the devastation of religious wars were certainly necessary
factors in promoting guarantees of tolerance, Zagorin sees them as insufficient, asserting that the
continuing argument for toleration made by the most historically influential political theologians
of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, “was very largely inspired by religious values and
was fundamentally religious in character . . . in advocating a policy of peace and tolerance
toward religious differences, their supreme concern was the welfare of religion itself.”16
Zagorin’s historical account is premised on the supposition that the diverse Protestant sects,
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influenced by advocates of toleration, came to share overlapping conceptions of the fundamental
right to choose one’s faith, and that they steadily learned to tolerate the aggregate results of those
choices. Inverting the previous Christian theory of persecution, they came to emphasize
Protestant commonalities, overlook narrow heresies, and accept that “true religion” is already
tolerant. Or, as Locke put it in his A Letter Concerning Toleration, “. . . I esteem that Toleration
to be the Chief Characteristical Mark of the True Church.”17
In an argument that runs parallel to Zagorin’s, Elizabeth Pritchard asserts that Locke, in
lieu of simply erecting secular barriers to hive off religion into the private sphere as the
conventional understanding often adumbrates, actually attempted to make religion -- especially
his vision of a more liberalizing Christianity -- more worldly, more secular. His political
theology attempted to achieve the best of Christianity’s potential by endowing “humans, as the
property of the divine, with an inalienable transcendence that grounds rights, and promotes the
conversion of “religion” into persuasions and fashions, suitable for circulation, debate, and
judgment in the public sphere.”18 The locus for this circulation of doctrines, the place where they
could attempt to persuade, be debated and judged, would be “Locke’s religious marketplace.”19
Like Luther, Locke believed that the Word of God must be put into circulation, but given
the endless schisms and fragmentation of religious authority since the Reformation, he held no
hope for the Lutheran vision of a singular, coherent faith united by the Gospel, but a looser
consensus held together by the henotic sorting of the market. Pritchard places a disciplinary
market logic at the center of Locke’s political theology, wherein “(r)eligious claims are to be
placed in circulation, as other competing market goods and political claims are, and are to be
submitted to the discipline of public opinion.”20 For Locke, a corruption of the gospels, either
malign or through accidental religious error, would be culled over time through public airing as
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they were exposed to both individual critical reflection and collective judgment. Publicity on
doctrinal matters helped to ensure peace, for it was far superior “to have a religious position
aired and challenged than to have it fester, mislead, and mobilize resistance in private.”21
This movement away from religious esotericism and secrecy is fundamental to the
emergence of the modern public sphere, a “shift from norms of secrecy and privilege to appeals
to public opinion, the recognition of the right to petition the government, and printing’s
imposition of dialogical order on political (and religious) conflict.”22 Locke’s political theology
establishes the space for contentious religious debate within Protestant society, provided that the
interlocutors share the same sacred values of open-mindedness and toleration. As Pritchard
notes, “In other words, consensus about the truly sacred enables religious dissensus. Locke is
explicit and perhaps insistent that the consensus on which religious pluralism pivots is itself
religious.”23
Ancient theocracy lacked such consensus, its prioritizing of ecclesiastical law over civil
made it coercive, and Locke was convinced that such a particularized and inflexible form was
and should be relegated to the past. In his Letter on Toleration Locke characterized the:
commonwealth of the Jews . . . was an absolute theocracy . . . Now, if any one an shew
me where there is a commonwealth at this time, constituted upon that foundation, I will
acknowledge that the ecclesiastical laws do there unavoidably become a part of the civil,
and that the subjects of that government both may and ought to be kept in strict
conformity with that Church by the civil power. But there is absolutely no such thing
under the Gospel as a Christian commonwealth.24
Dismissive of the possibility of a Christian commonwealth attempting to mimic the outmoded
ecclesiastical form of Hebraic theocracy, Locke was far more concerned about the threat of a
different form of theocracy, that of intolerant sects.
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Locke’s Intolerables
Locke’s notion of a rough religious consensus around sacred notions of tolerance requires, not
the retreat into a reserved or secretive of strictly private practice, but openness to scrutiny.
Public argument over religious doctrine and individual revelation will weed out error and should
keep variances narrow, and therefore more civil. Accordingly, all sects should be inquired into
and judged, a level of collective review and market discipline far more intrusive than merely
“private” religion. As Locke wrote in Human Understanding:
To break in upon the Sanctuary of Vanity and Ignorance, will be, I suppose, some Service
to Humane Understanding: Though so few are apt to think they deceive, or are deceived
in the Use of Words; or that the Language of the Sect they are of, has any Faults in it,
which ought to be examined or corrected . . . I have . . . endeavoured to make it so plain,
that neither the inveterateness or the Mischief, nor the prevalency of the Fashion, shall be
any Excuse for those, who will not take Care about the meaning of their own Words, and
will not suffer the Significancy of their Expressions to be enquired into.25
A sect’s willingness to share its doctrines, and perhaps be corrected, is the frequently
forgotten price of admission for what Martin E. Marty has called the “compact of mutual
tolerance” in American religion, a compact that -- if true to its Lockean derivation -- cannot
function if one sect is secretly intolerant of the rest, or, if in its secrecy, other religious sects are
unaware of what they’re asked to be tolerant of.26 Locke, in his Letter Concerning Toleration,
listed those intolerables to be excluded from the compact, first describing the obviously immoral
ones that public opinion could easily weed out:
No Opinions contrary to human Society, or to those moral Rules which are necessary to
the preservation of Civil Society, are to be tolerated by the Magistrate. But of these
indeed Examples in any Church are rare. For no Sect can easily arrive to such a degree
of madness, as that is would think fit to teach, for Doctrines of Religion, such things as
manifestly undermine the Foundations of Society, and are therefore condemned by
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Judgment of all Mankind: because their own Interest, Peace, Reputation, every Thing,
would be thereby endangered.27
Note that for Locke, the embrace of dangerous doctrines that risk reputation and openly defy
public opinion, the “Judgement of all Mankind,” was evidence enough of a degree of madness
that no sect could easily arrive at. Openly apocalyptic sects of the type that disrupt civil society
and threaten the public peace are deemed rare, an odd blind spot for a man who had lived
through the English Civil War and Commonwealth and must have witnessed the millenarian
militancy of many sects such as the Ranters, the Diggers, Fifth Monarchy Men and
Muggletonians.28 Even more dangerous, though, are those sects that traffic in deceit:
Another more secret Evil, but more dangerous to the Commonwealth, is, when men
arrogate to themselves, and to those of their own Sect, some peculiar Prerogative,
covered over with a specious shew of deceitful words, but in effect opposite to the Civil
Right of the Community. . . We cannot find any Sect that teaches expressly and openly,
that men are not obliged to keep their Promise; that Princes may be dethroned by those
that differ from them in Religion; or that the Dominion of all things belongs only to
themselves. For these things, proposed thus nakedly and plainly, would soon draw on
them the Eye and Hand of the Magistrate, and awaken all the care of the Commonwealth
to a watchfulness against the spreading of so dangerous an Evil. But nevertheless, we find
those that say the same things, in other words.29
Locke here is most likely referring to the threat posed by Catholicism, but his criteria for
inclusion point out the potential problems secretive sects pose for his ideas of tolerance and
pluralism. After arguing so strongly for the necessity of prohibiting magistrates from
interrogating diverse sects about the tenets of their faith, under what authority should they now
intervene to uncover sacred secrets?30 And if the sleuthing task were to be left to civil society
alone before it could levy intolerance on these intolerant and subversive faiths, just how is the
public supposed to first discover their true doctrines and intentions without official authority?
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Locke’s arguments for tolerance and Protestant pluralism would initially find their fullest
implementation in America, while European states continued to patrol the boundaries of
toleration and heresy, repressing those sects or individuals that threatened the peace. John Hall
notes that, after Puritan Revolution in England and its aftermath, and the revocation of the Edict
of Nantes in France, both states kept a close watch on Protestant schisms, wary of the contagion
of apocalyptic enthusiasm.31 By the time Tocqueville reached America, he discovered no such
state oversight necessary, for “no religious doctrine displays the slightest hostility to democratic
and republican institutions.”32 Among the “innumerable” sects in America Tocqueville
encountered variations of worship “in their own peculiar manner,” but that all of them, just like
Locke had dreamed, “preach the same moral law in the name of God,” and that “(m)oreover, all
the sects of the United States are comprised within the great unity of Christianity, and Christian
morality is everywhere the same.”33 Tocqueville too was dismissive of personal revelation, but in
believing that the historical advance of democracy was clear enough to show where God’s will
lay, he did not deem it a real danger: “It is not necessary that God himself should speak in order
that we may discover the unquestionable signs of his will” but modern men should learn “by
attentive observation and sincere reflection, that the gradual and progressive development of
social equality is at once the past and the future of their history, this discovery alone would
confer upon the change the sacred character of divine decree. To attempt to check democracy
would be in that case to resist the will of God.”34 As noted by Steven Harper, during
Tocqueville’s nine-month sojourn in America from 1831 to 1832, in which he could find no
major variations among the “innumerable sects” that thrived under democracy, Joseph dictated
more than fifty revelations to his increasingly peculiar, theocratic Church.35
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Having missed the quickly growing Mormon Church in Ohio and Missouri, Tocqueville
was not to know the degree to which “the American Religion” loathed the cacophony of
denominations, parties, and voluntary associations that made up the raucous pluralism he so
praised. In Joseph’s mind, the proliferation of sects led to confusion and apostasy, a plan
hatched by Satan to divide the Church. As the Mormon historian Marvin Hill remarks, “in
opposing the voluntary agencies of reform in America, the Saints set themselves against those
institutions which Alexis De Tocqueville said were indispensable to a democratic society where
individualism had become extreme. In denouncing the means by which a democratic society
achieved its democratic ends, the Saints were demonstrating their distaste for democracy
itself.”36

“What Is To Be Done?”: The Search for True Spiritual Authority
Joseph’s theocratic drive against pluralism began with his youthful search for true
religious authority among many competing denominations. He was to discover that the type of
authority he sought was dissipated long before his birth in 1805. Christianity in America was
already plural and decentralized at the founding of the republic, for the Revolution had severed
the authority of the Church of England from those states where it had been established in
colonial times, while in parts of New England the Congregational Standing Order had long
established dissident denominations as their state religions. A singular, coherent national faith
was already impossible during the writing of the constitution.37 The already tenuous ties
between church and state frayed further when Baptists in Vermont successfully disestablished
the Standing Order in 1807 on the basis of religious discrimination, and by 1818, only
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Massachusetts bothered to maintain an established state religion, a distinction it held until
1833.38
Disconnected from the last vestiges of official state authority, American religion became
far more voluntary, an increasingly personal choice influenced by spiritual yearning, aspirational
community, and desired status. American Christianity constituted the freest marketplace of faith
in the Protestant world, one given to constant innovation, denominational schism, and -- with so
many churches making similar salvific assertions -- an increasingly populist competition that
continually vitiated claims to any single sect possessing a unique spiritual authority.39 Amid the
eruption of radical sects and eccentric revivalists emerging out of the Second Great Awakening
came a “widespread disdain for the supposed lessons of history and tradition, and a call for
reform using the rhetoric of the Revolution.” Under these centrifugal social pressures there was
no definable national center of Church authority left, only many counterestablishments vying for
souls and greater glory.40
In an era where local religious instruction still comprised the most formal and rigorous
educational experience over any other state or social institution in molding the worldviews of the
mass public, the intense religious competition was “not merely a clash of intellectual and
theological differences, but a social struggle with power and authority.”41 Overlapping with the
rise of Jacksonian democracy, political and religious issues of the Second Great Awakening
often merged, and the generalized sense of the arrival of truly radical times led many Americans
of diverse denominations to ponder the coming of the Millennium.42 The historian Nathan O.
Hatch has described the era as a “period of religious ferment, chaos, and originality unmatched
in American history,” a time in which the traditional claims to religious authority could not
weather “such a relentless beating.” 43 For religious dissidents and many revivalists, the ceaseless
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challenges to spiritual authority revealed that the theological foundation of predominately
Protestant America was so much shifting sand, and the very viability of the young republic
seemed threatened by a spiritual anarchy.
Against this unprecedented degree of insecurity, upheaval and social disintegration,
Joseph Smith and his apostles saw the pluralism of what they termed the “the Gentile world” as
promoting confusion and infidelity. Pluralism, is all its social aspects and competing
associations, was “devoted to destruction” in the words of the Mormon apostle Oliver Cowdery,
and the Saints believed they could impose safety and salvific certainty through a new gospel
declaring the one true faith.44 That faith would be a testament of such authority and strident
finality that all other religions and associations would soon join or be destroyed. No religion,
indeed no voluntary portion of civil society, would long stand against Mormonism and its divine
mission. According to the Mormon historian Marvin Hill, by “opposing voluntary associations
the Saints were repudiating some of the fundamental ways in which the developing democratic
society functioned.”45 Mormon opposition to religious pluralism was textually supported in The
Book of Mormon by historical scriptures detailing how divergent faiths led to a civil war among
the ancient tribes of America -- the spiritual and prophetic forerunners to the modern Saints. The
originally righteous tribe of Nephites is described as being continually beset by internal
disintegration and schisms; their existence endangered by heresies and enemies within far more
than it was by foreign invasion.46 The Mormon dread of the chaos unleashed by ungodly
pluralism was matched by its opposite, a certainty that all godly aspects of civil society were
soon to be subsumed under a millenarian unity through the Mormon faith, an apocalyptic vision
described by the Book of Mormon scribe and apostle Martin Harris in 1832 thus:

44

Within four years there will not be one wicked person left in the United States; . . . the
righteous will be gathered to Zion . . . and there will be no President over these United
States, after that time.
I do herby assert and declare that in four years from the date whereof [September] every
sectarian and religious denomination in the United States will be broken down, and every
Christian shall be gathered unto the Mormonites, and the rest of the human race shall
perish.47
As Hill has argued, against the many choices of religious pluralism available during the
Second Awakening in conjunction with the expansion of Jacksonian democracy, the theocratic
tenets of Mormon political theology that decried and prophesied the imminent end of political
and religious pluralism demonstrated “their distaste for democracy itself.”48 Out of the Mormon
quest to restore the true gospel of the primitive church came the imperative that “godly men must
rule. When they do not society is imperiled.”49
At the center of that imperative, as prophet of God’s new testament and “revelator” of his
will, was Joseph Smith. In 1832 Joseph recorded his recollection of the spiritual struggles
leading to his first vision when he was fifteen years old.50 As the Mormon scholar Terryl Givens
writes, “The Mormon emphasis on exceptionalism is traceable to the first recorded spiritual
experience of the young Joseph Smith. Long before he ever heard the word Mormon, or had an
inkling of what his life or ministry would stand for, he learned what he was to be set against.”51
Experiencing the enthusiasms unleashed by regional revival meetings -- and the frequently
riotous violence over religious disputes that followed -- had ignited an inner agony in Joseph.
His family, with its long history of religious seeking, was split at the time among Presbyterians
and Methodists, and Joseph knew firsthand how the “great excitement” of the era created “great
uneasiness” owing to the “confusion and strife among different denomination.”52 The Smiths,
having been defrauded in Vermont, and struggling with successive crop failures and dubious getrich-quick schemes in Palmyra, New York, were denied the consolation and guidance of an
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authoritative religious voice, remaining bitterly confused and socially detached by the cacophony
of faiths sweeping the regions.53 Despite the “great zeal manifested by the respective clergy” of
the competing revivals, Joseph noted that the ardor of new converts would quickly fade as they
drifted off to different sects and “soon a scene of great confusion and bad feeling ensued—priest
contending against priest, and convert against convert; so that all their good feelings one for
another, if they ever had any, were entirely lost in a strife of words and a contest about
opinions.”54 Joseph wrote that as a young man:
My mind at times was greatly excited, the cry and tumult were so great and incessant . . .
In the midst of this war of words and tumult of opinions, I often said to myself: What is
to be done? Who of all these parties are right; or, are they all wrong together? If any one
of them be aright, which is it, and how shall I know it? . . .
After lengthy prayer and meditation, Joseph ventured out into the woods alone to seek answers.
There he encountered two angelic “Personages, whose brightness and glory defy all description,”
one of whom instructed that among the many Christian denominations available to him, Joseph
was to abstain from them all:
I was answered that I must join none of them, for they were all wrong; and the Personage
who addressed me said that all their creeds were an abomination in his sight; that those
professors were all corrupt; that: “they draw near to me with their lips, but their hearts are
far from me, they teach for doctrines the commandments of men, having a form of
godliness, but they deny the power thereof.
He again forbade me to join with any of them; and many other things did he say unto me,
which I cannot write at this time. . . . It seems as though the adversary was aware, at a
very early period of my life, that I was destined to prove a disturber and an annoyer of his
kingdom; else why should the powers of darkness combine against me? Why the
opposition and persecution that arose against me, almost in my infancy? 55
Though Joseph’s faith and political theology was born amid the Lockean pluralism of
American Protestantism, from his first vision he rejected the normative traditions of Christianity
and with it, the original bases for Lockean consensus. His rejection was premised on
reintroducing prophesy and miracle as realities suitable for political discourse, a sphere of
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contention where Locke’s efforts to forge a more reasonable religion had hoped to excise it.56
Prophecy and miracle returned to the world because true Christianity was being restored by
Joseph and his apostles, and with this restoration came an alternative history for the true Church
that wends its way from ancient Israel through ancient tribes in America before culminating in
the Golden Plates in upstate New York. The major schisms within historical Christianity (Roman
Catholic, Eastern Orthodox, Western Protestantisms) all deeply identify with a common Biblical
tradition that encompasses the apostolic era and the early Church of at least the first four
ecumenical councils, traditions Mormonism’s instant history circumvented and dismissed.
Generations of irenic theologians from Sebastian Castellio to John Locke had attempted to forge
some cross-sectarian agreement on creedal fundaments as the basis of tolerance.57 Early
Mormonism’s extirpation of these common roots of faith, while boldly asserting the titular claim
to Christianity, poses a radical discontinuity with the historic confessions and the politics
informed by them. By dramatically rejecting the foundations of Western Christianity, Joseph’s
theology steps outside the “consensus about the truly sacred [that] enable dissensus” that forms
such a convivial basis within Locke’s political theology.58 Joseph would later comment that it
was obvious to him that, “if God had a church it would not be split up into factions.” The
incessant factionalism tolerated by American Christianity raised the very question for the
discomfited as to whether God had a Church at all.59 Protestant pluralism’s cultivation of, even
reliance on, such Satanic uncertainty was a sure sign that all other confessions were corrupt
abominations. 60
The testimonials of many Mormon converts follow Joseph’s autobiographical themes of
uncertainty, spiritual seeking and ultimate revulsion with the pandemonium of contending faiths
preaching their divergent methods of salvation.61 But with government’s firm disinclination to
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intervene with any manner of official church, the restoration of singular religious authority could
no longer be a top down imposition as it had been throughout so much of European Christianity.
Paradoxically, while castigating the voluntarism intrinsic to the new spiritual marketplace of
American Protestantism, and railing against the democratization of American Christianity,
Joseph’s young church won over its adherents voluntarily, often through promises of a more
democratic access to the sacred.62 The Book of Mormon attracted many of its early followers
through attacks on social injustice, inequality, and the professional clergy, and by promising
them the true Christian priesthood to all adult males who joined. Thematically, according to the
historian Nathan Hatch, the Book of Mormon is primarily a work of “profound social protest, an
impassioned manifesto by a hostile outsider against the smug complacency of those is power and
the reality of social distinctions based on wealth, class, and education;”63 a new gospel that links
the splintering of faiths to social stratification, injustice and repression.
Early in the Book of Mormon, the Book of Nephi declares that there is only one true
church, and all the other factions found on Earth are actually of a “great and abominable” church
founded by Satan.64 As the good, light skinned proto-Christian tribe of American Jews, the
Nephites, were, at the initial reception of the one true gospel, stridently anti-pluralist, for “dissent
and diversity were always atheistic and destructive.”65 Appearing to borrow heavily from
excerpts from the biblical prophecies of Isaiah and Malachi, the Book of Mormon, depicts the
righteous prophet Mormon, in the dying days of Nephite civilization, prophesizing the
apocalyptic judgment of God’s wrath upon the wealthy, arrogant and educated.66 Mormon’s
condemnation comes after Satan’s triumph, for the Nephites have backslid, and their once just
and noble society is infiltrated by apostasy, unequal riches, and a plague-like proliferation of
merchants, lawyers and:
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many officers . . . the people began to be distinguished by ranks, according to their riches
and their chances for learning . . . And thus there became great inequality in all the land,
insomuch that the church began to be broken up. . . Now the cause of this iniquity of the
people was this – Satan had great power, unto the stirring up of the people to do all
manner of iniquity; tempting them to seek power, and authority, and riches, and the vain
things of the world.67
While presented as a history of ancient America, Marvin Hill writes that The Book of
Mormon’s “prime purpose was to warn Americans in the 1830s.” The ancient peoples of
America had once been given the true gospel, but wealth, social division, and sectarianism – the
temptations of Satan – had led them to ignore the message of godly prophets and destroy
themselves.68 Satan’s most effective agents in sowing discord, in ancient times and in 19th
century America alike, are the competing clergy and their churches, as Mormon laments: “O ye
wicked and perverse and stiffnecked people, why have ye built up churches yourselves to get
gain?”69

A Modern Zion on the Frontier: The Paradoxes and “Contraries” of an American
Theocracy
Radical in its critique of social stratification and inequality and novel in its peculiarly
American spiritual geography, Joseph’s new gospel and faith claims to be ancient in its origins.
Writing of public and Mormon perceptions of Joseph’s Saints in 1833, Richard Bushman notes,
that “(t)hough organized less than three years before, Joseph’s new religion felt old. The Saints
had an instant history.”70 ‘Instant history’ provides a deft term for Joseph’s eclectic tradition, his
daring fusion of innovation with a claim to an Adamic/Abrahamic lineage already declared by
Jews, Muslims, and Christians. Thematically quite similar to the diverse American anti-modern
19th century cultural projects analyzed by Jackson Lears in his No Place of Grace, Joseph’s
49

Saints, “long(ed) for a regeneration at once physical, moral, and spiritual,” and sought to escape
a disenchanted and venal American liberalism in an alternative world of a refounded primitive
church. In its tremendous flexibility and dynamism, its rapid alterations of protest and
accommodation, the alleged tradition of Joseph’s instant history was also “unstable, [and]
ambivalent” in its contestations of the hegemonic culture.71
Antagonistic encounters, a constant striving for greater enlightenment, and abrupt shifts
in perspective and position were for Joseph not only descriptions of his character development,
but, according to Mormon scholar Terryl Givens, “his intellectual modus operandi: exploring the
limits, challenging conventional categories, and dynamic engagement with the boundaries – all
in the interest of productive provocation. Or, as he said more simply, shortly before his death,
‘by proving contraries, truth is made manifest.’”72 In their ceaseless acquisition of spiritual and
worldly knowledge, Joseph’s Saints are to never rest upon their halos but – as “Faustian
strivers”-- constantly pursue ever higher degrees of enlightenment and glory . . . wherever to be
found.73 Even though the “larger world was still a corrupt Babylon,” Givens notes that, “Joseph’s
open eclecticism (‘we will claim truth as ours wherever we find it’) meant some borrowings
were not only allowed, but mandated.”74
Propelled by these paradoxical imperatives, early Mormon alterity rapidly vacillated
between political moments of absolutist condemnation and salvific exclusivity with campaigns
for more members, inclusion, and religious rights. Prophecies of America’s imminent
apocalyptic downfall were mingled with Joseph’s 1844 national campaign for the American
Presidency; secret Old Testament prophecies for God’s elect were publicized through
broadsheets and newspaper interviews; condemnations of factionalism were quickly superseded
by agile machine politics and bids for Mormon block votes among Whigs and Republicans; and
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the sect’s founding antipathy for legal guarantees of pluralist religion and their reactionary
privileging of God’s harsh commandments over man’s dissolute laws would be hybridized with a
growing devotion to the Constitution. Initially, Joseph had neglected the relevance of
Constitution as an inconsequential part of the soon-to-be destroyed political system of the United
States, but after the mob violence and extralegal persecution of the Mormon during the Second
Missouri War, he switched tactics and embraced religious rights as the best earthly hope for the
safety of his ministry and people.
Imprisoned for treason against the state of Missouri in March of 1939, Joseph wrote that
the great appeal of the Constitution was that it “garantees to al parties sects and demomimations
and clases of religion equal and coher[ent and] indefeasible right”: “Hence we say that the
constitution of the unit[ed] States is a glorious standard it is founded [in] the wisdom of God it is
a heavenly banner it is to all those who are privileged with the sweats of its liberty like the
cooling shades and refreshing waters of a greate rock in a thirsty and weary land.”75 Yet, free in
Illinois three years later, Joseph would write in a newspaper article entitled “The Government of
God” that all the various forms of the governments of men “have in their turn been raised to
dignity and prostrated in the dust. The plans of the greatest politicians and the wisest senators,
and most profound statesmen have exploded . . .” and the United States, “which possesses
greater resources than any other, is rent from center to circumference, with party strife, political
intrigue and sectional interest.”76 The theme of factionalism and destruction had re-emerged,
with no mention this time of the constitution or rights. After reciting Biblical figures who God
had guided or instructed in governing, Joseph once more concluded on an apocalyptic note that
“every effort [to promote peace and happiness] has failed; every plan and design fallen to the
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ground; it needs the wisdom of God, the intelligence of God, and the power of God to
accomplish this.”77
In his paradoxical political and cultural blending of mythic tradition and modernity,
Joseph’s political theology resembles not only Lears’ American antimodernism, but Jeffrey
Herf’s study of German 20th century ‘reactionary modernism’. Analogous to Herf’s subjects and
their Weimar-era mix of Spenglerian doom, Nietzschean transcendence, and engineering
expertise, Joseph’s utopianism combines a very American sense of optimistic futurology
promising the ascent of man to godhood (theosis) with a doom-laden reaction predicated on a
retreat to Zion to ride out the destruction of the present republic. These seemingly contrary
elements were necessary in order for the Mormon movement to gain, first, adherents as a distinct
faith in an open marketplace of religion; and second, political and legal traction, as an
institutionalized Church with a unique state-granted charter, building a theocratic city-state in
Illinois. The legal and political space for this venture, though, were uniquely American and here
we see Lears’ American context where such overlapping spaces did not exist for Herf’s
Germany. Joseph’s theocracy thrived off a cultural symbiosis with American liberal pluralism
and the open spaces free from a central government concerned with religious disruption freedom
as in Europe. In his Apocalypse: The Empire of Modernity, John Hall writes of European states
after the Reformation that,
Catholic, Protestant and mixed states all increasingly took up the containment of religion
by regulating and sometimes administering it, and they did so in way that eventually
undermined the most intense apocalyptic doctrines. In the long term, two centuries after
the beginning of the Reformation, the book of prophecy was largely closed: both within
establishment national religious confession and in heterodoxical religious movements, the
range of permissible revisions to religious doctrine became circumscribed in ways that
discouraged radical new messiahs from stepping forward.
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The experimental space required to reintroduce prophecy into Christianity and permit
Joseph to step forth as a “radical new messiah” could only emerge out of the religious pluralism
he sought to overcome with his theocratic religion. "The American Religion," born of America's
vaunted religious liberty, promises a path to godhood once forged by the American Adam (out of
an Eden now called Missouri) while being governed by an authoritarian institution with
theocratic designs. In contrast, European states, with their official churches and willingness to
"regulate" and sometimes "administer" contentious religion, were much more likely to contain
messianic disruptions (e.g. the British state put the highly eclectic 19th century prophet Richard
Brothers in an asylum),78 while in America, the most pluralistic of early modern nations,
religious freedom produces the last serious theocratic challenge to the state (two Mormon wars
and the Deseret Kingdom), before being ultimately assimilated after the mob murder of its
founder and decades of coercive regulation. For this reason (and hewing closer to Lears’s antimodernism than Herf’s reactionary one) Joseph’s revelatory faith, for all its violence and
separatism, tied itself much more closely to America and modern liberalism, and it particular
evolution resembles a form of antagonistic symbiosis more than the steadfastly oppositional
modernity conceived of by Herf’s conservative revolutionaries. During Joseph’s life, and that of
his successor, Brigham Young, the most effective space to balance the demands of greater
autonomy and the proximity necessary to symbiotically tap mainstream energies and potential
recruits was the frontier.
On the frontier, Joseph could attempt to reconcile the theological mandates for
independence and universalism. At times he was quite clear in his desire to cut the ties of his
people from the corruption of American society, as in his statement in August of 1844 that “it
was my endeavor to so organize the Church, that the brethren might eventually be independent of
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every encumbrance beneath the celestial kingdom, by bonds and covenants of mutual friendship,
and mutual love.”79 Yet, Joseph also inspired the Mormon obsession with genealogy, the ritual of
baptisms for dead non-Mormons, and a phenomenal missionary zeal that counterbalances
Mormons’ deep sense of peculiarity and autonomy “with a theology, rituals and research
programs that aspire to universal integration.”80 Mormonism, though sprung from American
soil, is prophesied in the end times be the universal faith for not just America but the world.
Until then, the more pragmatic and prosaic accommodations with modernity meant that
life on the frontier could never fully detach itself from the material strivings of the Jacksonian
era. In their more independent mode, the early Mormons received from Joseph commandments
to pool resources and distribute their goods in communistic endeavors overseen by the Church
elders. As the movement grew across New York, Ohio and Missouri, the church organization
strained to regulate its communal economy, and the relative prosperity that benefitted from the
booming national economy was followed by another revelation loosening the bonds of the
United Order.81

Revolt against the Clergy

Promises of millenarian revolution of behalf of the poor found in Old Testament
prophecies were repeated and occasionally elaborated upon in the Book of Mormon. Given the
socially radical themes of past and present prophecies, the mainline clergy’s smug denial of
living prophecy and God’s power to still work miracles in the modern world seemed to Mormon
eyes to be part of a monstrous conspiracy.82 From their perspective, the mainline American
clergy still clung to its position of minor gentry in Jacksonian America as an aristocratic vestige
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that shouldn’t have survived the Revolution.83 Similar to Luther’s revolt against the Catholic
priesthood in its bill of particulars, American priests and the churches they served were
castigated by Mormons as heretical, obsolete, but still capable of orchestrating phenomenal
deceit to maintain power, thereby denying common people access to prophetic power with their
false doctrines. Priests were perceived as a rearguard of religious convention by the early Saints,
and “the vision of Joseph Smith [was] intensely populist in its rejection of the religion
conventions of his day and in its hostility to the orthodox clergy, its distrust of reason as an
exclusive guide, and its rage at the oppression of the poor.”84 That deep antipathy for the clergy,
and correspondent desire for a more primitive church of direct communication with God, is
present at the start of Joseph’s career in a confrontation between a Methodist preacher and the
young prophet. After Joseph informed him of the dramatic content of his first vision and:
I was greatly surprised at his behavior; he treated my communication not only lightly, but
with great contempt, saying it was all of the devil, that there were no such things as
visions or revelations in these days; that all such things had ceased with the apostles, and
that there would never be any more of them.
I soon found, however, that my telling the story had excited a great deal of prejudice
against me among professors of religion, and was the cause of great persecution which
continued to increase; and though I was an obscure boy, only between fourteen and
fifteen years of age, and my circumstances in life such as to make a boy of no
consequence in the world, yet men of high standing would take notice sufficient to excite
the public mind against me, and create a bitter persecution; and this was common among
all the sects-all united to persecute me.85
Here, we see early in Joseph’s career how the desire for prophecy, for active revelation opposed
to the mainline denomination’s cessationism (that miracles and prophecies ceased with the end
of the Biblical age), incited not just contempt but a feeling of profound persecution.86
As Michael Walzer observes, the populist desire to share in priesthood and the gifts of
prophecy is a part of revolutionary movements stretching from Exodus to the English
Reformation to the French Revolution. Korah’s rebellion against Moses and Aaron was
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premised on the notion that “All the congregation are holy, every one of them;” John Milton saw
Moses and the prophets rejoicing in heaven, for at long last in glorious Albion “all the Lord’s
people are become prophets;” and one of the promises for equality in the French Revolution
“was that everyone would share, and share equally, in the required religious or political
performances.”87 Following the themes of that long revolutionary tradition, the Book of Nephi
describes the Lord offering a sealed book to a man of learning whose pinched efforts to decipher
it are “thwarted by greed and ambition,” before turning to an unlearned man who joyfully reveals
its message of marvelous works and wonders to be bestowed upon the poor and unschooled.
Joseph’s revelation was not merely a reminder of an ancient promise, but an announcement of its
delivery, the vision and the Golden Plates were themselves supernatural proof of God’s
miraculous presence . . . as revealed to the common man who lacked the spiritual contamination
of “learning.” Soon a restored church would re-incorporate the ancient order of priesthood for
all, “an equality among all men.”88 The glories of the refounded primitive church would
empower all those who could find no home in the other denominations and provide them a
reason for their prior estrangement.
Joseph’s astonishing debut of the Book of Mormon and his early descriptions of his
continuing revelations, like the revivals meetings of his youth, ignited new fires of prophecy
wherever his testament was welcomed in the American West. Many eye-witnesses, Mormon and
Gentile, chronicled “the most wild, frantic and horrible fanaticism” set loose by Mormon
missionaries in Ohio and New York in 1831.89 Scenes of visionaries rolling on the floor,
“exhibiting “all the apish actions imaginable, making the most grimaces both horrid and
ridiculous,” aping “the Indian modes of warfare,” and even concuss themselves into
unconsciousness and then prophesy what they had seen.90 Joseph worried about what he had
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unleashed, as the Mormon historian Richard Bushman observes “[b]y licensing his followers to
speak through the Holy Ghost, the whole movement risked spinning out of control.”91
In igniting a populist blaze of prophecy, Joseph encountered a dilemma common to
religious dramaturges before him: how to fuse the newly freed passions of such chaotic “spiritual
gifts” with the desire to build lasting institutions to contain them. Before he would openly
promote theocracy as the penultimate regime on earth, Joseph had to first establish ecclesiastical
control and sole prophetic authority amid competing claims of biblical interpretation and
revelation. His initial appeal of a radically egalitarian priesthood brought hundreds of new
members into the fold in New York and Ohio, and Joseph had to quickly confront the fact that “a
church full of prophets was a holy bedlam.”92
As Thomas Hobbes pondered in Leviathan, if alleged prophets of God were to once more
deliver new revelations, inspiring new scriptures, then who was to determine their legitimacy? 93
Probably unknowingly, Joseph was traveling the well-tread theological ground of a Protestant
schismatic struggling to reassert authority. Hoping to reconnect Man with God through the
Gospels, Martin Luther first sought to raze the ecclesiastical hierarchy that mediated faith;
Church society was to be spontaneous, coercion-less and acephalous -- without a directing
“head”.94 In 1521, Luther had barely broken with the Catholic Church when he encountered
reports of the frenzied revelations of radical weavers, the “Zwickau prophets,” who claimed
complete knowledge of the Bible, telepathy and, most threatening to Luther, a divine revelation
that privileged their numerous heterodoxies and biblical interpretations against those of any
competitor .95 Luther was shocked, unprepared for this revelatory challenge after having
convinced himself that once the corrupt authority of Roman Papism had been defied, scriptural
exposition – solo scriptura -- and therefore true Christianity, would be obvious to all. 96 When
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his attempt at rational engagement through biblical exegesis and scholastic argument failed to
convince the unlettered prophets, Luther was forced to confront the anarchic menace with the
power of his own authority: “On April 12 he wrote in exasperation to Spalatin that Satan had
shat on himself to produce their “wisdom.” They talked so fast that he could hardly get a word
in. He commanded them to do miracles to prove their claims of direct conversation with God.
They refused. He said, “My God keeps your god from doing a miracle.” Soon they were
gone.”97
Joseph appears similarly naïve as to the populist enthusiasms, contending revelations, and
challenges to his own authority he was to initially unleash. An early revelation of Joseph’s in the
summer of 1828 equated “my people” with a non-institutional “my church,” and as with his
previous prophecies, once more rejected all organized religion as “they who do not fear me,
neither keep my commandments but build churches unto themselves to get gain.”98 Adhering to
this early tenet, the first gatherings of the Saints in 1828 were -- like Luther’s acephalous ideal -as an unorganized body of “my people” without priestly authority or religious ordinances. In
1829 however, Oliver Cowdery (while still allied with Joseph) debuted “A commandment from
God unto Oliver [--] how he should build up his church and manner thereof,” a blueprint for a
new organization with specific lines of authority, church offices and ordinances. Finally, after
rapidly establishing three branches in three separate counties, Joseph published the Book of
Mormon in March, 1830, and formally established a third reorganization, “the Church of Christ”
in April 6, 1830.99 Included in the formal launch were recent revelations on church organization,
originally called “the Articles and Covenants of the church of Christ,” which functioned as the
sort of confessions of the faith found in standard Christian denominations -- as well as a
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seemingly anodyne insistence that “[f]or all things must be done in order and by common
consent in the church, by the prayer of the faithful.”100
Despite the changes institutionalized in 1830, the early Mormon Church was still much
more egalitarian in its willingness to recognize priestly authority and those with the gift of
revelation. As David Whitmer, one of the original three witnesses to the existence of the Book
of Mormon would later lament: “Brother Joseph gave many true prophesies [sic] when he was
humble before God: but this is no more than many of the other brethren did. Brothers Ziba
Peterson, Hiram Page, Oliver Cowdery, Parley P. Pratt Orson Pratt, Peter Whitmer, Christian
Whitmer, John Whitmer myself and may others had the gift of prophesy.”101 Among those
prophets listed, Oliver Cowdery and the Whitmer family were the most prominent and
contentious, believing themselves to be independent authorities, capable of receiving revelations
and even correcting Joseph.102
In September of 1830, Hiram Page one of the “Eight Witnesses” to the book of Mormon - and an ally of the Whitmers and Cowdery -- used his own magical seer stone to generate a “roll
of papers” containing whole new prophecies while Joseph was away. Prominent Church
members initially entertained Page’s revelation as gospel until Joseph, clearly cognizant of the
danger of competing revelations, confronted him in an emergency conclave and Page abandoned
his claims. Mormon historian Michael D. Quinn notes that “a hierarchy of spiritual authority is
impossible if there is unrestricted access to receive and announce God’s will,” and Joseph soon
dictated a revelation at the next Church conference that proclaimed: “no one shall be appointed
to receive commandments and revelations in this Church excepting my servant Joseph, Jun., for
he receiveth them even as Moses.”103

59

This revelation utilized and was added to a developing Articles and Covenants document
which described the procedures and leadership structure necessary to restrict errant visions, the
bane of other charismatic movements. In official church documents, Joseph’s authority was now
as literal and all-encompassing as that of Moses leading the children of Israel out of Egypt. 104
After this second incident, Joseph realized that “charisma was to be focused, not left free to run
wild,”105 and Joseph and Oliver Cowdery would alter the later editions of the Articles (and the
succeeding document, the Doctrines and Covenants) to provide retroactive continuity for the
developing structure of the Mormon hierarchy. Michael Quinn writes that establishment of
priestly authority would be specified sixteen years later in Joseph’s 1839 account of his visitation
by the angel Moroni, but that “[t]hese words had not appeared in Smith’s 1832 account or in
Cowdery’s 1834 detailed description of Moroni’s words.”106 And Joseph himself would often
explicitly cite the refounded priesthood as the solution to the problems of Christian sectarianism:
“Conflicting opinions, the clash of doctrines, the diversity of sentiment [exists]. Let the
Melchizedek priesthood be introduced and men be subject to their teaching and their sectarian,
narrow contracted notions would flee away.... The anarchy and confusion that prevails among
men would disappear." When challenged with contrary opinions, his own revelation, which
undergird the priesthood would brook no challenges: "The opinions of men, so far as I am . . .
concerned are . . . as the crackling of thorns under the pot, or the whistling of the wind."107
Joseph’s revelations of the renewal of priesthood authority – and its quickly developing
hierarchy -- radically diverged from that of Protestant theology. Much like Catholicism, Joseph
taught that the “keys” to this authority were specific ordinances of salvation handed down
through apostolic succession, but not from Peter but Adam. This power was, according to Terryl
Givens, “coexistent with God himself and connected to his sovereignty.”108 This co-sovereignty
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with God was an awesome power one that Joseph said was “nothing more or less than to triumph
over all our enemies and put them under our feet . . . and the last enemy was death . . . [U]ntil a
man can triumph over death, he is not saved. A knowledge of the priesthood alone will do
this.”109 This was the power of the resurrection of the dead as well as the divine ability to bond
the faithful to each other through all time and eternity through the ordinances of celestial
marriage, an eternal power that had been physically transmitted form an apostolic chain starting
with Adam.110 These were to be the bases of Joseph’s American theocracy.
Shortly after arriving in Kirtland, Ohio to check on the progress of the congregation
there, Joseph confronted shocking displays enthusiasm in which the Saints would mimic the
antics of Indians, and even more troubling, a mysterious prophetess named “Hubble” who had
gathered followers of her own and demanded acknowledgment as a ‘teacher in the Church.”
Providentially, Joseph’s authority was further strengthened by yet another revelation, that only
one prophet was “appointed unto you, to receive commandments and revelations from my hand,”
and “there is none other appointed unto you to receive commandments and revelations until he
be taken, if he abides in me.”111 Richard Bushman remarks that, “In an inexplicable
contradiction, Joseph was designated as the Lord’s prophet, and yet every man was to voice
scripture, everyone to see God. That conundrum lies at the heart of Joseph Smith’s Mormonism.
The amplification of authority at the center was meant to increase the authority of everyone, as if
the injection of power at the core energized the whole.”112 In eliminating rivals and crushing
dissent, Joseph remained firmly at that core, and he began to preach that his followers would be
exalted first through his leadership and visions, the prophetic gifts open to all men would have to
be developed under his guidance. A key component of Mormonism’s success was the unique
way in which it placated tensions among members by letting the subordinate orders of priesthood
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share in the light of Joseph’s revelatory glory. As the historian John L. Brooke describes,
“Institutionalizing the anticlericalism of his following, Smith established the ideal of universal
priesthood among the believing men of the church, sharing charismatic power and organizational
responsibility while retaining prophetic authority.”113 Once that tutelage began, the initiate was
cleaved from the rest of humanity to join a sacerdotal elite, for as Grant Underwood describes, “.
. . the Mormons have always believed that they were called upon to pass the gathering of the
elect. Not the broad electorate of humanity.”114 In gathering the elect, not every link to the
broader American culture was hewed, however. Joseph claimed that his gospel has ancient roots
in prehistoric America, and the cultural resources he knit together to institute this new theocratic
order resonate with other Anglo-American prophetic, magical and masonic traditions
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Chapter 3: Pluralism as Imaginative Resource: Mining and Refining the Mysticism of the
Radical Reformation
“Even great innovative religious founders have to draw on a preexisting vocabulary available to
their society.” -- Charles Taylor, Modern Social Imaginaries1

“What kind of being was God in the beginning, before the world was?’ [Joseph] asks, and
replies, “God Himself who sits enthroned in yonder heavens [was] as Man like unto one of
yourselves -- that is the great secret!” -- Joseph Smith, “The King Follett” sermon2

In castigating all the other sects and denominations of American Christianity as an
“abomination,” an implacable enemy to the one true path to salvation, Joseph warred against
religious tolerance and pluralism, a reactionary challenge in which he borrowed from the broader
culture he declared so adversarial. Joseph saw the expanding pluralism of Jacksonian America
as a spiritual malaise and political disaster, but it also provided the space and myriad cultural
sources for him to forge his own theological heterodoxies, populist appeals, and paradoxical
demands for the state protections provided by religious liberty from the very state he sought to
supplant. Pluralism was both opponent and resource, equipping him with the mythic materials to
enact his own Exodus, a triumphal retreat to the wilderness of the frontier in which he gathered
his own Israelites in America and delineated an oppressive Egypt to flee from. As Gordon
Wood has observed:
[Mormonism] was born at a peculiar moment in the history of the United States, and it
bears the marks of that birth. Only the culture of early-nineteenth-century evangelical
America could have produced it . . . It defied as no other religion did both the orthodox
culture and evangelical counterculture. Yet at the same time it drew heavily on both
these cultures. It combined within itself different tendencies of thought. From the outset
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it was a religion in tension, poised like a steel spring by the contradictory forces pulling
within it.3
Joseph’s ministry drew from diverse counter-cultural traditions of Anglo-American
prophecy, folkmagic, hermeticism and masonry to blend into his own uniquely American
cosmology and religious practices. Mysticism, alchemy, and the occult were suppressed, but
integral, practices of early modern religious radicals of the Protestant Reformation in Europe,
and in a specifically early American popular culture, their resurgence in Mormonism constitutes
what W.T. Lhamon, Jr. refers to as a lore cycle.4 According to Lhamon,
A lore cycle is important because it provides connection underlying the breaks we
experience as historical shifts. Lore is vernacular culture that people practice without any
sense of who authored it. Lore is manifest in the anonymous practices of groups. It is a
group’s common sense, its gestures and styles, its tunes and tendencies . . . Because lore
cycles enforce the return of an underlying continuity, they also point to places where
emerging groups will break with imposed or engineered social directions.5
Joseph’s deft use of hermetic lore, to a far deeper degree that his competitors among “young men
of restless energy” in the prophecy trade made him distinctive in a career field where “selfconscious outsiders” with apocalyptic visions were also attempting to tap the “acute anger at the
orthodox churches for withholding knowledge from ordinary folk.”6 The enthusiastic years of
Joseph’s early adulthood “were the most fertile in America’s history for the spouting of
prophets,” and the revivals and endless schisms of the era almost normalized outbursts of
enthusiasm and religious eccentricity.7 Incorporating the mystic lore of folk magic and
hermeticism into his sect not only helped to set Joseph apart, but provided him with another form
of populist appeal in a vocation previously dominated by religious elites -- as well as a bridge
back to traditions of the Radical Reformation that hinted of a restored Christianity. As the
Mormon scholar Terryl Givens writes: “The larger world was still a corrupt Babylon, but
Joseph’s open eclecticism (“we will claim truth as ours wherever we find it”) meant some
borrowings were not only allowed, but mandated.”8 Many of the more heterodox and mystical
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tenets Joseph would integrate into Mormonism bear remarkable parallels to those found in the
political theology of the Savoyard reactionary Joseph de Maistre. Best known either as the
archconservative apologist for “throne and altar” counter-revolution, a traditionalist who initially
hoped providence would simply restore the ancien regime; or, as an ultramontane, an early
modern proponent of papal authority and infallibility, Maistre’s forays into mysticism and
heterodoxy are less well examined.9 Having lived long enough to see the limits and historical
refutations of some of his earlier counter-revolutionary arguments, Maistre’s later theoretical
contentions (notably in Les soirées de Saint Pétersbourg, 1821, and Éclaircissement sur les
sacrifices, 1810) in the service of theocratic power became evermore unorthodox and esoteric.10
For both Josephs, Masonry and hermetic lore contributed a symbolic order to decipher the
hidden flow of history and perceive within it the outlines of both a theocratic government
capable of universal sovereignty, and a true Christianity restored by incorporating the wisdom of
ancient pagan revelation. Analogous to Joseph Smith’s recovery of a lost testament among native
Americans fallen into paganism, Maistre, influenced by Friedrich Schlegel, believed that sin has
dispersed revelation (like language and the Tower of Babel) throughout a shattered peoples, “and
that it is the nature of revelation to be forgotten with time and preserved, in corrupted form, in
the myths and institutions of pagan peoples.” Both theocratic theologians believed that this from
of “primitive revelation” provided an ontology outside of that accessible in conventional
Christian theologies and clerisies, a thoroughly unorthodox access that would reconnect man
with God and assist in the reconstruction of his true church.11
In Joseph Smith’s circumstance, the incorporation of esoteric features from a “vernacular
culture” would push him above and beyond a cohort that was already overturning the orthodoxy
and institutional churches of their day. As Nathan O. Hatch remarks, Joseph’s fellow insurgents
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also often emerged from the periphery of American culture, and their parallel projects of
reconstruction “mingled diverse, even contradictory sources, erasing distinctions that the
political culture . . . had struggled to separate.” These alchemists of popular religion combined
“odd mixtures of high and popular culture, of renewed supernaturalism and Enlightenment
rationalism, of mystical experiences and biblical literalism, of evangelical and Jeffersonian
rhetoric.” Harkening back to the origins of the early Jesus movement, they often inverted
traditional modes of religious authority, preaching that “divine insight was reserved for the poor
and humble rather than the rich and proud,” a spiritual egalitarianism fitting for the Jacksonian
revolution.12
Breaking from the past and establishing more democratic modes of worship required both
novelty and the promise of a more generous distribution of spiritual gifts. The Presbyterian
revivalist Charles Finney, one of the greatest preachers of the Second Great Awakening (and
who began his ministry simultaneously with Joseph’s in Western New York) incorporated the
arts of innovation and salesman-like persuasion in his evangelizing, popular styles that were
previously considered too common, crude, or carnivalesque for the dignity of a respectable manof-the-cloth. 13 In the hopes of sustaining the momentum of his revivals, Finney sought to evoke
not the “intermittent shower,” but “a continuous downpour” of grace within a carefully marketed
message of handbills and pamphlets.14 Formalization of worship and respectability, the return to
the drab liturgies and clerical pretenses of yesterday, were signs of calcification and snobbery,
for the new religious firebrands understood the need for a spiritual dynamism as relentless as the
other revolutions of the age.15 Alexander Campbell, who would lose his lead disciple, Sidney
Rigdon, to Joseph, was one of several innovators who condemned the “pollution” of
contemporary Christianity and deem himself and his mission the one divine channel to wash
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away the deceitful accretions of Catholicism and Protestantism and rediscover a primitive
church, the authentic Christianity, that would resolve the crisis of pluralism and restore unity by
ushering the arrival of Christ millennial kingdom.16 Joseph’s religious imagination, then, drew
from a tide that propelled him before he swam against it. His theological cohort of radical
reconstructionists all drifted in the same counter-stream of crisis and discontinuity, one
characterized by “the sharp blows of democratic revolutions in severing taproots of orthodoxy
and the disconcerting reality of intense religious pluralism.” 17
Joseph’s project was unique, however, in his drive to restore not only Christianity, but to
do so while revitalizing and (re)combining radical Protestantism with the “magical world view”
shared among those with little wealth or formal education -- as well as the esoteric spiritual
orders of Masonic elites.18 For beneath the conventional veneer of late 18th and early 19th century
American Protestantism that the Great Awakening sought to upend were hundreds of strains and
minor traditions of radical sects and “cunning folk,” practitioners of hermeticism, alchemy,
witchcraft, divining and treasure-seeking, mystical counterfeiters, and the odd community
practicing modes of Adamic perfectionism and polygamy.19 Similar in their anarchic
composition and circulatory function, Brooke’s historic social movement of radical heretics also
thematically overlaps with the revolutionary Atlantic proletariat chronicled by Rediker and
Linebaugh.20 Both studies portray the trans-Atlantic movement and hidden influence of
historically invisible cultural radicals, lumpen commoners, and primitive rebels arising like a
“Hydra of misrule” beneath the surface of early modern globalization. As the historian Gordon
Wood noted, part of the uniqueness of Joseph’s enduring innovation was to combine this radical
folk tradition with the initial surface appearance of Protestant respectability: “In dozens of
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different ways Mormonism blended the folk religiosity of common people with the hardened
churchly traditions and enlightened gentility of modern times.” 21
Joseph’s unearthing of the Golden Plates of the Book of Mormon managed to resonate
with not only folkloric practices of rural seekers that had deep roots among his impoverished
family of visionaries in a region rife with the occult, but also with a more formalized hermetic
tradition of “the Rosicrucian-Masonic mythology of sacred texts in underground vaults,” which
was an integral part of his more subaltern formative religious experiences. 22 Early familiarity
with this mystic lore cycle flowed through Joseph as an inheritance from both sides of his family:
“The Smiths of Topsfield were predisposed to witchcraft beliefs and metallurgical dreams; the
Macks of Lyme lived in a religious milieu of visions, healing miracles, and sectarian
perfectionism. The marriage in 1796 of Joseph Smith Sr. and Lucy Mack in Tunbridge,
Vermont, brought both streams of familial culture into a single household.”23 In her dictated
manuscripts, Joseph’s mother, Lucy Mack Smith, was quite open about the family’s deep
involvement with folk magic, while his father, Joseph Sr. was, by his own account, a “firm
believer in witchcraft and other supernatural things” and a practitioner of alchemy. 24
Compromising both a deep rural tradition and a source of scorn that divided them from more
mainstream Christianity and higher class society, an affidavit from one of the Joseph’s neighbors
in Palmyra sniffed that, “all with whom we were acquainted, that have embraced Mormonism
from this neighborhood, we are compeled [sic] to say, were very visionary, and most of them
destitute of moral character.”25
Arriving in the New World through the migrations of Baptists, perfectionists, Pietists and
Quakers, the cultural inheritance of the Radical Reformation filtered through generations of
family tradition and remained vivid enough at the start of Joseph’s ministry that, according to the
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historian John L. Brooke, “the Mormons themselves were self-conscious of these memories . . .
and they centered their religion on a cosmic hierarchy of familial connections stretching
backward and forward through eternity.”26 Incorporating folk magic and the more formalized
rituals and esotericism of masonry helped to draw many of the early Mormon converts together
from a shared sense of a spiritual past outside of a more prosaic Protestantism -- an affiliation
that also connected Joseph and the early Church elders with the mythic components to construct
their rapidly evolving heterodoxy. Even some of the more unlawful aspects of early Mormon
social banditry, such as counterfeiting, had mystical antecedents the in subcultural practices of
New England and New York sects performing alchemy and hermeticism. The Smiths had old
familial links to counterfeiters in 18th century New England, and they had “brushed up against
counterfeiters in 1807 and in the 1820s,” well before Joseph’s indictment for the failure of the
fraudulent Kirtland Bank in 1837.27 Oliver Cowdery, Joseph’s distant relative, closest early
disciple, and an amanuensis for the Book of Mormon, had family ties to the hermetically inspired
New Israelite sect of New England (which claimed lineage to ancient Jewish tribes, the power of
revelation, and practiced treasure seeking), and both sides of their extended families were
exposed to Masonic millenarian influences from the 1790s on.28 (Of the three non-Mormon
members of Joseph’s theocratic Council of Fifty, two were known counterfeiters and the third
was pursued by Joseph for having invented a “liquid fire to destroy an army or navy.”29)
While Joseph’s ministry used techniques and tenets of innovation, dynamicism, spiritual
egalitarianism, and ecstatic practice analogous to revivalist figures like Charles Finney, the
inclusion of tenets and practices strikingly redolent of hermeticism and folk-magic moved him
well-beyond the Protestant theology of his contemporaries towards the exceptional path of
American godhood. Indeed, so relentless was the pace of Joseph’s revelations, so quickly where
69

new tenets and texts added (The Book of Commandments, The Book of Moses, The Book of
Abraham, Joseph’s revisions to Gospel of Matthew) that his ministry sometimes seemed to
outpace the very Book of Mormon that founded his movement. During the consecration of a hotel
built according to revelation for him to manage, Joseph broke from the dedication to retrieve the
last surviving manuscript of the Book of Mormon. After flipping through to ensure it was
complete, he complained “I have had enough trouble with this thing,” and buried it under the
cornerstone.30
Breaking from the traditions of Luther and Calvin and revealing truths not contained in
the Book of Mormon, Joseph taught in his final years that salvation is not delivered by God’s
grace, but, according to the Mormon scholar Terryl Givens, “[s]anctification is strictly connected
to self-conformity with laws that are intrinsically transformative,” with God the originator and
guide of and through these laws. Sanctification, instead of mere salvation, for man possesses a
divine potential coequal with God, an eventual exaltation that retains a formally monarchic
hierarchy in its ranking of celestial ascendancy (“Ye . . . shall inherit thrones, kingdoms,
principalities, and power, dominions, all heights and depths” (D&C 132:19), This celestial
monarchy includes the power to generate infinite spiritual children as part of an expansive
eternal family that rules from their own planetary realms.31
While a startling theology for the uninitiated, or more conventional Christian, the
Mormon doctrine of human perfection has many shared features with old traditions of European
hermeticism, in which ancient theories of resurrection and metallurgy were fused in an
exceedingly eclectic theology premised on refining the human spirit to regain the divine powers
lost since Adam’s Fall.32 Intertwined strands of hermetic theology snake throughout early
modern European thought and were influential in the Anabaptist tradition in 16th century Europe,
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the revolutionary sects of 17th century England, and the anti-Hapsburg mysticism of the
Rosicrucian movement (17th century), the predecessors of modern Masonry.33 Whereas
hermeticism held out the promise of restoring Adamic perfection through deciphering the secrets
of divine knowledge and attaining ritualized degrees of spiritual rank, in Joseph’s version of
human potential, his people were commanded: “You have got to learn to make yourselves Gods”
by ascending the degrees and rungs of spiritual transcendence, “till you are able to sit in
everlasting burnings and everlasting power and glory as those who have gone before, sit
enthroned.”34
Curiously, Maistre also aspired “to the utter and essential transformation of humanity, out
of itself and onto a higher state” and believed that the human will would continue to gather
power through its spiritual evolution until it could contradict the very will of God.35 In Maistre’s
cosmology, God is still omnipotent, but he predicts a future state where there are no permanent
limits on the ever expanding power of a humanity, “attached to the throne of the Supreme Being
by a supple chain.”36 For both theologians the image of the heavenly throne is a coveted position
for future humanity to approach or occupy for celestial glory a step far beyond conventional
Christian conceptions of salvation. As an actual social and political practice, Joseph Smith’s
hidden focus on human perfection and the formation of celestial families were not only licenses
to transvalue contemporary law and morality, but to cleave the Mormon people from the corrupt
and pluralistically atomized Americans that they emerged out of. “It was my endeavor,” Joseph
wrote, “to so organize the Church, that the brethren might eventually be independent of every
encumbrance beneath the celestial kingdom, by bonds and covenants of mutual friendship and
love.”37
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The re-emergence of this secret knowledge into an expanding Church of saints could not
happen in an ordinary time. The Mormon faithful, like the Rosicrucians of 17th century Europe,
believed that “the discovery of buried text bearing the wisdom of the ancients would aid in the
dawning of the millennium.”38 The outbreak of illumination emerging from encounters with
these holy texts, the confounding presence on Earth of ever more potent and illuminated men,
and the growing precision of revelations concerning an encroaching divine government could
only be signs of the Apocalypse. Hopes of hermetic revival had been key tenets in the
development of occult millenarianism in late 18th century America, as evidence by the New
Israelite movement in the Vermont of Joseph’s youth, and Brooke finds a “powerful affinity” in
the era between the spiritual seeking of Masonic mythology and Christian restorationism.39
Apocalypticism in early Mormon theology serves not only as the appropriate eschatological
stage for the emergence of “latter-day” saints with a new dispensation, but as a capstone between
for the long-running subcultural effort to unite hermeticism to a restored Christianity. Brooke
describes the project of Hermetic Restoration launched at Nauvoo as “in effect an institutional
antinomianism, with a fundamentally radical notion of divinization contained and circumscribed
by the absolute rule of Mormon ordinance, the “perfect law of Theocracy.” The Mormon faithful
were not to be accountable to mere human law but to the higher law of the Kingdom of God.”40
Throughout both the sectarian and esoteric strains of the Radical Reformation, a
mythology of the elect unlocking secrets through the possession of magical “keys” was linked to
visions of restoration. Striving for their own foretelling of a restored Christianity, English
puritans believed that they held the “keys” to church authority, and therefore the true apostolic
succession established by Jesus Christ; while Masonic myth foretold of three Masons
discovering a translating “key” to decipher the Ark of the Covenant. A central theme of Joseph’s
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later preaching was that his dispensational authority derived from his possession of “keys” to the
Church, or “keys to the Kingdom of God.” This revelatory power, descended from a divine
Patriarchy, infused the authority of the ancient priesthood Joseph had reestablished, and the
ultimate expression of that authority lay in the “perfect law of Theocracy,” whereby the “kingly
power” of the priesthood would “administer . . . endless lives to the sons and daughters of
Adam.”41
Much like the explicitly political program of the Fifth Monarchy Men of the English
Revolution, the early Mormon devotion to immanetizing the incipient Kingdom of God was
premised on the destruction of the current regime and “the establishment of a theocratic world
government” under God’s chosen saints.42 Three weeks after Joseph was formerly initiated into
Masonry in April of 1842, he revealed that the forthcoming government would be called “The
Kingdom of God and his Laws, with the Keys and power thereof, and judgment in the hands of
his servants, Ahman Christ.” Two years later, in March of 1844, he secretly formed the
governing “Council of Fifty,” also known as the “Council of the Gods,” in which some of his
most trusted associates (85% of whom were also Freemasons)43 were to begin planning to
legislate over all the world. Similar to the Mormon priesthood’s ability to “bind on earth and
seal eternally in the heavens”, the Council amalgamated divine power with human will
unfettered by secular moral codes or laws written by men.44 Instead, the Council would operate
as a government in a continuously exceptional state, enacting a higher form of divinely inspired
politics as a “Living Constitution.” Shortly after being initiated by Joseph, the Council then, in
turn, ordained him as “King on earth,” and sanctioned his run for President of the United States
in order to bring “Theodemocracy” to the rest of America. It was time to expand the borders of
the Mormon Kingdom beyond Nauvoo, and by early April of 1844 the already grandiose
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conception of Missouri as Zion was dramatically expanded to “cover a broader ground . . . the
whole of America is Zion itself from north to south.”45
A couple of days earlier Sidney Rigdon had first revealed to thousands of Mormons that
their divine system of salvation was also a “system of government” that “shall rule over temporal
and spiritual affairs,” one which would supersede the laws of the United States and every other
secular state:
A man is not an honorable man if he is not above all law, and above government. . . . The
law of God is far more righteous than the laws of the land; the laws of God are far above
the laws of the land. The kingdom of God does not interfere with the laws of the land,
but keeps itself its own laws.46
Here we have a distinctly American culmination of the elite freedom proffered by the promise of
hermetic practices, an ultimately political vision that the religious critic Harold Bloom holds out
as one of the best examples of dangers of American Gnosticism: “It is a knowing, by and of an
uncreated self, or self-within-the-self, and the knowledge leads to freedom, a dangerous and
doom-eager freedom: from nature, time, history, community, other selves.”47 Of course, while
Joseph’s religion sought to marginalize its saints from the sinful national community, it didn’t
provide freedom from all community, but linked patriarchal power and the formation of celestial
families backwards, towards righteous ancestors and those redeemed through “baptism of the
dead;” in the present, among a community of saints building God’s Kingdom on Earth; and
forwards towards a future of limitless celestial glory. The theologies of Adamic perfection found
in forms of folk and Masonic hermeticism encountered throughout his life are strikingly similar
to integral features of Joseph’s theology, and from them flow his divine license for an
exceptional politics and theocratic ethics. The approaching apocalypse means that profane time
has been shattered by a divine schedule, the miraculous has been restored to a redeemed
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America, and the return of a “King of Earth” presiding over a political kingdom promises a
continual flow of spiritual gifts and new prophecies.
Joseph’s cosmology promises the obedient and righteous Mormon a path to godhood, but
that Promethean quest is an ascendency of many unequal degrees and even secret rituals
unknown to those laboring below, while those in the higher ranks are granted extraordinary legal
and ethical prerogatives to fit their exalted status. Organized into a loyal priesthood, the basics
of that hierarchical structure would survive Joseph’s death to rule a theocratic kingdom in the
American West almost to the beginning of the 20th century -- before evolving to guide the
development of one of the world’s most recent major religions.48 During its formation, religious
pluralism equipped Joseph with both an enemy, a pseudo-Christian “abomination” to overcome,
and a vast lore of folk magic and high hermeticism to inspire and incorporate, from the social
banditry of counterfeiting to the correlations between Adamic perfection and Masonic
millennialism.
Though there were some resemblances, none of Joseph’s American contemporaries among
Protestant revivalists shared in his astounding compilation of esoteric practices, apocalypticism
and reactionary political theology, the unique doctrines that made him an exemplar of “the
American Religion” as noted by Harold Bloom. In pondering the distinctions between a more
traditionally European Christianity and its American variants, Bloom inquires into how
theologians mingled the seemingly immiscible strains “of the American religion, the “positive
thinking” aspect of our optimism, and the Gnostic despair of society that is our even more
persistent pessimism. What is the link between these strains?”49 Knowing now the procedural
links between Adamic perfectionism and the apocalyptic arrival of the Kingdom of God in the
gnostic tradition that informed Joseph’s theology, we can reframe Bloom’s question to explore
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its political corollary: Why is it that this so democratically accessible cosmology (Bloom’s
optimism) has, in its most exemplary American form -- wherein even godhood itself has
allegedly been pluralized and placed within democratic reach – become intertwined with, indeed,
resulted in, theocracy (Bloom’s pessimism)?

Joseph as Lockean Nightmare
We can better understand how theocracy works as the institutional corollary of an elite
imagination unchained from the constraints of Lockean liberalism by employing Uday Mehta’s
analysis of Locke’s anxieties over imaginative excess. Mehta perceives a deep unease within
Lockean liberalism about the instability that unregulated imagination can so easily unleash, and
he explores why Locke became obsessed with “curbing the conscience” in order to contain the
cognitive sources of political volatility.50 A Lockean suspicion of the sort of visionary
extravagance long practiced by Joseph would only be further piqued by the prophet’s assertions
that such politically disruptive passions are permitted within a legal right to privacy. As Mehta
writes, “Lockean liberalism is deeply suspicious of that which smacks of being fundamentally
different, especially if that difference claims for itself immunity on grounds of privacy.”51 While
attempting to break with pluralism, Joseph’s theocratic alterity is also iterative of Lockean
liberalism in his realization that the imaginative excess that propelled his movement was also
destabilizing, and must be itself controlled through new institutions if it was to form an enduring
church. Such isomorphic mimicry does nothing to calm Lockean anxieties however. In
demanding the liberty to conceive and promote his illiberal dreams, in creating illiberal
institutions within the permissive space of religious freedom, and by resuscitating modes of
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political theology Locke had hoped to supersede, Joseph appears as a Lockean nightmare within
liberalism.
Locke’s fixation with patrolling the imaginative limits of individuality emerges out of a
concern for guiding the formulation of reason, ensuring that a broader, consensual form of reason
is strong enough to maintain social stability.52 Reasonableness, as a precondition of politics for
Locke, must be promoted by encouraging a “self-discipline [that] requires submission not to
one’s own reason but rather to the reason of others. The experience of submission to others is
thus a precondition of one’s own reason, and hence a precondition for self-discipline.”53 Against
such conformist submission, Joseph’s revelations persistently defied conventional reason. In
Mehta’s terms, his conception of religious liberty countenanced no external limits to his own
religious imagination. Complaining that Methodists “have creeds which a man must believe or
be kicked out of their church.” Joseph countered that, “I want the liberty of thinking and
believing as I please. It feels so good not to be trammeled.”54 While Joseph’s own liberty was
exalted through the power of prophecy, his most prominent revelation, the Book of Mormon,
“proposes a new purpose for America: becoming a realm of righteousness rather than an empire
of liberty . . . the book’s main point [is] that submission to God is necessary for society to
survive.”55 In pursuit of that realm of righteousness for everyone else, Joseph’s political
theology rears back, away from established arguments of natural law to return to a form of
scriptural politics as the basis of an ideal governance, the sort of scriptural politics that Locke
had sought to end.56
Diverging however from the form of early Protestantism’s scriptural politics premised on
the Bible as the guide to human affairs, Joseph placed himself as the ultimate, authoritative
translator of an expanding library of divine texts.57 Even the King James Bible itself would have
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to be revised by Joseph to bring it up to more contemporary standards of accuracy.58 The
introduction of new scriptures, doctrines, and covenants, with the promise of more to come as
Joseph received or translated them, constituted a profound rupture with not just with Locke but
also Luther’s concept of sola scriptura.59 The New Testament was no longer a closed canon or
the single best guide to salvation -- now the revised Mormon bible and the Book of Mormon
would constitute the authentic source of political anthropology (of ancient American tribes), and
these scriptures would help illuminate a vision of theocratic governance. The interpretative mode
of scripture inspiring the “authoritative political ideal and discourse” Locke once hoped to
neutralize in the works of his opponent, Robert Filmer, was once again loose in the most
Lockean of lands.60
The central institution within Locke’s thought that was supposed to curb such irrational
extravagance was education,61 and Joseph was sensitive to how little he had. His boasts,
betraying his shortcomings, frequently indulged in “fantastic claims to learning and position, as a
lawyer, a doctor, a linguist, a politician, the positions in respectable society from which his
family and the Church were excluded.”62 By incorporating subaltern forms of folk magic and
hermeticism outside of the more conventional Protestantism political theology, Joseph represents
– to the Lockean worldview -- the imagination unlearned and unleashed, and, most dangerously,
he arrives equipped with the ability to forge new letters and build new institutions to trespass
were he wished.
Those new institutions arose after Joseph encountered the destabilizing “burdens of
plurality” within his developing church, and quickly discovered the necessity of having to build
regulatory institutions to contain them -- a dynamic that led to increasing degrees of control in
response to the contrary imaginations he confronted. As Bushman describes, “revelation meant
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freedom to Joseph, freedom to expand his mind through time and space, seeking truth wherever
it might be. . . Against the centrifugal force of individual revelation, Joseph continually
organized and regulated.”63 What in Lockean terms this resembles is a politically unruly form of
elite imagination, with Joseph as its theurge and warden. As Mehta has shown, Lockean
liberalism can only perceive this almost Nietzschean will with “utmost suspicion,” for this is the
will that continually resists “the general . . . collective . . . or national will” while appearing to
possess “an inner certainty that demanded obedience.”64
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Chapter 4: Liberty for Theocrats: The Challenge of Apocalyptic Theocracies for Liberal
Pluralism
“Both liberty and equality are among the primary goals pursued by human beings through many
centuries; but total liberty for the wolves is death to the lambs . . .”
-- Isaiah Berlin1
“When I am the weaker I ask you for my freedom because that is your principle; but when I am
stronger I take away your freedom for that is my principle.”
-- The ultramontane polemicist Louis Vueillot2
Joseph Smith’s apocalyptic political theology challenges liberal pluralism both in its
inception -- by emerging out of a pluralistic populace already tolerant of a wide variety of
Protestantisms -- and in its theocratic tenets. By engaging Joseph’s apocalyptic political
theology with the works of contemporary liberal theorists, we can better grasp the continuing
relevance of the strategic cunning to his conservative thinking and how, through the language of
religious liberty, he fought to establish a place within a liberal pluralist society he ultimately
sought to supersede. The strategy of antagonistic symbiosis, so integral for his American
theocracy to thrive, worked by adopting and modifying liberal principles in order to subvert
liberal pluralism, capitalizing on where Lockean liberalism has certain limited ideas of what it
has to confront from illiberal elements within its polity and how much it can accommodate them.
In proclaiming his revelations the basis for new ontological hierarchies deserving
political power, Joseph drew on forms of irrationality that Locke sought to dismiss from the
public sphere. Joseph’s political challenge to Locke strikes deeper than merely a clash over
interests or ideologies because it emerges at the cognitive level, the level of imagination that
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Uday Mehta claims as “the central locus of conflict and disorder for Locke.”3 According to
Mehta, Locke saw madness, revelations, and other forms of irrationality as originating from
excesses of imagination: “Locke places his stamp on subsequent forms of liberalism both in the
noble insight that links imagination with freedom and, unfortunately, in the urge to circle the
wagons and close itself off from different imaginations that it cannot comprehend or otherwise
tolerate.”4 Despite Locke’s arguments for their exclusion, revelatory claims to political authority
within liberal polities have continually attempted to disrupt liberal politics, especially when they
assume Locke’s language to demand tolerance and religious liberty. So while this discussion of
Joseph’s political theology and his millenarian goals resides within its historical context of 19th
century theocratic city-states on the American frontier, we will introduce it to modern theory –
“subsequent forms of liberalism” -- fully aware that Jacksonian society constituted a far more
limited spectrum of pluralism than the range of diversity discussed by 21st century liberal theory.
The intent is not to harp on the failures of liberalism to anticipate all enemies so much as it is to
anatomize Joseph’s political theology, revealing the ways it emerged to work in between the
principles of liberalism in order to subvert it. Joseph’s revelatory mode and the politics it
inspired collapsed the distance established by more conventional Christianities in America
between the sacred and profane, and in so doing, blurred distinctions that liberal secularism uses
to discourage adventures in explicitly religious rule.
Indeed, the very novelty of Joseph’s theocratic religion and the fluidity of its revelatory
theology confound efforts of liberal toleration and recognition. A faith so rapidly developing its
dogma and doctrines frustrates external determinations of what its core essence truly is.
Questions of what is integral to the faith cannot be thoroughly satisfied if it is constant flux, for
inclusion within liberal pluralism relies on some degree of integrity and openness in order to first
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make distinctions between legitimate faith and fraud. As mentioned previously, mainstream
Mormon doctrines, culture, and beliefs have evolved substantially since the murder of Joseph in
1844. This study is primarily about Joseph’s original thought and its political implications, not
the more moderate politics of its institutional successor. Noting these qualifications, the
application of a 19th century political theology to 21st century theories of pluralism is worthwhile.
Despite the self-acknowledged heterodoxy and anachronism of Joseph’s thought several of the
contemporary theorists discussed below acknowledge that new theocratic challenges are
common in modern liberal society. As the religious historian Philip Jenkins has described the
character of American religious culture, “(e)xtreme and bizarre religious ideas are so
commonplace in American history that it is difficult to speak of them as a fringe at all . . . the
doomsday theme has never been far from the center of American religious thought.”5
Contemporary apocalyptic movements premised on revelation over reason and distinctly
anti-pluralist beliefs will not follow the specific contours of Joseph’s political theology, but the
Schmittian exceptional politics at its core is not entirely unique. Analogs can also be found
among illiberal new religions -- and should serve as a warning that some theocratic challenges
that request liberal accommodations still cannot be answered by the traditional liberal solutions
of negotiation, rational discussion, and the privatization of religion.
In his effort to carve out his own empire within American pluralism, Joseph deployed an
exceptional politics with tactics that can be broken into three general categories. First, against
the broad tolerance for minor heterodoxies within Protestant denominations, Joseph cultivated a
deliberate peculiarity for his newfound people that could simultaneously appeal for tolerance
while cleaving from a common Christianity. While similar liberal arguments have been made to
grant toleration and legal accommodations for “marginal” religious groups resisting assimilation
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like the Amish and the Hasidim,6 Joseph’s innovation was to promote peculiar practices and
beliefs that inspired persecution for a group emerging out of an already integrated population,
not controversial tenets of a faith already formed when its adherents arrived in America. In
deviating from the underlying theological consensus and liturgical similarities that helped to
promote tolerance, Joseph broke from the commonalities that Michael Walzer identifies as
making America so unique: “One reason that toleration works so easily in countries like the
United States is that the churches and congregations that individuals form, whatever their
theological disagreements, are, mostly, very much like one another.”7
As his theology further developed, the early Mormon communities Joseph led attempted
a complex stratagem of publically appearing tolerant of the broad array of American Christianity,
sometimes portraying their beliefs as within those bounds of conventional Christian tradition,
while simultaneously defying social taboos and developing ever more grandiose theocratic
institutions and national ambitions in what they asserted was the private practice of their faith.
Joseph’s ministry demanded tolerance for his Saints while preaching the adoption of radical
theological and social differences that inspired persecution. As R. Laurence Moore has argued
about the ways Joseph courted notoriety for himself and his nascent church,
Mormons were different because they said they were different and because their claims,
frequently advanced in the most obnoxious way possible, prompted others to agree and to
treat them as such. The notion of Mormon difference, that is, was a deliberate invention
over time. . . . Furthermore, as their opponents charged again and again, they fed on
persecution. They memorialized it in ways that seemed to invite more of it . . . Joseph
Smith employed a rhetoric of deviance to describe himself and to elaborate the
institutions of his church.8
In response to persecution that could not have been a surprise, Joseph’s moves towards
ever greater degrees of semi-sovereignty for Mormon communities were premised on requesting
and receiving legal exceptions through pluralist accommodation for a repressed minority
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religion. Once granted, he initiated ever more dangerous and illiberal political practices within
his archipelago of autonomy. This tactic should be noted by liberal theorists in examining
contemporary theocracies, for as new movements marshaled out of the diversity of modern
America, they’ve already emerged out of pluralism, subverting the principles of tolerance that
helped to incubate them as they exit.
Second, as we’ve seen there is an important in emphasis Joseph’s political theology on
secrecy, oaths, and in esoteric teachings, wisdom and even revelations that must remain
concealed from the larger public. Deceit for Joseph is a strategic tool, a political weapon
doctrinally validated. The liberal reliance on negotiation, deliberation, and compromise (to settle
conflicts of interests) cannot handle strategic dishonesty well from within its polity, especially
when it is intertwined with assertions of religious freedom. Lucas Swaine notes that laws and
institutional practices in the Unites States emerged from Protestant doctrine, and “still retain their
partisan trapping,”9 and in matters of faith and religion, their blind spots too. The competition
among denominations for members within Protestant pluralism in Jacksonian America relied on
an openness about (or usually promotion of) church doctrines and biblical exegesis. Secrecy and
deceit were then often affiliated with Popish plots and conspiracies, while the Protestant seeker
was expected to find a denomination that comported with his faith in a marketplace of competing
churches.10
Finally, there is Joseph’s prioritizing of revelation over reason in politics. Much like
negotiation, rational discussion (to resolve conflicts of ideas) for liberals is premised on a shared
conception of reason. Theocrats like Joseph who cite revelation over reason to buttress their
anti-liberal political claims and policies (overt or covert) within a liberal polity do so from an
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ontology inaccessible to those outside the faith, and therefore constitute the problem of what
Johnathan Quonq (working off of John Rawls) describes as unreasonable citizens.11
In order to gauge the ways in which American theocracy maneuvers outside the
peripheral vision of liberal pluralism, or, through a secondary facet of the phenomenon, how
liberal pluralism fails to account for, or outright misunderstands, the theocratic threats it must
confront from home-grown or immigrant apocalyptic movements, we will first contrast Joseph’s
political theology with Michael Walzer’s work on pluralism and the politics of difference. Here
we’ll note the theocratic strategy of separation out of pluralism as a religious liberty, and how it
slips outside liberal efforts of incorporation. Since theocratic challenges do not rise to a specific
concern of Walzer’s, Lucas Swaine’s arguments for how theocrats can be won over to liberal
governance by appeals to a liberty of conscience will serve as an example of how an exceptional
politics (utilizing the strategies of peculiarity, deceit, and revelation) common to illiberal
apocalyptic movements subverts a contemporary pluralist theory that hopes to better adjudicate
the many dilemmas posed by theocrats. We’ll see how the theocratic hierarchy established by
Joseph as an authority on revelation and doctrine affords no space for Swaine’s appeals to
individual reason. In concluding, the recent works of Jürgen Habermas on the difficulties for
liberal regimes in incorporating the voices of those religious citizens unwilling to formulate
liberal rationales for their political claims in the public sphere will be juxtaposed with the array
of discourses available within Joseph’s political theology. Joseph’s life and ministry illustrates
that revelation can be transcribed by prophets in prosaic language, on subjects that may be
surprisingly banal, and the more conventional language of reason, even liberal rationales, are still
available to religious citizens for crafting political claims.
*

*

*
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The challenge raised by Joseph’s apocalypticism, particularly its more reactionary
Schmittian elements that outright reject pluralist premises, is not addressed by a good deal of
pluralist American political theory. The emergence out of assimilation is rarely perceived as a
possibility for liberal theorists. For example, Michael Walzer’s schema of articulation,
negotiation, and incorporation, laid out as a successful sequence of integrative citizenship in his
The Politics of Difference, assumes that the primary difference within a multicultural society is
that of an ethnic immigrant identity that moves at varying rates towards assimilation, aiming for
and reaching a final status of reciprocal recognition and toleration by other ethnic groups.12
Though this model has its origins in the tolerance of religious minorities in liberal states, for
Walzer ethnicity in America is now the primary grounds for contestation in a politics of
difference. The critical problem Walzer locates in the present is how a pluralist society is “to
encompass the actually existing differences within some overarching structure,”13 and he
perceives the politics of difference starting when “a group of people, previously invisible,
repressed, and fearful, insists on its value as a group and on the solidarity of its members, and
demands some form of public recognition.” So defined, groups then begin a process of
negotiation, where “each group must come to acknowledge that its limits are set by the
legitimacy of others.” The mutual recognition of these limits become the boundaries of group
identities peacefully coexisting in a pluralist civic culture, foundational borders for continuing
negotiation. Their articulation gives hope -- through negotiation – for reaching a “shared
commitment to tolerance, equality, and mutual aid.” 14 Walzer hopes that this establishment of an
ethnic solidarity, and its recognition as having value and legitimacy vis-à-vis other ethnic groups,
constitutes a break with the old world and its coercive practices of imperial placement,
relocation, and incorporation for ethnicities. As a liberating step towards non-repressive modes
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of assimilation in pluralist society, “(a)rticulation shatters these ancient patterns, and negotiation
replaces them with their liberated, dissociated pieces.”15
Walzer’s final, ideal step of incorporation, dependent on articulation and negotiation, can
only start “after we have made our peace with the newly liberated groups” and adheres to no
particular pattern.16 Concerned that excessive articulation of difference is undercutting the
negotiation of difference, Walzer hopes that the latter can be strengthened through a much
stronger conception of “American citizenship, for a political community of engaged and active
men and women.”17 An ultimately optimistic theory that puts great faith in the deep cultural pull
of incorporation, Walzer is dismissive of the “silliness and nastiness” of autocratic and
aristocratic politics in multicultural societies. They are minor problems, and the “response to
demagogues and cults, to bizarre doctrines of racial superiority and unlikely tales of conspiracy,
is ostracism, avoidance, rejection.”18 This dismissal finds an echo in his later work, On
Tolerance, where he asserts that in modern liberal states, intolerant minorities are no threat to
their neighbors or internal critics. “These same minorities cannot practice intolerance here (in
France, say, or in America), that is, they cannot harass their neighbors or persecute or repress
deviant or heretical individuals in their midst.”19
In contrast, the articulation of group difference and religious identity for Joseph was not a
break from the old world, it was a return to it, or more precisely, an adherence to doctrines
derived from a uniquely Mormon vision of an old world of theocratic Israeli tribes in ancient
America. Unlike Walzer’s diverse ethnicities moving towards greater visibility, liberation, and
toleration on American shores, Joseph’s Latter-day Saints emerged from the already visible and
free communities of Anglo-Saxon Protestantism. As Moore has argued, many Americans have
formed their sense of American identity “by turning aspects of a carefully nurtured sense of
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separate identity against a vaguely defined concept of mainstream culture.” What makes this so
novel, so American, is the language of dissent merging with that of religious liberty in a culture
where traditions have become increasingly fluid. “New religions,” writes Moore, “which have
often been linked to ethnic identifications, have served as vehicles through which people have
nurtured a sense of antagonistic culture.”20 A distinctive part of the new Mormon identity, part of
their thymotic struggle for spiritual and social distinction, was the assumption of the yoke of the
“repressed and fearful” that Walzer’s success stories strive to shake. They become heretics
stalked by a religious society they feel compelled to leave -- but whose material goods and power
they would soon inherit. The process of group articulation occurred while the very doctrines that
made them distinct were still being developed (or revealed); the addition of ever more strange
commandments handed down from the Prophet, the greater the “actually existing differences”
from the rest of gentile society.
Early Mormonism under Joseph’s leadership was a culture in formation that did not
inherit ascriptive identities or discrimination as per a subordinate ethnic minority or “race;” the
heterodox beliefs and peculiar practices that inspired opprobrium from much of American
society were knowingly adopted.21 In this expanding marketplace of religions, there was a
novelty to theocracy: the “traditions” relied upon in forming a new ethno-religious people where
either highly syncretic or entirely unknown; they were not, at first, clearly bounded so much as
additive and expansive. Only Joseph could interpret all of his mysterious golden plates, and
there were always new magic items popping out of the secreting earth.22 This novelty to
“tradition” is outside of Walzer’s focus, which is why his theory misses Lucas Swaine’s warning
that liberals need to address the challenge of theocracy “because new theocratic groups
continually burgeon forth in democratic societies as new flora in the simple pluralistic array.”23
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(Ironically, the non-immigrant groups that Walzer covers as having the most difficulty with
integration are the Quebecois, Native Americans and Puerto Ricans, are all colonized peoples
and the last two of which possess indigenous claims. The Mormons, in comparison, assumed an
indigenous inheritance and identity through their theology.24)
Another point of friction lies in what other multicultural theorists would call recognition,
for what in Walzer’s theory would be situated between the stages of negotiation and
incorporation. For political theorists recognition entails groups overcoming social and political
marginalization and gaining respect for their contributions to society, if necessary through
measures to reduce discrimination or preserve and protect their unique culture.25 Remarking on
Charles Taylor’s work of how recognition and identity form the bases for an ethics of
authenticity necessary for liberal politics, K. Anthony Appiah notes that within a plural society
“people have the right to be acknowledged publicly as what they already are. It is because
someone is already authentically Jewish or gay that we deny them something in requiring them
to hide this fact, to pass for something they are not.”26
Given the profoundly covert aspects of early Mormon culture, what degree of “public
recognition” would be possible when so many of the distinct doctrines, eschatological goals and
beliefs are practiced in secret, some under penalty of death?27 The authentic Mormon self
formed by Joseph’s political theology is concealed from the gentiles behind a strategic mask, and
can only be given its full expression when protected from the faithless in theocratic city-states on
the American frontier.28 Passing is what the authentic Mormon does as a minority in a doomed
pluralist society, for her true role as successor to the current corrupt regime must be concealed
for her own safety and that of her mission. This is a theocratic mode that claims the privilege of
privacy in its formation and transmission of doctrine among its members, but as a political
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practice cannot be reconciled with liberalism’s commitment to a principle of public justification
for its governing policies. The value of recognition as a form of public authentication for “what
they already are” misses what must be kept secret – and it is also exceedingly difficult to
recognize a bounded, consistent social entity, community, or faith when a religious culture
changes so quickly as new revelations arrive. The Mormon Church founded in 1830 was
doctrinally quite different from the Church in 1844 at the time of Joseph’s death, notably in
regards to the former’s revelatory prohibition of polygamy.
In the last of Walzer’s sequences, the critical step for incorporation “is the territorial
dispersion of the immigrant ‘tribes’ -- national and ethnic groups, races, religious
communities.”29 Joseph’s flight from American pluralism towards a Zion prophesied for his
refounded people reverses this movement -- it is a process of increasing distinction as his
revelations inspired the mustering of a tribe of anti-pluralists who saw the mainline Christianity
they emerged from as not just misguided but an “abomination.” 30 By 1980, the Harvard
Encyclopedia of Ethnic Groups gave Mormons their own entry.31 As we’ve studied, the adoption
of taboo practices, “apparently absurd beliefs,” and an emphasis on ancient Hebraic sacrifice
incurred social costs that cleaved their adherents from the corpus of relatively tolerant
Protestantism. Believers in “extreme” tenets can thus identify and trust one another, a solidarity
necessary for defense against a hostile culture.32
In opposing integration, articulation of group differences for the early Mormons meant an
increased antipathy to the pluralism of Jacksonian America as the historian Marvin Hill has
written: “The early Mormons wanted a society that would exclude unnecessary choices and
would exclude pluralism. Above all, they wanted to diminish influences that pluralism
engendered.”33 According to Joseph’s theology, the secularizing influence of pluralism must be
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shunned to appreciate the re-enchantment of the world, attained through the divine unity
promised in a wholly new dispensation, one available to those capable of listening and believing.
Those unprepared for the second advent of Christ would be “cut off and destroyed.”34 Yet in
response to hostility and conflict from the Gentile world they sought to supplant, Mormons
would gain sympathy for the persecution they suffered and ask for toleration and their rights to
worship as simply one church among many.35 Anti-Mormons were aware of the quandary that
their persecution enhanced Mormon tales of martyrdom and appeals for tolerance, that, “(a)buse
seemed to give Mormons what they most needed.”36
As we’ve seen, for Joseph the abomination of a corrupted Christianity so spiritually dead
it can no longer hear God, the confusion of pluralism spread by Satan, and the profound evil
pervasive in America that the Second Coming would vanquish, all contributed to a profound
Schmittian friend/enemy attitude towards pluralist society and the American government. 37
Given these tenets, Walzer’s dream of a more participatory American citizenship is simply not
on the table. Joseph cultivated a paradoxical stance of praising the American Constitution -- for
which he saw himself as a great apologist -- and, near the end of his life in Nauvoo, insisting that
he honored and protected all religious practice, while covertly promoting a priesthood
government, a contradiction he never reconciled for his followers or the dissidents caste out of
his movement.38
Ultimately, Joseph’s movement does, after his death, move much closer to the
mainstream of American culture, which at first glance might appear to be one of Walzer’s liberal
success stories. However, this came after the Mormon War of 1838 and the martyrdom of
Joseph, as well as the federal government’s 1852 War against the Mormon Kingdom in the Utah
territory and a campaign of heavy-handed raids and mass incarcerations of Mormon elites in the
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1890s . . . before the Church publically renounced its most radical practice of polygamy. Instead
of a steady movement of peaceful assimilation and integration as per the liberal ideal, the most
controversial of Mormon tenets were only renounced after an intense campaigns of social and
state-sponsored coercion.
The more specific type of antagonistic symbiosis that Joseph represents evade
traditionally liberal conceptions of distinction and recognition, Walzer’s theory, for example,
comes closest to addressing this illiberal phenomenon in two arguments. His first is tangentially
related, and rest on the observation that the accommodations granted to marginal religious sects
like the Amish and Hasidim “is justified in part by the marginality of the Amish, and in part by
their embrace of marginality: their deep commitment not to live anywhere except on the margins
of American society and not to seek any influence beyond them.”39 Joseph’s revelations of
Mormons inheriting gentile lands in Missouri, of Mormonism triumphing in a post-apocalyptic
America, his block voting and party alliances in Illinois, and his run for the presidency, are all
indicative of a drive for influence beyond the margins. Walzer’s second argument lies is in his
aforementioned dismissal of any real danger posed by the autocratic and aristocratic politics of
“demagogues and cults,” which he believes can simply be avoided or ostracized. Since the
mechanisms for doing so, and whether it is practical to merely ostracize a rapidly growing
expansionistic theocratic movement that is attempting to supplant pluralism, are outside the
ambit of his argument, we turn to the theories of accommodation for theocracies proposed by
Lucas Swaine for a more in-depth look at how theocratic threats from within pluralism can
circumvent efforts of accommodation.
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Revelation Over Rationality: Liberalism and Semi-sovereignty for Theocrats?
“Relative to our city [of Nauvoo] charter, courts, right of habeas corpus, etc., I wish you to know
and publish that we have all power; and if any man from this time forth says anything to the
contrary, cast it into his teeth . . .”
-- Joseph Smith, June 184340
In his The Liberal Conscience: Politics and Principle in A World of Religious Pluralism,
Lucas Swaine expresses concern for how theocrats are treated in liberal polities and how they
can best be reconciled to liberal arguments and governance. His goal is to engender greater
respect for theocratic practices and beliefs, and find the right space for them to create a nomos of
their own, one free of disruptive intrusions from liberal state and society.41 Swaine asserts that
liberal governments that attempt to “simply repel and retaliate against theocrats” are terribly
misguided, for “the stance is kindling for combat, fuel for zealot’s inflammatory plans.” Such an
innately adversarial stance conforms too easily to the theocrat’s internalized friend/enemy
distinction and offers no hope for reconciliation, a terrible error in that it only “looks to the eyes
of many as though theocrats must by their nature be at odds with liberal principles.” In reality,
the conflict “need not exist, and liberals can make a positive impact to mollify problems.” 42
Swaine’s theoretical exercise is useful for illustrating how the cunning of Joseph’s
deployment of theocratic revelation alongside liberal arguments for religious liberty can subvert
even modern attempts to win over theocrats with liberal rationales and grants of greater
autonomy. Swaine defines theocracy as “a mode of governance prioritizing a religious
conception of the good that is strict and comprehensive in its range of teachings.”43 The
philosophic fulcrum to leverage theocrats into liberalism is the appeal to a liberty of conscience,
which he believes can be far better argued by liberals to convince even ambitious theocrats.
After elaborating on the principles of a liberty of conscience and how they can overlap with
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theocrat’s conception of the good, Swaine explores the best ways to grant theocratic
communities the sort of autonomy that assuages them to the best practices of liberal governance.
So confident is Swaine in the philosophical appeal of a liberty of conscience, and
arguments for liberal institutions that naturally extend from it, that he does not regard
“illiberality as a definitive trait of theocracy.”44 Instead, he focuses on four exigent moral failures
of liberalism and how liberals are beholden to rectify these shortcomings and better advance their
arguments. First, “liberalism lacks a well-devised schema for treating theocrats within liberal
democracies.” Second, liberalism provides no “proper and identifiable grounds for governing
theocrats.” 45 Third, liberals have not provided readily comprehensible and consistent
justifications for the coercion of theocrats when the latter break the law. And finally, Swaine sees
a fourth moral failure in liberalism’s neglect in offering reasons for interference in theocrats’
lives comprehensible enough for them “that theocrats should accept.” 46 Noting that in the end,
they must accept them, Swaine is convinced that theocrats “may not yet understand that they are
rationally committed to these principles of liberty of conscience or that they should accept and
affirm the institutions those principles require, but they can come to understand those facts.”47
There are three principles of liberty of conscience that Swaine argues will appeal to
theocrats if liberals respectfully dialogue with them: 1) Rejection: the supposition that in the
search for divine truth, one must be free to reject lesser doctrines and conceptions of the good. 2)
Affirmation: one must be free to accept the good. 3) Distinction: one must be free to distinguish
between good and bad doctrines.48 Since theocrats themselves are committed to discovering and
accepting the good, rejecting the bad, and the necessity of discovering the difference, Swaine
proposes that these principles will appeal to theocrats when they sequentially accept the
premises, hence “the value conflict between theocrats and liberal is a rationally soluble
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problem.”49 Addressing the issue that there is no liberty of conscience for “self-assured
theocrats,” Swaine insists that theocrats will still need to procure a reason for why God rejects a
free conscience to seek truth.50 For Swain, guaranteeing the principles of liberty of conscience
permits open ontological inquiry, the very notions that Joseph at first welcomed and then sought
to contain under his singular control. Swaine extends the liberty of conscience to claim that
there is a “strong reason for theocrats to reject unqualified theocratic governance and to affirm
liberal institutions, given their wish strictly to promote and pursue otherworldly ends.”51
But what form of governance would allow theocratic practices while preserving a liberty
of conscience? In attempting to reconcile theocrats to liberalism and liberal governance, Swaine
first dismisses a legal accommodation standard that would merely grant specific exemptions to
theocratic communities within a regulatory framework as far too narrow and intrusive, for the
struggle to constantly gain exemptions from the many points of conflict with legal codes would
still involve theocrats in “continual and excessive” legal battles with legislatures, courts and
governments attempting oversight of their uncommon practices. 52 Litigation would embroil
theocrats in lawsuits and invite the kind of interference that Swaine deems to be “infra
dignitatem or even outright proscribed by doctrine.”53 Therefore, “the only legal structure able
to handle theocratic communities appropriately that could be adapted to fit with the overarching
legal structure of democracies would be one that allowed those communities to gain semisovereign status.”54 Since theocratic communities do not “normally” wish to outright secede
from the polities in which they reside, granting them limited autonomy would provide a far more
pragmatic standard.55
Permitting theocrats to establish semi-sovereign communities would assuage their fears
of liberal government, as it shows that liberals are “prepared to respect their religious practices
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and beliefs, giving members . . . the option of greater religious autonomy and the ability to create
a nomos of their own.” Yet, in acknowledging that when theocrats are granted “free reign over
their subjects” severe repression could occur,56 the accommodating liberal government will still
have to continually monitor these semi-autonomous communities “for outbreaks of physical
violence, the rapid acquisition of firearms and other weapons, and further warning signs.” This
would require that, when detected beforehand, government defuse “such situations tactfully”.57
If full autonomy would permit theocrats to suppress their members’ basic rights and even war
against other polities, then the government must be not only ensure that such a secession isn’t
attempted, but is must also take a proactive role in ensuring the maintenance of basic rights.
Having outlined his arguments, how do Swaine’s theories of the rhetorical and
philosophical appeal of a liberty of conscience, and the liberal accommodation of semisovereignty, illustrate the subversive power posed by Joseph’s mode of theocracy? In terms of
Joseph’s theology (and many other forms of theocratic soteriology), searching for divine truth is
permitted, even encouraged, but true revelation is not open to everyone nor are they free to reject
it. It must be obeyed. When V.S. Naipaul conducted interviews with Islamic fundamentalists in
Mansoura, Pakistan, he encountered a similar conception of a strongly circumscribed religious
freedom in a theocratic state: “‘There is freedom in Islam.’ [an Islamist argued] What they
wanted . . . was a state where everyone accepted Islam voluntarily, with all his heart. And I
began to understand how freedom and submission could run together.” 58 For “self-assured”
theocrats (and which ones aren’t?), there already is a liberty of conscience -- with only one
correct answer.
What Joseph established in an American context, and what Swaine neglects, is who it is
within theocratic theology that receives and interprets the will of God, and what the otherworldy
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ends are that they alone hear. His egalitarian premise of a right of conscience would subvert the
very hierarchies of authoritative interpretation that constitute theocracies. Within Joseph’s
theology, the prophet could both proclaim his longstanding devotion to a liberty of conscience,59
while simultaneously repressing dissenters and plotting the overthrow of the liberal order that
claimed to guarantee free speech and conscience. A January 1831 revelation of Joseph’s decreed
that individual freedom only exists under the authority of Jesus Christ: “Wherefore, hear my
voice and follow me, and you shall be a free people, and ye shall have no laws but my laws,
when I come, for I am your Lawgiver, and what can stay my hand?”60 Given the evident
confusion over what Christ wants for his followers on earth, Joseph’s renovated priesthood (with
himself as high priest) would cut through that chaos with the authoritative interpretations. The
principle of distinction Swaine proposes to determine the difference between good and bad
doctrines is ultimately in priestly heads alone to decipher, not in the heart of each individual
adherent. Swaine’s conception of how religious seekers discover truth and the correct
conceptions of the good is rooted in a post-Reformation ontology, one in which the earnest
Protestant knows God and the good through individual effort, such as prayerful investigations of
sola scriptura. The allegedly ancient caste system of different degrees of ontological status that
Joseph (re-)established was inspired by pre-Reformation forms of hierarchy, “an authoritarian
system of priesthood that he intended to be monolithic . . . Mormons were supposed to view any
factionalism in spiritual or temporal matters as contrary to God’s will.”61
Not everyone knew of Joseph’s priesthood or how it really functioned. For those
Americans distant from Mormon communities, Joseph and his apostles could appeal for religious
tolerance and protection from unjust persecution, while, according to Norman O. Hatch, for
those gentiles closer to them, “what also infuriated their neighbors and makes it difficult to think
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of [the Mormons] in any sense as classical republicans, was their denial of the most basic liberty
imaginable, freedom of thought.”62 Swaine’s very argument for engagement, for winning
theocrats over to religious pluralism, is premised on the receptivity of their “comprehensive
conception of the good” to liberal appeals, and that “theocratic doctrines are widely or fully
comprehensive in the sense that they extend to cover” all recognized values and virtues .63 As
we’ve seen, Joseph’s social doctrines could shift very rapidly and promised to continue evolving
as his exceptional politics drew from a stream of new revelations, a continuing elaboration of
gospel truth with a rapidly evolving cosmology and dogma. Early Mormonism eschewed
contemporary Christian theology as static and stale, devoid of the clarifying, enchanting power
of revelation, while the collection of beliefs and commandments into the Doctrine and Covenants
were not considered comprehensive for all eternity, and might never fully be -- they were
absolute for the present, with the promise of ever greater light and knowledge to be revealed.
The quick progression of revelatory knowledge, the inherent mutability of Joseph’s political
theology confuses liberal attempts to establish what a faith’s comprehensive doctrines truly are,
as well as communitarian assertions that religious beliefs and practices are deeply rooted and
immutable.
In regarding theocrats as bounded by their comprehensive doctrines, tied to their
conceptions of the good, Swaine claims that though they reject liberal basic rights, they “do not
make these maneuvers merely to suit some immediate selfish interest; to the contrary, they do so
in the larger purpose of trying to save souls, avoiding eternal damnation, or achieving some other
otherworldly value, so conceived.”64 To the liberal skeptic, unable to access revelation
transmitted through a singular prophet, the exceptional politics of Joseph Smith can appear
suspiciously convenient. Joseph’s citation for the divine authorization of counterfeiting in
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Kirkland, for example, blurs the line between integrity and venality. Aside from Joseph, the
presumption that all theocratic ontologies are intrinsically oriented towards “conceptions of the
good” neglects those religious movements with wildly divergent conceptions of the “good,”
those whose (anti-)theology consciously inverts modern norms premised on what they perceive
as mere convention,65 or the potential for pious frauds to run a religious racket. Swaine argues
that rational commitments almost always undergird illiberal theology, which is why those who
“seek unmitigated theocratic governance are indeed misguided” in failing to see why they should
strongly affirm liberal institutions.66 His faith in the underlying rationality of most theology is so
deep that in discussing the theocratic preference for martyrdom over assimilation, he finds it an
“implausible” suggestion that “the best religious doctrine should command such an apocalyptic
stance toward temporal life.”67
Swaine admits that some theocrats possess conceptions of the good that “seem as though
they may be fundamentally different and discordant” with those of other citizens, and they
clearly do not accept the liberal notion that their epiphanies are ultimately a private matter when
it comes to politics, best left outside the public sphere of policy debate.68 What he does not dwell
on is the appropriate liberal response if those deeply held theocratic beliefs truly are radically
different from the norms and conceptions of the good held by liberal society and are not
amenable to reason and its appeals to a liberty of conscience. For emergent groups of ambitious
theocrats, having rejected liberal values and the conventions of rational argument at their
inception, dismissing an enduring modus vivendi for community life within a liberal government
is part of what makes them distinct. Instead of an episteme amenable to argument, ambitious
theocrats rely on an ontology that appears fluid and inaccessible to those outside of its doxa.
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Swaine, frequently acknowledges the novelty of modern theocracies when he remarks on
how theocracies continually emerge as “new flora” in pluralist societies,69 but he doesn’t account
for what it means when this emergence required that theocracies must have previously rejected
liberal pluralism as part of their sociological and theological (or cosmological) formation. That
is, either through immigration or their development out of the pluralist religious array,
theocracies in liberal polities must be aware of liberal norms they contest from the outset -- and
how pluralist rights have afforded them legal space for certain practices while they
simultaneously reject liberal authority to curb those that are illegal. Emergent theocratic
religions in modern liberal states therefore must possess intrinsically illiberal tenets, doctrines,
beliefs and/or ontological modes as part of their self-definition. Aside from indigenous
theocracies (already granted a problematic semi-sovereignty70), no modern forms were first
conquered or forcefully assimilated by the liberal state. Their adoption of peculiar or illegal
practices happens in a modern world where the theocrat knows they are already disdained or
proscribed.
We can see how Joseph’s mode of antagonistic symbiosis weaves its way between liberal
principles and perceptions in Swaine’s analysis that within modern liberal democracies, theocrats
divide “naturally” into retiring and ambitious classifications.71 While the retiring ones, like the
Old Oder Amish and Satmar Hasidic settlements, do not participate in civil and political society
and simply seek seclusion from everyday affairs, ambitious theocrats are active in public life and
participate in politics “with a view to supplanting liberal institutions with stricter laws and
regulations drawn from their religious conceptions of the good.” Swaine doesn’t devote much
time investigating whether theologies premised on illiberal conceptions of the good really
negotiate in good faith with liberal governments or take seriously liberal arguments.
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As we’ve seen with Joseph’s penchant for Masonic-style secrecy and his covert
establishment of the theocratic Council of the Fifty -- an ambitious theocrat, somehow compelled
to supplant the liberal order, might deem it strategically wise and doctrinally approved to
publicize his political theology as that of a merely retiring theocrat -- as Joseph did to the Illinois
legislature in 1840 to win Nauvoo’s unique charter. To be more accurate in discerning theocratic
typologies, and correct for his claim that they “naturally” divide, the apocalyptic theocrat might
be added to Swaine’s two categories, an even more adversarial version of the ambitious theocrat
whose theology is premised on the sort of imminent apocalypse Joseph prophesied and who
deploys a style of exceptional politics similar to what Joseph practiced. The apocalyptic theocrat
would differ from the ambitious one is that in their exceptional politics, in their willingness to
enter into liberal politics in order to subvert, they might appear far more moderate, even retiring.
How a liberal government could distinguish the true typology and threat level of a selfproclaimed theocratic community is, barring scandal or violence, left unclear.
Intriguingly, Swaine mentions Joseph Smith as a theocrat who claimed other religions are
“misguided,” but he still maintains that an affirmation of his principles of liberty of conscience
would be “logically consistent and psychologically unproblematic” for theocrats such as
Joseph.72 Of course, Joseph saw all of contemporary Christianity as not merely misguided, but
an “abomination.” And as we’ve seen, the alleged freedom of religion Joseph mandated for
Nauvoo Illinois neither protected real dissent nor mitigated the foundational belief in the
Mormon eschatological triumph over all other faiths.73
The need to protect dissenters, guarantee the rights of minorities within theocratic
communities, and provide a realistic exit option for apostates that desire it were concerns raised
by the feminist scholar Susan Moller Okin, and they are loosely addressed by Swaine within his
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defense of granting theocrats partial autonomy. The very vague educational standards he
proposes, such as ensuring that children in theocratic communities are taught about their “rights
of exit,”74 on top of his prior proposals for government supervision, illustrate the functional
contradictions of his semi-sovereign scheme. The state intrusion and legal entanglements that
Swaine dismisses under an accommodation standard as infra dignitatem would still be required
to ensure theocrats’ compliance with a regime of basic rights . . . they oppose.75 Swaine wants to
protect theocrats from excessive interference from the state while still ensuring basic rights for
all members in a theocratic community -- but as Sarah Song has strongly argued, a guarantee of
basic rights for subordinated members within a theocratic community requires a high degree of
state oversight (notably in ensuring a right of exit), one sure to seem invasive by the standards set
by Swaine.76
Whatever their interaction with the state, Swaine promotes the effort to reach beyond
those that hold liberal values to engage with even for the most recalcitrant of theocrats: “The
point is that it will generally be better to try to convince or persuade theocrats to turn away from
their more illiberal inclinations before leaving it to government to employ coercion against
them.”77 This could be true, but leaves aside the severity of the illiberal inclination in question,
which might merit legally-sanctioned coercion instead of discussion.78 However noble a goal,
Swaine’s hope for his theory relies on the rational appeal of a liberty of conscience that positions
a liberal conception of politics and acceptance of reasonable argument over whatever tenets of
illiberal theology confront it. A deeper familiarity with the history of early Mormonism and the
political theology of Joseph Smith should modify those premises.
*

*

*
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Throughout the formation and trials of his young Church, Joseph formulated explicitly
political demands in both the languages of revelation and the secular logic of legal rights and
liberties. His rapidly vacillating stances over the primacy of American law, frequently on the
same subjects of contention, illustrates that he could offer liberal rationales for political rights, or
the supremacy of divine law, or a fusion of the two when they agreed. His frequent use of legal
rationality in lawsuits and petitions within a context of antagonistic symbiosis illustrates how the
theocratic retention of revelation could be combined in the same radical religious movement with
clear expressions of more conventional forms of public reason when strategically necessary. The
ways in which Joseph’s situationally variable approach to law and public discourse obscures
liberal perceptions of the nature of American theocracy and confuses critical liberal categories of
public and private, integrity and venality, accommodation and subterfuge, and rational and
irrational discourses, can be seen in the recent works of Jürgen Habermas.
Habermas’s later works are concerned that John Rawls’s controversial “proviso”
requiring religious faiths provide liberal rationales for their political voice in the public square
excludes those religious citizens who “cannot or are not willing to” formulate liberal rationales
for their politics, and that a liberal constitution meant to protect religious forms of life would
inflict “asymmetrical” burdens on its religious citizens. 79 Habermas shares Rawl’s primary
assumption that it will be ultimately beneficial to both religious citizens and the larger public to
bring these moral intuitions and their resulting politics into a more popularly accessible dialogue,
and in order to lift the burden of translation, he counters Rawls suggestion with his own
proposed proviso that every citizen should be able choose whether to deploy religious language
in public – and that if they do they should accept that “the potential truth contents of religious
utterance must be translated into a generally accepted language” before they can be admitted into
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the world of official discourse.80 Habermas hopes to popularize a Karl Jaspers inspired
perspective on the “genealogy of reason” that will not only allow and encourage religious
citizens to greater access within the public sphere, but also assist Rawlsian liberals in both
recognizing and enhancing their own sense of overlapping moral solidarity with religious
citizens within the pluralist array.81 Part of this effort is a grandiose reconciliation between the
traditions of Athens and Jerusalem, an awareness that reason has its roots in “the shared origin of
philosophy and religion in the revolution of worldviews in the Axial Age.”82The translation
proviso ensures that “all legally enforceable and publically sanctioned decisions can be
formulated and justified in a universally accessible language without having to restrict the
polyphonic diversity of voices at its very source.”83
The example of Joseph’s political theology and the early Mormon movement, however,
provides notable counterpoints to several of Habermas’s assumptions. As we’ve seen, the
majority of Mormon converts were initially situated within the dominant Protestant culture
where they could access such rationales in the liberal idiom of the Jacksonian era as well as other
mainstream citizens. Through conversion and evolving doctrine they moved into a more
deliberate practice of peculiarity and antagonism towards the mainstream culture as they became
religious distinct. Peculiarity is often expressed through cultural idiom in rituals and practices,
and in early Mormonism the emphasis on a hierarchy of revelations, certain of which must
remain secret, augmented the development of deep cultural truths that were necessarily
inaccessible to outsiders: secret truths that set Mormons on an inherently adversarial relationship
to American society.84 Joseph Smith and his leading apostles understood very early on that the
revelation of the inceptive theocratic triumph for their young church required that its immanent
eschatology and resulting organization be hidden from the public.85
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Joseph’s antagonistic symbiosis with liberal pluralism further complicates Habermas’s
schema by problematizing when translation provisos are required and why, as it provides an case
of recently enraptured citizens who were unwilling to express deep truths of the faith, yet could
still formulate liberal rationales when demanding their religious rights for either legal redress or
greater autonomy vis-à-vis the state. In concealing key aspects of its faith within the private
sphere, the larger public could not accurately recognize the Mormon faith or its goals. In
February of 1831, for example, a revelation recorded in the Book of Commandments announced
that God “will consecrate the riches of the Gentiles, unto my [Mormon] people which are of the
house of Israel.”86 Before Joseph had even arrived in Missouri with Mormon settlers to establish
a Zion for the end times in July of 1831, he had revealed that June that God commanded the
Saints to assemble “upon the land of Missouri, which is the land of your inheritance, which is
now the land of your enemies.” A subsequent revelation in August proclaimed that lands in
Missouri should be obtained for the expansion of Zion either “by purchase or by blood (of
Mormon martyrs)”.87 In Kirtland, Ohio, when the Mormon leadership was desperate for
development funds they established the Kirtland Safety Society Bank Company “with the
authority of divine revelation but not a state charter.” The unlicensed and under-secured “anti”bank soon collapsed, and a heavily indebted and court fined Joseph fled to Missouri, a posse
pursuing him on charges of illegal banking and counterfeiting.88
Joseph could declare in October of 1843 that “I am the greatest advocate of the
Constitution of the United States there is on the earth,” and in March of 1844 secretly task his
theocratic Council of Fifty “to decide formally which national or state laws Mormons could
disregard.”89The many incidences of his legal exceptionalism, going back to at least 1831, and
their foundations in apocalypticism were unknown to interlocutors like President Martin Van
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Buren, and Senator John C. Calhoun, to whom he appealed for legal redress -- or to the Illinois
legislature that granted him the unique degree of civil autonomy he would use to craft his refuge
from out of state warrants in Nauvoo.90 As the ultimate example of Joseph’s ability to speak both
languages simultaneously, he protested in January of 1844 that he would not have declared his
candidacy for the President of the United States if “I & my friends could have had the privilege
of enjoying our religious & civel rights.” Three months later he secretly “prophecied the entire
overthrow of this nation in a few years,” and was crowned king of the Kingdom of God by the
theocratic Council of Fifty, a shadow government soon to emerge as the political foundation of
Christ’s millennial reign.91
Joseph was not alone among the Mormons in his mixing of sacred and profane rationales
and discourses. The Mormon apostle Oliver Cowdery delivers another curious illustration as to
the availability of secular, rational discourses among a people made recently receptive to
revelation. As witness to -- and scribe for substantial portions of -- The Book of Mormon,
cofounder of the church, and long serving Assistant President, Cowdery was integral for the
early development of the faith. Yet, after clashing with Joseph over polygamy, and further
defying church authority by selling some of his land investments during the slow collapse of the
Mormon colony in Far West, Missouri, he was charged by the high council with “virtually
denying the faith by declaring that he would not be governed by an ecclesiastical authority nor
Revelation in his temporal affairs.” He responded with a scathing letter contrasting ecclesiastical
authority (which he compared to European feudalism), and American constitutional rights based
on “the three great principles of English liberty”: the rights to personal security, personal liberty,
and private property. “This attempt to controll me in my temporal interest,” he wrote, “I conceive
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to be a disposition to take from me a portion of my Constitutional privileges and inherent
rights.”92 Writes Bushman of this remarkable shift in discourse:
Cowdery’s letter is a reminder of the complex ideological environment of Mormons in
the 1830s. Most of the time they spoke Kingdom of God language . . . At the same time,
as American citizens knew the political language of rights and freedom. . . Cowdery
showed how easily a disaffected member could slip out of millennial, scriptural discourse
into political talk, using republicanism to discredit Church leaders. Democratic discourse
transformed obedience, faith, and loyalty into fanaticism and blind submission.93
Cowdery’s slippage back to the language of constitutional rights, a form of public
reasoning, to counter a “Kingdom of God” language he helped create, serves as an example of
the tremendous mutability of religious traditions formed in early modernity. Habermas’s
translation proviso is informed by a communitarianism that insists that religious traditions offer a
depth and a solid grounding that is often missing in liberalism. He sees a stream of knowledge
and deep moral intuitions flowing down from the Axial age, of “major world religious – as the
only surviving element of the now alien cultures of the Ancient Empires”94 Joseph’s faith was
also premised on being the surviving element of the now alien culture of an ancient empire in
America, but as Bushman notes, it debuted in the 19th century with an “instant history.” Instead
of reminding Western civilization of the deep moral intuitions and “unexhausted force” of
timeless religious traditions that undergird communal life, Joseph’s dynamic theology illustrates
that religious traditions can be highly adaptive and rapidly revisable. For Habermas, the
modernization of religious consciousness is the response of religious traditions to the “challenges
posed by the fact of religious pluralism, the emergence of modern science, and the spread of
positive law and secular morality.”95 Mormonism did not have to respond to the challenge
through an alteration of modern consciousness, it was born within the challenge, a fluid tradition
that is composed out of the constituent elements of the challenge itself. In contesting religious
pluralism, modern science, and secular law, Joseph demanded pluralist accommodations,
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declared an openness to amalgamating all form of knowledge into the faith for “a man is saved
no faster than he gains knowledge,” 96 and filed lawsuits and legal petitions against his opponents
while placing revelation over reason, and theocracy over secular law.
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Chapter 5: Joseph’s Exceptional Politics
Joseph Smith’s remarkable political project and theology illustrate how American
theocracy arises in reaction to, and from within, liberal pluralism through an adaptive process of
antagonistic symbiosis. A deeper examination of the exceptional politics that emerge from his
revelatory faith will also reveal how American theocracy recombines its authoritarian politics
and theology for a political theology capable of justifying its claims to sovereignty against the
liberal state. What are these integral theological elements that American theocracy must reestablish in order to first assert and sustain itself within liberalism? Critics of liberal pluralism
like Alasdair MacIntyre, R. John Neuhaus, and Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde have argued that
liberal modernity subsists on religiously informed ethical resources that it cannot renew, that the
modern state is incapable of sustaining the moral bases of its own legitimation without resorting
to illiberal methods.1 This “Böckenförde dilemma” also points to an intriguing difficulty for
would-be theocracies. The theological desiderata that communitarian and conservative theorists
so often discern in the liberal public sphere are, for theocratic theorists, the very spiritual bases of
their legitimating political theologies. Theocracies delineate themselves in opposition to secular
regimes by adhering to some mode of ontological privilege which is publically inaccessible and
consistently trumps secular sovereignty. For theocracies within liberal states, these ontological
premises and their providential claims must remain esoteric -- they wither under the harsh light
of modern skepticism and public scrutiny and have to be protected by theocrats, marshalled in
ways that reveal both theocracy’s vulnerabilities and how it seeks to mask them. To better
understand American theocratic thought and theocracy’s struggle to establish its theological
presuppositions as sovereign within modern communities, we can invert the Böckenförde
dilemma’s core critique to see how those supernatural sources of authority and social order must
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cautiously circumvent secular law and public scrutiny in order to establish the social bases for
theocratic sovereignty. In other words, what distinctly illiberal tenets of transcendental
justification are necessary for modern theocracy’s claims of sovereignty?
Joseph’s example demonstrates that theocratic authority relies on extra-state assertions of
divine providence, phenomena that Hobbes and Locke sought to severely constrain within, or
outright banish from, modern politics in order to establish peace from religious struggles over the
apparatus of state. Since competing assertions of having received revelations and miracles were
so politically disruptive in England and Europe, both theorists argued that they should be
subjected to skepticism and public scrutiny, while another theocratic holdover, sacrificial rituals,
were to be simply rejected for their clerical corruption. In reaction to the secular division within
liberal modernity, theorists like Carl Schmitt and Joseph de Maistre sought to recombine the
political and theological, which they argued would require a restoration of divine elements such
as the miracle and sacrifice into politics in order to establish true authority. The miraculous
power of revelation, as Heinrich Meier has cogently argued, is integral to Schmitt’s political
theology for its provision of divine truths and their corollary sorting of the political world into
those faithful friends who accept that truth and enemies who do not.2 As an argument for the
return of political theology, revelation is supposed to supply the truth claims that inform
Schmitt’s infamous decisionism, the theological core of his exceptional politics.
Echoing Hobbes’s analysis of how the political symbolism of the miracle was used to
establish the authority of an elect capable of receiving and interpreting its messages, Schmitt
inverted Hobbes’s concern over the invidious demands for obedience from revelation, perceiving
its potentially transcendent power as a source of henotic strength and motivation. Instead of
abandoning revelation as a basis of sovereign authority, Schmittian political theology
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“presupposes faith in the truth of revelation. It subordinates everything to revelation and traces
everything back to it. Insofar as political theology champions the binding force of revelation, it
places itself in the service of obedience.”3 As elucidated by Meier, “political theology stand and
falls with faith in revelation” and a demand for faithful obedience to its message is the key
determinant of a revelation’s political content.4 To contest the validity of the revelation is to be
an enemy of the faith in the revelation.5
A restoration of faithful obedience among the masses and religious political power were
also pivotal aims of Maistre’s political theology. Dismissive of the viability of constitutional
republics premised on reason, Maistre declared that religious rituals of sacrifice constitute a
social imperative for any enduring political order. Sacrifice, he argued, was an anthropological
universal: found in every human culture, it was only through sacrifice that nations and
communities could be certain of the vitality of their solidarity.
One especially finds that all nations agree on the marvelous efficacy of the voluntary
sacrifice of the innocent who sacrifices himself to the divinity as a propitiatory victim.
Men have always attached an infinite price to the submission of the just person who
accepts these sufferings.6
Dismissive of the resilience of secular institutions, Maistre believed that an institution is
either “founded on a religious concept or it is only a passing phenomenon. Institutions are strong
and durable to the degree that they are, so to speak, deified,”7 and the real political order is only
visible to God’s “elect.” Therefore, as Armenteros writes, “Maistre argues that neither society
nor political constitutions can be products of rational deliberation.” As the source of “all
polities,” God, according to Maistre, “when he wants to lay the foundations of a political edifice
all at once, and show to the universe a creation of this kind, it is to rare men, it is to veritable
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elect that he confides his powers: placed at great distances across the centuries, they rise like
obelisks on the road of time, and as the human species grows older, they appear more rarely.”8
Over this sacred foundation revealed to rare men, Maistre perceived sacrificial practices
as central to the maintenance of social stability for the clear, costly evidence they provided of the
popular recognition of that divine sovereignty. In Maistre’s formulation social stability cannot
exist without religion, and religion requires ritual, those communal customs that establish
religious solidarity. Ritual, ultimately, is sustained by sacrifice “where the symbolic order of
religion comes into contact” with quotidian life and re-establishes a sense of providence’s
harmonious pattern to fallen humanity.9 Sacrifice required a stark categorization within a society,
for its ideal victims are innocents, preferably loosely attached to the community, whose gentle
attributes would substitute for the guilty.10 The degrees of obeisance and deference inherent in
such social differentiation would function as a correlating mechanism for hierarchies between
members of society, a necessary function for political order.11 Thus, through his idiosyncratic
version of sacrificial theology, Maistre theoretically unites “the religious nature of politics” and
the “political nature of religion.”12 His reinterpretation of Roman Catholic theology adapted a
conception of sacrifice for the reactionary politics of post-Revolutionary Europe where he hoped
that sacrificial displays would soon serve as a powerful sign of the restoration of divine
authority. In Maistre’s thought, sacrifice possesses a historically dialectical dimension, for as
“historical phases of tranquility are followed by shorter, critical periods of punitive but remedial
suffering,” the reappearance of these intensely “punitive” periods of violent suffering will prove
providential to the world, revealing how sacrifice works cyclically throughout history as an
engine of progress, a “vehicle of the eschaton.”13 Sacrifice serves as both a sign of the historical
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progression of the divine political order by supplying meaning to bloodletting, and when it is
restored, as an eschatological proof of the final Kingdom.
Joseph Smith’s importance as a political theologian is that he concretizes, codifies, and
enacts those theological elements -- which Maistre and Schmitt ultimately left up to providence
to establish -- as the doctrinal basis for his theocracy. He demonstrates that miracles can be
introduced and sustained by “God’s elect” in liberal modernity, and why a revelatory mode of
political theology must necessarily be theocratic. Moreover, the ways in which Joseph’s
theological concepts’ ontological foundations and eschatological justifications are incubated in
liberal arguments of religious liberty, family law and privacy, and local control, reveal the power
of theocratic exceptionalism at work within the frame of American liberalism. Joseph
accomplishes this by first shielding the miracle and revelation, and faith in them, from too much
public scrutiny. Hidden doctrines and revelations, deemed unfit for the larger public are
concealed behind justifications of sacred secrecy and the protections of religious liberty.
The private sphere to which Schmitt believed Hobbes had so regrettably consigned
religion -- to the detriment of revelation -- is for Joseph the site of revelation’s rebirth. Here, too,
within the spheres of family and private faith, Joseph secretly reintroduces practices of sacrifice
as proof of obedience and faith to a project of theocratic restoration that bear striking parallels to
the political theology of Maistre, practices Hobbes and Locke had hoped to proscribe. As we’ve
seen in the previous chapter, the theocratic imperatives integral to the faith and practice of
Joseph’s political theology were best defended against state intervention through the assertion of
private conscience, by the liberal right of religious freedom. Joseph’s exceptional politics were
intensely socially disruptive, but they were most successful in being translated into institutional
practices when they were anchored in those remnants of feudal control -- particularly familial
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relations – still residing within American liberalism as elucidated by Karen Orren, Nancy Cott,
and Michael Grossberg. By rooting secret rituals of sacrifice in the privacy of the family sphere
among autonomous communities on the frontier, it becomes easier to isolate believers and
inculcate obedience. Once believers were firmly enmeshed in an increasingly covert and
confidential habitus, their loyalty could be more easily determined and the ranks of theocratic
priesthood filled with the most dedicated.
This chapter first examines how Hobbes and Locke attempted to divorce disruptive
religious concepts like the miracle and sacrifice from politics. In reaction to these moves Maistre
and Schmitt dreamed of reintroducing the miracle and sacrifice in order to recombine politics
and theology. Joseph actually accomplishes what Maistre and Schmitt only theorized: by
reintroducing a politics based on the miraculous and sacrifice, he establishes a political theology
with striking parallels to the radical aspirations of both theorists. His vision for a theocratic
kingdom in America did not resemble that of traditional theocracies before the rise of secular
states in Europe: Joseph’s prophetic authority was a form of Schmittian exceptional politics. The
return of God’s revelations to Jacksonian America, with a singular prophet as ultimate sovereign
of earth, heralded the imminence of the apocalypse and meant that mere human laws and
governing norms would be transcended.14 Revelations are exceptional moments that resist
codification, they cannot be circumscribed by laws, general norms, or even prior prophecies in
holy scriptures, and Joseph’s exceptional politics were fueled by a continual stream of revelation,
providing Mormon doctrine with an astonishing fluidity that appeared suspiciously slippery to
outsiders and apostates. Despite its protean nature, the specific theoretical components of
Joseph’s theological anatomy can be more clearly drawn than Schmitt’s -- its impelling
revelations and resulting doctrines were recorded (and revised), believed, and acted upon, thus
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providing a more concretely religious referent for a revelatory theology in historical practice.
Our investigation of Joseph’s exceptional politics will focus on how he wielded his revelatory
authority to establish his theocratic city-states in expectation of the apocalypse, and how,
sociologically, he embedded an archipelago of theocracy within the liberal spaces of religious
liberty, and familial privacy, as well as the greater legal autonomy found on the frontier and the
contested authority between states and the federal government.
Chapter six will detail how, once Joseph was more securely established in his theocratic
city-state, he more aggressively promoted the peculiar prerogatives of his American Zion in
order to form his own ethno-nationalist people out of American society. His antagonistic
symbiosis with American pluralism best functioned by melding theocratic precepts analogous to
those found in Schmittian and Maistrean political theology with demands for religious liberty.
The peculiar doctrines that made Mormonism different from its Protestant origins struck against
key concepts of liberal political theory, and they overlapped in complex and subtle ways that
American liberalism found difficult to negotiate with and legally regulate. Finally, chapter seven
will diagnose some of the idiosyncrasies of modern revelatory politics that Maistre and Schmitt
did not confront in their theories: how faith in revelation, when challenged by public skepticism,
must remain idiomatic to survive, and how the constant evocation of the sacred into quotidian
politics inevitably turns revelatory politics banal.

The theoretical constraints on the power of the miracle that would become foundational
for the secular tradition within liberalism were most influentially first theorized by Hobbes in
Leviathan. Attempting to establish a reasonable basis for peace, perhaps even a limited tolerance
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for private conscience, Hobbes promoted an epistemological skepticism towards all forms of
revelation not sanctioned by the state.15 His specific concern was not with the wondrous or
bizarre that, lacking political content, might be chalked up to a “strange deviation of nature,” but
the miracles that established, or spoke through, divine authority.16 Hobbes defined the miracle as
“a work of God (besides His operation by the way of Nature, ordained in the Creation) done for
the making manifest to His elect the mission of an extraordinary Minister for their salvation.”17
The miraculous, by its very nature, establishes a divine hierarchy (an elect) on earth, for miracles
are “wrought for the procuring of credit to God's Messengers, Ministers, and Prophets, that
thereby men may know they are called, sent, and employed by God, and thereby be the better
inclined to obey them.”18 In chapters twenty-six and thirty-seven of Leviathan, Hobbes uses the
terms miracle and revelation interchangeably in regards to their political import, both of them
denoting divine events that were supposed to establish or enhance the authority of a religious
elect on earth. In their intended form, they demanded the subordination of all earthly powers to
their prophets, the fusion of politics and theology.
Throughout Leviathan, Hobbes weaves his arguments of epistemological skepticism in
order to dispel disruptive revelatory assertions that can arise from diverse social sources to
challenge state authority. His skepticism is deployed as part of an effort to move away from a
political theology grounded in revelation towards a philosophy of governance established by
reason. In his attack on a singularly revelatory assertion of authority, Hobbes builds a skeptical
argument that denies any large scale public agreement on the meaning of divine manifestations,
thus revealing the entirely subjective nature of miracles and revelation. Questioning how anyone
can be certain of another’s putative revelation without having received one himself as
verification, Hobbes answers that such discursive assurances are impossible, for
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though a man may be induced to believe such Revelation, from the Miracles they see him
doe, or from seeing the Extraordinary sanctity of his life, or from seeing the
Extraordinary wisedome, or Extraordinary felicity of his Actions, all which are marks of
Gods extraordinary favour; yet they are not assured evidence of speciall Revelation.
Miracles are Marvellous workes: but that which is marvellous to one, may not be so to
another. Sanctity may be feigned; and the visible felicities of this world, are most often
the work of God by Naturall, and ordinary causes.19
No one can know with certainty, through reason alone, the truth of a revelation; one can
only reject it through skepticism or subscribe to it through greater or weaker degrees of faith.
Correlated with the vast variation in human knowledge and experience, “it followeth that the
same thing may be a miracle to one, and not to another.”20 Aside from personal witness, and
private judgement as to the veracity of such claims, if one were to hear secondhand of a miracle
and require verification, Hobbes recommends consulting the singular “Lawful Church” of the
sovereign.21 He argues for an integrative and ideally irenic appeal to political community -ultimately rooted in the state -- for authority in lieu of investing that authority in invidious
sects.22 Individuals in doubt should look to this authority, as a form of public conscience, to
clarify their concerns. Above the level of the individual, public transparency for religious and
civil groups assures the state that treasonous doctrines are not being concocted and disseminated.
By publically accounting for their actions they assure the state of their inherent lawfulness and
benign intentions, while those who refuse and meet covertly without the state’s knowledge, such
as private leagues, cabals and factions are to be proscribed by the Hobbesian state.23
Having isolated political appeals to the miraculous through his skepticism, Hobbes places
the rationality of natural law at the center of his ideal political community: one has to obey
natural law, and all laws emanating from the sovereign, but people don’t necessarily have to
believe these laws possess divine origin or import to comply. Subjects of the sovereign are
“bound I say to obey it [law], but not bound to believe it: for mens beliefe, and interiour
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cogitations, are not subject to the commands, but only to the operation of God, ordinary, or
extraordinary.”24 As Schmitt summarizes, Hobbes argues that it is sovereign state power alone
that “determines what subjects of the state have to believe to be a miracle . . . but also--and here
the irony is especially acute -- the reverse: Miracles cease when the state forbids them.”25
Schmitt associates the miraculous with a powerful, motivating belief, one that “penetrates to the
innermost core of men, in order to grasp them in their conscience, their virtues, their deepest
longing.”26 Schmitt argues that the modern state, in availing itself of skepticism to constrain the
miraculous, and by declaring itself the sole authority on what was legitimately supernatural, has
effectively lost its foundation in accessing what is truly divine. Like a drunk unwilling to leave
the light of streetlamp to find his keys, the state misses the miracle that emerges outside of state
control, and Schmitt regards this instrumental determination of the politically convenient miracle
as a profound mistake.27 In divorcing itself from the truly miraculous and centralizing the
authority of public reason, Hobbes’s Leviathan cannot compel the necessary degree of obedience
from its subjects. The artificial “Mortal God” constructed by the English skeptic lacks access to
the transcendent power of true authority that undergird the feudal order, revelations rooted in
private faith.28
Hobbes doesn’t outright deny the existence of the miracle, but in mandating its
verification by the state, in promoting public skepticism, and by advancing “scientificty” and
philosophy over political theology, the miracle is severely contained. So contained that Schmitt
claims Hobbes has snuffed out the potential for revelatory authority, even for his stated goal of
bolstering loyalty to the state. For Schmitt, Hobbes so overplayed his skepticism that he now
stands as one of the most culpable “inaugurators” of the Enlightenment; on who, in a “style
almost reminiscent of Voltaire’s,” portrayed the peddling of miracles as “error, delusion, and
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open or bidden deceit; the tricks of forgers, actors, ventriloquists, and other swindlers.” Hobbes
accomplished this feat of skepticism “in a manner so vivid that in this domain every claim to
credence seems to be senseless and no longer a subject appropriate for discussion.”29 Convinced
that Hobbes was attempting to unify religion and politics through the mythic grandeur of his
artificial construction, Schmitt is convinced that Hobbes’s rigidity on the question of faith and
miracles will eventually deconstruct Leviathan.30 In creating conditions whereby paying public
“lip service” to the official confessional faith suffices for the state, while acquiescent private
conscience (whether to believe or not) is permitted, Hobbes effectively detached the transcendent
power of revelation and religion from his political system. Thus lacking the ability to “penetrate
the innermost core of men,” the regime was left only with a corrosive skepticism that “contained
the seed of death that destroyed the mighty leviathan from within and brought about the end of
the mortal god.”31
Schmitt contended that a reliance on pervasive skepticism cannot prepare the Hobbesian
state for an exception that exceeds a rationalist sovereign order, for “the exception confounds the
unity and order of the rationalist scheme.”32 Escaping all attempts to constrain or codify it, the
exception, says Schmitt, “can be more important” and “is more interesting than the rule.”33 Its
inherently disruptive ability exposes the limits of the rules and laws it exceeds, revealing the
uneasy borders of general norms based on a legal rationality. The dull artifice of the rationally
constructed liberal system, starting for Schmitt with Hobbes, pales in comparison to the authentic
danger displayed by the eruption of the exceptional moment, and Schmitt clearly appreciated its
power to break through the Weberian routinization that underlay the modern order and uncover a
deeper mode of existence: “In the exception the power of real life breaks through the crust of a
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mechanism that has become torpid by repetition.”34 Free from rational constraints, real life is
only experienced in extremis.
Liberal political orders could not readily avail themselves of this “vital intensity,” for
“(t)he exception was something incommensurable to John Locke’s doctrine of the constitutional
state and the rationalist eighteenth century.”35 This incompatibility was most readily evident
when it came to exceptions premised on miracles and revelations. In his An Essay Concerning
Human Understanding Locke opposed demands to assent to supernatural propositions that
contradict our own reason. Whether they come from individuals claiming a direct inspiration
from God, or miracles related to us secondhand, we must understand every proposition we are
asked to agree with. For at the end of any civil deliberation “reason must be our last judge and
guide in everything.”36 Ideally then, all proselytizing must occur within the domain of civil
society and be governed by the liberal conception of public reasoning.37 Like Hobbes, Locke
sought to anchor public reasoning in theories of natural law, proscribing revelations that are
“inconsistent with natural religion and the rules of morality.” Since the presumption of certain
prophecies that violate natural law also violate the “light of reason,” one “cannot be supposed to
back the contrary [to reason] by revelation; for that would be to destroy the evidence and the use
of reason, without which men cannot be able to distinguish divine revelation from diabolical
imposture.”38 Locke viewed revelations that defied reason, in their earliest Old Testament
examples, as inherently subjective and discursively constrictive, for they were “shut up in a little
corner of the world, amongst a people, by that very law, which they received it, excluded from a
commerce and communication with the rest of mankind.”39 Throughout his political theology,
Locke promoted the circulation and intermingling of Christian doctrines, confident that the
aggregate result of this commerce would be a more “reasonable” Christianity.40
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In his debates with Jonas Proast over the political power of miracles, Locke observed that
according to the Acts of the Apostles “even miracles themselves [performed by Christ’s
disciples] did not effect, upon all eye-witnesses,” and were therefore so subjective as to be
unable to affirm the truth of doctrine or scripture.41 Proast -- as Carl Schmitt would later also
argue -- had linked the compelling power of miracle with the state’s own power to compel
through coercion, implying that the diminishment of the former over time necessitated the
increase in the latter to maintain doctrinal compliance.42 Locke countered that miracles were only
“inwardly compelling” therefore not comparable with external phenomena such as state
coercion, and the inherent mystery and subjectivity of miracles made them incapable of reliably
establishing doctrinal truth or social order.43 At best, from a Lockean perspective, the recourse to
supernatural inspiration as a justification in politics is “at a basic level disrespectful of the
rational capabilities and sensibility of the other.”44
Locke frequently asserted a similar disdain for and concern over the power of religious
ritual, characterizing it as a form of compliance riven with fraud, contrivances (“wrong notions
and invented rites”) created by priest to “secure their empire” once they had ceased to be
virtuous.45 Priests had “made it not their business to teach” virtue, but instead demanded that the
people be “diligent in their observations and ceremonies, punctual in their feasts and solemnities,
and [adhere to] the tricks of religions,” through which the gullible were told the gods were
pleased. Sacrificial rituals had “an expiatory” function, that too cheaply “atoned” for the
observation of virtue, and “was much more convenient, than a strict and holy life.”46 In Locke’s
view, such rituals were always Pharisaic and patrolled by scoundrels, for it was Jesus himself
who overturned the very need for rituals “by nailing to his cross the law of ordinances.”47 Even
when priestly rituals and authority were to be tolerated, Locke insisted that they be proscribed
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from any sort of theocratic pretense. Whatever powers a voluntaristic Church society granted its
priest, Locke was adamant that they could not “in any manner be extended to Civil Affairs,” for
individual Churches were “absolutely separate and distinct.”48

Perhaps unique among major twentieth century political theorists, Schmitt perceived
revelation as necessary for politics and according to Meier, “sought to the best of his ability to
combine them.”49 Schmitt’s dictum “sovereign is he who decides the exception” could very well
have been amended “and there is no exception of greater exigency than the revelation” to better
emphasize the crucial force of revelation in his political theology. Echoing Hobbes’s analysis of
how the political symbolism of the miracle was used to establish the authority of an elect capable
of receiving and interpreting its messages, Schmitt inverted Hobbes’s concern over the invidious
demands for obedience from revelation, perceiving its potentially transcendent power as a source
of henotic strength and motivation. Instead of abandoning revelation as a basis of sovereign
authority, Schmittian political theology “presupposes faith in the truth of revelation. It
subordinates everything to revelation and traces everything back to it. Insofar as political
theology champions the binding force of revelation, it places itself in the service of obedience.”50
As elucidated by Meier, “political theology stand and falls with faith in revelation” and a demand
for faithful obedience to its message is the key determinant of a revelation’s political content.51
Lacking that demand, competing claims to revelatory truth within a system of religious pluralism
won’t necessarily compel the various faiths or secular philosophies within society to antipathy
and conflict. The rancorous polarization that Hobbes feared arrives “as soon as a theology claims
to be blessed with the revelation of sovereign authority that demands obedience,” for under such
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a broad ultimatum “whoever does not decide for the truth of faith decides against it.”52 To
contest the validity of the revelation is to be an enemy of the faith in the revelation.53
For Schmitt only the theological is what is politically authoritative, and he proposed in
the first edition of The Concept of the Political that this lack could be “corrected” within
liberalism by its reassertion “whether from the political or the religious [side].”54 Liberal
democracy’s inability to sustain the basis of its own legitimation engendered a profound and
continuing crisis, making it both feasible and “politically imperative to uncover the theological
thought forms once used to imagine, build, and defend the European state.”55 Genealogical
investigation aside, Schmitt never precisely described why the theological conception was still so
essential for grounding the sovereign, and though he proclaimed the contemporary need for the
miraculous, the theologically inflected exception for which a liberal regime -- with its reliance on
secularism -- had no answer for, he never developed a larger theological framework necessary
for the reception and interpretation of the miraculous. The exceptional moment was frequently
described by Schmitt in eschatological terms and in an apocalyptic tenor, but its particular
political telos -- or eschatology -- was never posited to be within orthodox Christianity.56 Two of
his primary examples of political theology, Maistre and Donoso Cortes, were both deeply
heterodox in their Catholic faith, and the religious component of Schmitt’s own political
theology is not considered Catholic in any conventionally understood sense.57
Philosophers like Peter E. Gordon have observed this peculiar vagueness to the
theological dimension of Schmitt’s political theology, arguing that his theological lexicon was
“impoverished,” his political existentialism rather abstract, and that he failed to “specify exactly
which strands of our tremendously variegated theological tradition are truly of relevance today.”
Similarly, Heinrich Meier and Gopal Balakrishanan have convincingly countered the effort to
123

portray Schmitt’s political theology as merely a reactionary extension of his Catholicism by
emphasizing the idiosyncratically revelatory and deliberately elusive theological qualities that
are distinguished from the merely confessional doctrine he professed.58 Böckenförde, “in light of
many personal conversations with Schmitt,” claims that the “theological portions of his political
theology were influenced by religious convictions and interpretations in which he is deeply
rooted and which propel him to act. Yet this remains essentially hidden.” These mystical
motivations were not “communicated on the level of science” but were conveyed “only
encryptically.” Böckenförde remains mystified by the “the cipher of ‘political theology’ that is
the key to Schmitt,” uncertain as to how to disentangle those religious convictions that emerged
from a Catholic “ecclesiastical framework” from those that “were of a far more personal kind.”59
Schmitt never invoked a historical or contemporary revelation as an exemplar for his
exceptional politics. Whatever his aspirations, when it came to asserting any distinct grounding
for God’s sovereignty on earth he offered no answers, for “in the end everything [in his political
theology] depends on the question before which [Schmitt] stops himself.”60 For Schmitt, the
insidious advance of Hobbes’s “natural scientificty” since the 17th century had evicted God from
the world, first into the disenchanting metaphysics of deism and then neutralized into a merely
depoliticized, more individualistic concept. “The concepts that were developed over many
centuries of theological thought are now becoming uninteresting and are turning into a private
affair,” he lamented.61 Schmitt sees the private sphere as where liberalism buries its troublesome
theologies, and it is there, in the realm of an individual’s religious liberty, that Joseph Smith
seeks to resurrect political theology. Unable to articulate a viable theological program, Schmitt’s
precise political theology remains vague, “encrypted,” but Joseph illustrates what a modern
revelatory politics looks like on the ground and in an American form. He reveals what a
124

Schmittian theology would actually looks like in practice, and, following Schmitt, why it must
follow a stark friend/enemy distinction and theocratic politics.
Like Schmitt, Joseph’s political theology placed the battle lines of contemporary politics
within the framework of an imminent “eschatological confrontation,” a cataclysmic conflict that
“appears simultaneously as the promise of faith and as the completion of great politics.”62In
pursuit of his political goal, the restoration of an epic age of prophets, Joseph’s frequent appeals
to the apocalypse were not merely instrumental, an only rhetorical resort to catastrophe when
times were daunting, they were constant, a license for a broader plane of action for him and the
core of his movement, a continual politics of exception. In a hierarchy of revelatory politics, the
encroaching apocalypse is the apex of exceptionalism; within modern political theory it is an
anachronism, a theological category thrust back into the modern era. Minor revelations involving
more prosaic matters of church life and ritual don’t necessarily challenge the state, but a
revelation of imminent national catastrophe and the rise of a new elect asserts both a supernatural
event and a transcendent authority far beyond the capability of the state to manage or even
access. The inherent apocalypticism of Joseph’s theology characterized both his exceptional
political and their reception in Jacksonian America: as his career progressed his prophecies
increasingly rejected popular sovereignty, and his revelations of Mormon triumph over their
neighbors drove a sharp friend/enemy distinction into communities adjoining Mormon enclaves.
Thematically similar to other millenarian movements, Mormon apocalypticism heralded a sacred
age of divine manifestations for its adherents, a break with the present in which a theocratic
nation would arise from the destruction of the old. However, the rapid debut of new
commandments, scriptures, and doctrines lent a peculiar dynamism to Joseph’s theology, a
doctrinal fluidity that appeared situational to outsiders -- a license to convene laws established
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through popular sovereignty that, in order to avoid public scrutiny, assumed ever greater degrees
of secrecy.
Secrecy gained more prominence in Joseph’s theology and Mormon practice with the
quiet introduction of the principle of plural marriage, a volatile new doctrine unveiled to a select
few. Running counter to the egalitarian access to scripture proposed by Martin Luther in his
concept of Christian liberty, secrecy established different audiences for revelations, degrees of
elite hierarchies of faith and loyalty within Mormonism, and became conceptually intertwined
with tests of loyalty, sacrifice, and plural marriage. All of these radical tenets and secret practices
helped to determine and reinforce loyalty to Joseph as the divine prophet of the imminent
apocalypse. From their perspective, Joseph and his latter-day Saints believed secrecy was
theologically justified since they were surrounded by unholy enemies, living on the precipice of
Christ’s final kingdom, and were engaged in a larger cosmological order of politics than mere
democracy. Joseph wrote to a newspaper editor in January of 1833:
And now I am prepared to say by the authority of Jesus Christ, that not many years shall
pass away before the United States shall present such a scene of bloodshed as has not a
parallel in the history of our nation; pestilence, hail, famine, and earthquake will sweep
the wicked of this generation from off the face of the land, to open and prepare the way
for the return of the lost tribes of Israel from the north country. The people of the Lord,
those who have complied with the requirements of the new covenant, have already
commenced gathering together to Zion, which is in the state of Missouri . . .63
Where the specific “metaphysical core” of Schmitt’s political theology and the content of
his proposed “truth in revelation” remained undefined, Joseph was utterly “inflexible in his
insistence that his encounters with Deity involved literal speech acts between divine persons and
himself. The Book of Mormon he produced emphasizes as one of its cardinal teaching the
urgency of embracing dialogic revelation as the birthright of righteous seekers in all ages.”64 His
insistent leitmotif on the power of revelation was distinctly different however from evangelical
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Protestantism in both its expansion of entirely new revelatory scriptures and a rejection of
Protestant pluralism and popular sovereignty. Though revelation could be open to all who joined
the faith, Joseph placed himself as its central authority – an early revelation recorded in the
Doctrine and Covenants warned the Mormon faithful to “give heed unto all [of Joseph’s] words
and commandments which he shall give unto you as he receiveth them . . . . For his word ye shall
receive, as if from mine own mouth . . . For by doing these things, the gates of hell shall not
prevail against you.”65
As a hermeneutic practice Susan Juster remarks, this concentration of prophetic power
into that of a single revelator appears deeply authoritarian in its silencing of contending voices.66
Politically, the claims of nonbelievers, when they clashed with revelation, would have to be
over-ridden or ignored, for to provide those claims equal weight in political deliberations would
mean the “devaluation of direct, ‘dialogic’ revelation. Smith's followers [therefore] objected to
the process of transferring sovereignty from God to the people.”67 If God spoke only to an elect
(through dialogic revelation), then the elect must be sovereign, and to ignore their revelations
was profane. Joseph’s revelations, following the privileged path of divine communications
warned of by Hobbes, proclaimed the authoritative truth of a sovereign, biblical God, and with
the prophet’s revered position as primary recipient of His truth, Joseph was God’s highest
authority on earth, an argument that would eventually lead to his claim of sovereignty over all
the earth.68 In his King Follett Sermon of April 7, 1844, Joseph proclaimed:
If I am so fortunate as to be the man to comprehend God, and explain or convey the
principles to your hearts, so that the Spirit seals them upon you, then let every man and
woman henceforth sit in silence, put their hands on their mouths, and never lift their
hands or voices, or say anything against the man of God or the servants of God again. . . .
I will prove that the world is wrong, by showing what God is. I am going to inquire after
God; for I want you all to know Him, and to be familiar with Him; and if I am bringing
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you to a knowledge of Him, all persecutions against me ought to cease. You will then
know that I am His servant; for I speak as one having authority.69
As Meier remarked on Schmittian political theology, to deny the authority of revelation is
to be an enemy of faith in revelation, and in Joseph’s most militant statements, all critics of his
authority were to remain silent.70 Citizens outside the faith, when confronted with the Mormons’
revelatory politics in Ohio and Missouri in the early 1830s, reacted with outrage to this
presumption, particularly when Joseph prophesied to his followers that the land of Missouri
would soon transition from “your enemies” to the Mormon people.71 Strikingly similar to the
friend/enemy distinction that Schmitt placed, in its most intensified form, in the eschatological
confrontation between Christ and the Antichrist, the Mormon conflict with the “gentiles” was
prophesied by Joseph as a quickening of the apocalypse.72 Early in the movement, according to
Underwood, the Mormons subscribed to a “soteriological dualism, whereby their enemies were
damned “to perdition, while the elect live on triumphantly in a transformed world.” (Joseph
would later modify his cosmology of an interminable hell with hell gradations of salvation in his
“Vision of the Three Degrees of Glory”)73 Adhering to a sharply polarizing eschatology common
to millenarian movements, Mormons perceived a totalizing battle over all the earth where “the
lines between good and evil, between saintly and satanic,” their friends and their enemies were
“clearly drawn,” and this shaped their view of the world around them. Neighboring communities
would often be portrayed by labels such as “the congregations of the wicked” and deemed to be
either in league with Lucifer or his dupes.74
In their perception of themselves, the Mormon faithful believed that Joseph’s revelations
were nothing less than the triumphant return of God’s active presence in the world. Spiritual gifts
and the return of miracles under the guidance of a true prophet were signs that the true Christian
church had been restored to the faithful, as was the persecution from false Christians and satanic
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agents that followed -- just as The Book of Mormon predicted. Bushman writes that the Saints
believed that “great work . . . was to be accomplished through the book. It was not only the
herald of restoration; the Book of Mormon was the instrument for accomplishing it. The book
worked on the premise that a history – a book – can reconstitute a nation. It assumes that by
giving a nation an alternative history, alternative values can be made to grow.”75
The alternative values advanced in Mormon scripture had no enduring place for
Jacksonian democracy. One of the Book of Mormon’s dominant themes is that democracy and all
other forms of government have disastrously failed, and only under a theocratic government,
ruled by God’s elect, can society survive and prosper in the present and prepare for the
apocalyptic future. “Mormon civil theology,” writes the historian Michael D. Quinn “ultimately
dictated that the church depart radically from American political norms . . . in the middle of
Andrew Jackson’s first term as U.S. president (1829-33) when the national rhetoric praised the
common man and democracy, the Book of Mormon favored monarchy.”76 According to the Book
of Mormon, ancient tribes in America incurred divine disasters by placing popular sovereignty,
with all of its attendant pluralist confusion, above God’s. As the political scientist Michael
Barkun has observed across millennial movements “disaster harkens the breakdown of old values
associated with [religious] conversion.” The old order of the status quo “has failed to both to
prevent disaster and to explain it,” indeed, in its corruption and deviance, it has impelled the
imminent catastrophe.77
As a signal of a break with the secular past, the very arrival of the Book of Mormon began
what Mormons called “the restoration of all things,” an ecstatic return of ancient rites, rituals,
and priestly authority for an interim theocratic kingdom until Christ soon returned to rule man in
an Edenic state.78 The visions, rituals, and symbols of the imminent apocalypse were esoteric,
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transmitted through secret ritual, which helped to “conceal the message from the persecuting
majority and reserve it only for the elect.”79 The Mormon focus on the apocalypse began as early
as 1831, when a revelation told Joseph to prepare his people for the millennium by organizing a
new social order, and in those early years the Saints often set the arrival of the apocalypse within
a half dozen years: “Awakened one morning at 4 a.m. to see the signs in the heavens, Joseph
reported, “I arose and beheld to my great Joy the stars fall from heaven . . . a sure sign that the
coming of Christ is close at hand.”80 From then on, “wherever he was,” according to Bushman,
Joseph constantly watched “the world through a millennial lens,” looking for “calamities
signaling the end.”81
The approaching apocalypse demanded everything from those Christ had chosen.
Compared with other 19th century American religious movements, Joseph outdistanced his
millenarian competitors and indulged in a more radical range of political action and spiritual
authority by wielding his revelatory power to create, at the base of his movement, a refounded
Israel.82 He transformed a presumptive Protestant schism into a modern American tribe bonded
together by peculiar religious practices, polygamy, persecution and above all, their belief and
love in Joseph himself. At top, to weather the coming storm, he instituted an intricately
overlapping hierarchy that, in its transgressiveness and scope of power, exercised a protoNietzschean vision of elite individual freedom and aristocratic political privilege. His
transgression of contemporary taboos, combined with his disarming grandiosity and exalted
authoritarianism, led to bloody conflicts with outsiders, state and local governments, and many
defections – while ultimately enhancing his spiritual and secular authority among his remnant
and new recruits. Defiance of convention and laws testified to his greatness, his status as a
modern prophet and leader. Throughout his turbulent life there is an incredible and tremendously
130

improvisational quality to Joseph’s prophetic political tactics and religious dramaturgy: deep
personal rifts and theological contradictions are barely bridged with last moment revelations;
time and again struggles over authority and authenticity are won by the power of his personal
charisma and testament; all manner of rival prophets, dubious friends, and outright grifters are
drawn deep into his personal and institutional orbit only to be expelled, often violently; mobs
and militia come close to ending his life many times, before finally succeeding in Catharge,
Illinois in 1844.
In describing the dynamism typical of new millenarian movements, Barkun notes that the
charisma of the prophet is particularly vulnerable, “for it is of the essence of charisma that one
who has it be seen to performed; he must prove himself in the eyes of his followers.”83 The
prophet must continually reaffirm and complement the symbolic order he has created by readily
supplying new omens and portents; the experiences of the faithful must constantly be fitted into
an eschatological framework that makes immediate and absolute claims on reality. The world,
and its vision of an emerging order, must always be validated by the new word.84 Whatever
political opportunity or crisis confronted Joseph, revelation always pointed a way forward. The
ceaseless pace of prophecy he produced frequently seemed more attuned to the immediate
impact on his audience over any enduring coherence or fear of contradiction.85 Joseph routinely
revised the language of his collected revelations and The Book of Mormon with each new edition,
and the majority of the Saints, valuing “the process of revelation more than the product,”
appeared not to be terribly troubled by the inconsistencies.86
Remarking on his relentless revelations and penchant for revision, Bushman notes, “At
other points in his life, he was to think he had finished, and then a new revelation would drive
him on. He perpetually initiated new campaigns and taught new doctrines. His administrative
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style was almost excessively dynamic.”87 The author Walter Kirn labels Joseph’s mode of
“perpetually promising the world” as “Dynamic Overextension,” and when related, as it often
was, to Joseph’s continual extension of the millenarian horizon after the apparent failure of some
of his short term prophecies, it bears a strong resemblance to what the historian Richard Landes
calls “apocalyptic jazz,” in which “cognitive dissonance, or the confusion that arises with
apocalyptic disappointment, is often rationalized away with a form of prophetic
improvisation.”88 Early in their ministry obvious disjunctures in chronologies and discrepancies
in doctrine led to efforts by Joseph and Oliver Cowdery to establish some degree of retroactive
continuity, but these efforts gave way to the commandments proclaiming Joseph’s prophetic
powers unimpeachable, notably after Cowdery was purged.89 Like Schmitt’s praise of the
exception’s “vital intensity,” with its power to “break through the crust of mechanism that has
become torpid by repetition,” Joseph’s relentless prophetic style valorized exceptional moments
over general norms.90 The prophet’s authority was not to be constrained by worldly law or, as the
Church rapidly evolved, even a need to synchronize with previous prophecies or sacred text.91
When challenged by a “leading man in the Church” during a sermon in Kirtland to keep
his prophecies in line with those already laid down in the (now) canonical works of the Bible,
The Book of Mormon, and The Doctrine and Covenants, Joseph summoned Brigham Young to
speak in his defense. Young chastised the challenger, arguing that compared with “living
oracles,” these works of static scripture “are nothing,” for they “do not convey the word of God
direct to us now, as do the words of the Prophet or a man bearing the Holy Priesthood in our day
and generation.” Joseph seconded his testimony, “Brother Brigham has told you the word of the
Lord, and he has told you the truth.”92
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Of his many prophecies in which he proclaimed his paramount revelatory authority,
Joseph best explained his highly flexible mode of dynamic overextension, in April of 1842, in
his letter to Nancy Rigdon, the nineteen-year-old daughter of his friend and apostle Sidney
Rigdon. After his secret marriage proposal to her was rebuffed, Joseph instructed Nancy on why
she must overcome her horror and quietly join with him in polygamous marriage. He wrote to
her -- in an extant letter:
That which is wrong under one circumstance, may be and often is, right under another.
God said thou shalt not kill, -- at another time he said thou shall utterly destroy. This is
the principle on which the government of heaven is conducted – by revelation adapted to
the circumstances in which the children of the kingdom are placed. Whatever God
requires is right, no matter what it is, although we may not see the reason thereof till
long after the events transpire. If we seek first the kingdom of God, all good things will
be added . . . even things which may be considered abominable to all who do not
understand the order of heaven . . . (Emphasis added)93
This divine imperative delivered as a marriage proposal is an explicitly political
statement: that which appears to be profoundly situational, even violating previous
commandments, is actually premised on “the principle on which the government of heaven is
conducted.” The demand to do “things which may be considered abominable” is best justified if
“we first seek the kingdom of God,” for “whatever God requires is right, no matter what it is . . .”
The audacity of his transgressive actions and visions demonstrated Joseph’s religious
genius to his followers, and, in turn, fueled his political daring. Wanted in two states, married to
over thirty wives, and assuming ever greater degrees of religious and secular power, Joseph
declared that “I want the liberty of thinking and believing as I please. It feels so good not to be
trammelled.”94 Bushman writes that, “Revelation meant freedom to Joseph, freedom to expand
his mind through time and space, seeking truth wherever it might be.” 95 From his exalted
position, dissent, doctrinal routinization, oversight and excessive rationality were all hindrances
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to truth seeking, to spiritual evolution and personal freedom -- exceptional moments were the
ones that instructed, that brought forth further revelation. Three years after his death, his
successor, Brigham Young, wrote of Joseph’s dissemination of the secret revelation on “celestial
marriage.” The prophet had told Young: “‘I command you to go and get another wife.’ . . . [and]
I said to Joseph,”
Suppose I should apostatize, after taking another wife, would not my family be worse
off?” Joseph answered – “There are certain bounds set to men, and if a man is faithful
and pure to these bounds, God will take him out of the world; if he sees him falter, he
will take him to himself. You are past these bounds, Brigham, and you have this
consolation. . . . Then I said to Joseph, I was ready to go ahead. He passed certain
bounds before certain revelations were given.96
What Young describes is a method whereby an apostle’s discipline of alleged
righteousness, enlivened by the direct reception to God’s word, transcends norms -- and in turn is
given further revelations. As a spiritual prescription for gaining more power and knowledge, this
transcendence of “certain bounds” resembles a Nietzschean exercise of the transvaluation of
values.97 Inspired by Nietzsche, Schmitt too was fascinated by transgressive dynamics whereby
“the exception is more interesting than the rule” for its ability to break through the norm, and
Joseph himself was alive to the power he derived from his exceptional practices and continual
flirtations with violence.98 In a sermon delivered in May 1843, while surrounded by conspiracies
and suppressing ever more dangerous secrets, he proclaimed: “Excitement has become almost
the essence of my life. When that dies away I feel almost lost. When a man is reined up
continually by excitement, he becomes strong and gains power and knowledge.”99
So empowered, Joseph’s political theology, like Schmitt’s, frequently appears ambivalent
about, or even actively opposed to, tranquility and political stability. For both theorists, the
modern conception of peace, with its reliance on a routinized legal order and emphasis on safety,
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was a regime of constraints -- and extraordinary individuals and movements only thrive in
extremis. The perpetual challenge of disorder is more interesting than the solution of order, and
implacable enemies, the adoption of a stark friend/enemy distinction, ensures that a pluralistic
peace and a normative legal order is unobtainable. In his own ideal of political existentialism,
Schmitt wrote that “(t)he ever present possibility of conflict must always be kept in mind. . . . For
to the enemy concept belongs the ever present possibility of combat.”100 Joseph, particularly
towards the end of his life, proclaimed that he thrived in his role of prophet and church founder
in the face of enmity and oppression:
I, like Paul, have been in perils, and oftener than anyone in this generation. As Paul
boasted, I have suffered more than Paul did. I should be like a fish out of water, if I were
out of persecutions. Perhaps my brethren think it requires all this to keep me humble. The
Lord has constituted me so curiously that I glory in persecution. I am not nearly so
humble as if I were not persecuted. If oppression will make a wise man mad, much more
a fool. If they want a beardless boy to whip all the world, I will get on the top of a
mountain and crow like a rooster: I shall always beat them.101

Caught between the instability of his exceptional politics and the continual conflict his
revelations engendered, Joseph sought to stabilize his nascent political order with priesthood
institutions composed of loyal, tightly-knit hierarchies. Richard Wolin has critiqued the
apparently irreconcilable tendency within Schmitt’s thought between a decision that is “‘born of
nothing,’ and thus enacted ex nihilo, in flagrant disregard of the legal and moral requirements”
on the one hand, and on the other a deep regard and drive for a “philosophy of order” that must
commit to maintaining the stability of a political system.102 Ensnared in a similar dynamic,
Joseph struggled to establish the normative grounds necessary for an enduring institution, his
Church. He would attempt to minimize the confusion caused by his disruptive prophecies while
integrating the resulting new decrees into an increasingly peculiar and expansive theology. The
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Church was supposed to be governed by God’s laws, and as Schmitt observed about the stability
of a legal order, for it “to make sense, a normal situation must exist, and he is sovereign who
definitely decides whether this normal situation actually exists.”103 Since new revelations were
being continually disclosed by Joseph, doctrines were in almost continual flux, and even
seemingly foundational commandments were subject to revision. According to Bushman, “every
attempt to regularize belief was diffused by new revelations.”104 In order to stabilize his Church
and provide a foundation for his theocracy, Joseph would need to provide some form of
institutional structure for the governance of the faith and increase the solidarity of his Mormons
as a distinct people. In order to so he would have to contest those elements that made them more
mobile, communicative, and independent subjects operating within the religious world of
Lockean pluralism and turn them insular and secretive. His political theology would have to
incorporate unique tenets to make them, as they became known as, a “peculiar people.
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Chapter 6: The Peculiar Prerogatives of American Zion
Like Schmitt, Joseph believed that the identity of a people was sacred and one of the
most extraordinary accomplishments of his prophetic ministry was to create one. In order to do
so his political theology would evolve to reveal new doctrines and practices that bound together
the mobile, communicative, and independent subjects of Lockean religious pluralism into a
distinct ethno-religious people. He achieved this remarkable feat of social aggregation within a
pluralist society by repurposing some of liberalism’s essential freedoms into theocratic ties. As a
budding patriarch, Joseph’s uniquely anachronistic success was to weld his theocratic
prerogatives to a tribal structure that was both strikingly new, in situating an elect people and
sacred place in America, while seemingly ancient, in its invocation of God’s promise of a chosen
Jewish people -- a projection requiring a whole new covenant that mirrored the Book of Exodus.
Joseph asserted that a Hebraic lineage ran from Israel through ancient America and to his
Mormon flock, promising them a Zion on the frontier of the United States as a refuge from
oppression.1 Exodus had been a liberatory inspiration cited long before by Anglo-American
revolutionaries and republicans, but Joseph deviated from the nationalist arc of that tradition by
emphasizing a much more literal reading and application of its subject, the “people of Israel,”
and he readily assumed the desirability of theocracy over the tradition’s many republican
interpretations.2 Michael Walzer has written that “Exodus is a journey forward – not only time
and space. It is a moral progress, a transformation. The men and women who reach Canaan are,
literally and figuratively, not the same men and women who left Egypt.”3 Joseph’s young
Church, in following his vision, underwent a march of their own with the requisite persecution,
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struggle and backsliding, an exodus that transformed them into a Mormon people. The
distinctiveness, militancy and tight societal bonds of tribal affiliation tied the Mormons not only
to Joseph, but cut down on the social and economic variables of mobility and independence in
American frontier society, assimilating migrant nuclear families that had been detached from
their larger clan or community out of economic opportunity or necessity. Helping to lead the
people, the hierarchical ties among the Mormon elite were further tightened by Abrahamic tests
of faith and a web of polygamous and polyandrous marriage with the Prophet himself at the
center.
So successful was Joseph in forging his peculiar people out of Lockean pluralist society
that even today political scientists hold up Mormon distinctiveness as an example that within
American religious pluralism, “Rumors of death of ethno-religious politics have been greatly
exaggerated.”4 Joseph’s antagonistic symbiosis with American pluralism would score its
distinctive successes by combining theocratic precepts analogous to those found in Schmittian
and Maistrean political theology with demands for religious liberty, integrating these antipluralistic elements into Lockean pluralism in order to eventually supersede it. Of the many
peculiar doctrines that made Mormonism different from its Protestant origins, it was the Mormon
priesthood, separatism, secrecy, polygamy and the acceptance of sacrifice that most drew them
apart. The theocratic formulation of each tenet struck against key concepts of Lockean political
theology, and they could be combined in complex and subtle ways that American pluralist
society found difficult to legally regulate. This chapter first situates each of these theocratic
doctrines against the backdrop of Lockean political theory, and then examines their evolution
within Joseph’s political thought. Focusing on their unusual or outright bizarre aspects will
illustrate how their integration into Mormon doctrine assisted in forging a unique ethno-religious
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identity away from the normative pluralism of the time, an identity intrinsically receptive to
theocracy. After discussing the characteristics of each, a deeper examination of polygamy’s
theoretical challenge to the dominant American familial arrangement of monogamy will be
applied. Finally, a brief exploration of how Joseph’s conflation of the empyrean with the
everyday will conclude with how his continual evocation of the sacred ran the risk of banality.

Structurally, Joseph’s introduction of the Mormon priesthood institutionalized a
hierarchical access to the divine, its Masonically-influenced ranks with their grades of
ontological privilege similar to those theorized by Maistre in his aspirations towards Christian
restoration.5 In containing disorder and apostasy, Joseph’s priesthood could ideally establish a
hierarchy both loyal to Joseph and capable of implementing his new doctrines and rituals.
Locke, as previously discussed, insisted that ecclesiastic power be kept separated from civil
power and he demonstrated considerable suspicion of priests and priestly ritual, seeing them as
outmoded constraints on the free flow of religious ideas.6 In his conception, a church was ideally
a “voluntary Society of Men,” who had peacefully united for the “publick worshipping of God.”7
The more public and accessible church doctrine was, the better the assurance that there was no
practice of “secret Evil,” whereby “men arrogate to themselves, and those of their own Sect,
some peculiar Prerogative, covered over with a specious shew of deceitful words, but in effect
opposite to the Civil Right of the Community.”8 Central to Locke’s political theology was the
proposition that “reason must be our last judge and guide in everything,” and that the precepts of
Christian faith should be readily accessible so that, provided the time and ability, seekers could
work out their inherent reasonableness free from coercion. As a theological premise, Locke
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portrayed Jesus’s clash with the Sanhedrin as the triumph of reason and consent over the more
coercive religious power of the Hebraic priesthood.9
In theorizing both the economy and the interchange of religious convictions, Locke
encouraged “the circulation and exchange of goods, ideas, and people.”10 For him, much like
Luther, “Jesus heralds the broad circulation” of God’s word. It was through the free circulation
of ideas that the intrinsic reasonableness of Christianity would predominate in the marketplace of
religious ideas, the consensus building process of public discussion and reflection over doctrine
making it ever more reasonable as it shed superstitions and an antiquated reliance on miracles
alone.11 (As I.T. Ramsay remarks, over time this dynamic within the public sphere had the effect
of diluting mystery and what was theologically distinctive about the particulars of the Christian
faith.12) Circulation would also open up worship geographically, not confining it by ritual to
specific religious sites. Jesus’s ministry showed that the “magnificent temple, and confinement to
certain places, were now no longer necessary for his worship, which by a pure heart might be
performed any where.”13
In Joseph’s political theology, secrecy and separation are methods of restoring the social
power of the miracle within Locke’s increasingly skeptical world. Secrecy inhibits the
circulation of religious ideas, helping to create – along with the priesthood -- hierarchies of
sacred knowledge within Mormonism. It could also serve as a testing ground to check the degree
of social acceptance of new doctrines, it could shelter “infant, half-formulated ideas from
persecution by keeping them hidden from public knowledge.”14 Separatism for Joseph was also
means of creating a safe space where his miracles could incubate and attach themselves to social
power, enhancing the sanctification of his people. From that social power would grow increasing
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political power, and both forms were most safely cultivated on the frontier, away from form the
urban centers where it their accumulation would be more rapidly and forcibly contested.
Even far from major cities, Joseph’s introduction of Mormon polygamy would still attract
the outrage and violence from the Gentile world culminating in his death. Why polygamy, what
did it do sociologically for the formation of the Mormon people? How did it strike against
theories of the family in Lockean pluralism? In Pritchard analysis, Locke holds a strong
ambivalence about the outer limits of religious diversity and its “concomitant promiscuity,” an
ambivalence which finds him turning to the family to provide the socially stabilizing grounds of
affection and unity. “Returning to the family . . . has the added benefit of cultivating the feeling
of dependency that is so prized by Locke. Locke’s worldly, promiscuous subjects will
nonetheless feel strong emotional bonds for their parental nurturers and heavenly father.”15
Although he argues for untethering “religion from the steady reproduction of political and
familial patrimony,” Locke “reenvisions and redeploys the family as the foundation of his
political theology. Thus, Lockean political theology appears paradoxical: subjects “are freed
from patriarchal political-religious power only to be quietly imbued with a softer version of this
power,” a power based more on familial pedagogy.16 Joseph returns to a more explicit form of
patriarchal political-religious power by dramatically restructuring the family through polygamy,
enhancing ties to a heavenly father and creating a patriarchal model derived from the Hebrew
Bible. Starting with his most trusted disciples in Nauvoo, Joseph prophesied that this return to
patriarchal families would spread out to unite the globe. Familial bonds sealed in temple
ordinances form a “theological imperative” to weave together “all of humanity into a vast
network of interlocking, eternal relationships.” (Thus the related effort to baptize the dead,
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reaching those who had missed the new and everlasting covenant of plural marriage and bringing
them too into the Mormon fold.)17
As we’ve considered previously, Locke believed that Christianity had dispensed with
sacrificial ritual (indeed almost all religious ritual) and the clear preference in his political
theology is for tacit consent expressed through spiritual enlightening words over more coercive
displays of political loyalty and fixed group membership.18 For Joseph Smith and Maistre
however, “the road back to God” was “not with enlightening words” but through renewed
practices of Christian restoration such as sacrificial ritual.19 Sacrifice in Joseph Smith’s theology
served several functions. Explicitly, its return was a covenantal signal that devotion was deep
enough for the Church to endure, a tenet Maistre has suggested earlier in a European context.
Sacrifice was a recognition of divine sovereignty, an eschatological proof of the political
restoration of God’s Kingdom on earth. Instrumentally, as the anthropologists Scott Atran and
Jeremy Ginges have proposed, adherence to bizarre religious beliefs can increase group
solidarity in ways that a larger liberal society cannot. Whereas “fully reasoned social contracts
that regulate individual interests to share costs and benefits of cooperation can be more liable to
collapse,” in contrast, “costly and seemingly arbitrary ritual commitment to apparently absurd
beliefs deepens trust, galvanizing group solidarity for common defense and blinding members to
exit strategies.”20 As discussed in the previous chapter, Joseph Smith declared his intention “to
so organize the Church, that the brethren might eventually be independent of every encumbrance
beneath the celestial kingdom, by bonds and covenants of mutual friendship and love.”21 As I
shall illustrate, the secretive, separatist, and sacrificial components Joseph ultimately revealed in
his theology apply a more authoritarian and punitive cast to those bonds and covenants than just
friendship and love alone.
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Amidst the doctrinal chaos of his highly dynamic young religion, Joseph proposed that
rituals and ranks of priesthood would provide a semblance of institutional order. As Pritchard has
observed, political theologies dependent – as Mormonism was – on immanent sacrality “tend to
set up hierarchical and competitive structures of differential access to this sacred.”22 Managing
access to the sacred is much easier with institutional gatekeepers and varying levels of access.
Though he frequently derided “priestcraft” at the start of his ministry, Joseph began to develop
complex orders of priestly hierarchy a few years into his ministry to diminish confusion about
the status of doctrine and assist the Prophet in governing the Church.23 He, as Bushman observes,
“almost always wound theology around his organizational changes.”24 For Joseph, the most
dangerous threat to faith was that both apostates from within the Church, and skeptics from the
outside world, fed an unholy perplexity among the faithful -- and he preached that they had the
same origin.25 Warning that spiritual gifts could be counterfeited by Satan, Joseph cautioned that
“the Devil can speak in tongues,” and only a trained priesthood could accurately determine the
providence of the supernatural.26 Priestly hierarchies organized and trained through secret rites
would serve to verify and promote the truth of Joseph’s revelations to the wider church, while
protecting them from the sort of public scrutiny and skepticism that Hobbes and Locke had
promoted to dispel the politically invidious power of revelation. Once more in Joseph’s political
theology, religious pluralism, both societal and institutional, was conflated with Satanic
confusion.27 Hill writes that loyalty to the priesthood among Mormon emerged as “the
paramount virtue,” and as the orders were granted new powers they became vital “instruments of
group cohesion.”28 After priestly ranks were firmly established and aspirants to the higher
echelons properly vetted, these ascending orders of priesthood would become the basis for
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Joseph’s evolving political system -- a theocratic kingdom.29 Joseph’s confidence in the stability
a restored priesthood would provide was initially exceedingly optimistic: “Conflicting opinions,
the clash of doctrines, the diversity of sentiment [exists]. Let the Melchizedek priesthood be
introduced and men be subject to their teaching and their sectarian, narrow contracted notions
would flee away.... The anarchy and confusion that prevails among men would disappear.”30
Establishing a reliable priesthood was no easy task, however. To guide the elect, Joseph
continually tinkered with an increasingly elaborate and overlapping set of orders, quorums, and
governing councils, the eventual cadres of a Mormon hierarchy. The fluctuations in its structure
and content can be historically correlated with the unstable dynamics between Joseph’s
increasingly radical revelations and the expulsions and dissensions that continually wracked the
Church. Many of the defectors doubted Joseph’s more radical revelations, and the movement
was rife with high-ranking disciples who apostatized.31 Apostates who “denied the faith” were
“cut off,” and when they came from the upper echelons of the Church their excommunications
were often violent.32 Curbing apostasy by properly preparing the elect meant acclimating the
Saints to constant doctrinal innovation, a process which required both a continuing battle against
some of the more staid traditions of contemporary Christianity and a willingness to jettison even
recently adopted Mormon traditions in favor of newer ones. It was lonely work. Joseph
complained that:
There has been a great difficulty in getting anything into the heads of this generation. It
has been like splitting hemlock knots with a corn-dodger [a piece of corn bread] for a
wedge, and a pumpkin for a beetle [a wooden mallet]. Even the Saints are slow to
understand.
I have tried for a number of years to get the minds of the Saints prepared to receive the
things of God; but we frequently see some of them, after suffering all they have for the
work of God, will fly to pieces like glass as soon as anything comes that is contrary to
their traditions: they cannot stand the fire at all. How many will be able to abide a
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celestial law, and go through and receive their exaltation, I am unable to say, as many are
called, but few are chosen. 33
Outside of the faithful, the widely perceived peculiarity of the new Mormon myths,
particularly in their tendency to inspire derision from mainline culture, demonstrates to what
degree faith in the modern miracle is necessarily culturally idiomatic, even secretive. In
confronting the dangers of public scrutiny and the frequent turmoil caused by apostasy,34 Joseph
encountered what Charles Taylor calls the “fragilization of faith” among his followers; the
awareness that “people who lead ‘normal’ lives do not share my faith (and perhaps believe
something very different),” therefore “my own faith commitment becomes fragile—put into
question, dubitable.”35 Strengthening a fragile and rapidly developing faith, maintaining
communal belief in the return of the miraculous in the face of widespread hostility and
skepticism, required restricting knowledge of key elements of the sacred to Mormon
communities alone. The ideal Lockean social practice of broadcasting and openly debating all
aspects of doctrine in pursuit of an ever more reasonable Christianity had to be curbed, and the
political control to do so could best be maintained in communities that were situated in the
relative isolation of the frontier. As evidenced by some of the early movement’s skeptical
encounters and adverse reactions in the Eastern cities, the proximity Zion to large urban centers
would have led to even more direct conflicts with state and federal authorities – especially as
Church doctrines grew more socially and politically transgressive -- in those places where both
legal and liberal cultural power was strongest.36
Susan Juster discovered the same withdrawal to the periphery in her study of AngloAmerican prophets: in the nineteenth century, a shared aversion to industrialization,
cosmopolitan skepticism, and growing state power inspired diverse millenarians to turn “their
back on the city,” and embrace a militant pastoralism. Mormonism, for Juster, was “the most
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spectacular example” of this prophetic exodus, a pilgrimage away from urban centers to the
frontier so that “the vices of the modern world are held at bay” by great patriarchs ruling over
pacific kingdoms.37 Zion would therefore lie, as Bushman describes, “on the margins of the
civilized world, not at the center;” the New Jerusalem would find its “own space at the edge of
American settlement.”38 There the secretive dissemination of Joseph’s more peculiar and
grandiose revelations could better rely on the cultivation of a specifically Mormon culture for
their limited reception -- with the express understanding that they were not yet available for a
broader cultural distribution. Secrecy helped to shield the content of dramatic revelations and the
peculiar forms of new rituals, as well as conceal the expanding development of theocratic
practices and imperial ambitions.
In April of 1844, Sidney Rigdon delivered a lecture on Church history at the Nauvoo
conference describing the need for secrecy at the beginnings of the movement. Rigdon revealed
that at his first Mormon conference in Waterloo, New York, fourteen years prior, the nascent
Church already required that prophecy be discussed in “secret chambers” to shield it from the
corrosive effects of ridicule and outright violence.
We knew the whole world would laugh at us, so we concealed ourselves; and there was
much excitement about our meetings, charging us with designs against the government,
and with laying plans to get money &c, which never existed in the heads of any one else,
and if we talked in public, we should have been ridiculed more than we were, the world
being entirely ignorant of the testimony of the prophets . . . So we were obliged to retire
to our secret chambers, and commune with God.39
We talked about the people coming as doves to the windows; that all nations should flock
unto it; that they should come bending to the standard of Jesus, saying, ‘Our fathers have
taught falsehood and things in which there is no profit,’ and of whole nations being born
in one day. We talked such big things that men could not hear them, and they not only
ridiculed us for what we did say in public, but threated and inflicted much personal
abuse; and had they heard all we said, their violence would have been insupportable. 40
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Rigdon’s testimony is intriguing not only for its possible dating of an emerging
nationalist sentiment (“of whole nations being born in a day”) so early in the Church’s history,
but also for its assertion that anti-Mormon reaction would have been even more extreme if the
full range of Mormon heterodoxy was made public. Now that the Mormons were more secure in
Nauvoo in 1844, Rigdon relaxed his guard enough to explain the initial necessity of secret
meetings:
The time has now come to tell why we held secret meetings. We were maturing plans
fourteen years ago which we can now tell; were we maturing plans to corrupt the world, to
destroy the peace of society? Let fourteen years of the experience of the church tell the story.
The church would have never been here, if we had not done as we did in secret. The cry of false
prophet, and imposter rolled upon us . . . 41
Aside from Rigdon’s personal testimony, a commandment delivered to Martin Harris by
Joseph in the summer of 1829 already established that the larger world was not ready for the full
scope of revelations and teachings of the Prophet: “And I command you that you preach naught
but repentance, and show not these things unto the world until it is wisdom in me. For they
cannot bear meat now, but milk they must receive; wherefore, they must not know these things,
lest they perish.”42 Faith in Joseph and his first visions would precede knowledge of all of the
new covenants and doctrines that had been received. A year later, in September of 1830, Joseph
would link the fullness of faith in his revelations to the imperative of establishing a refuge for his
followers from the coming apocalypse.
And ye are called to bring to pass the gathering of mine elect; for mine elect hear my
voice and harden not their hearts; Wherefore the decree hath gone forth from the Father
that they shall be gathered in unto one place upon the face of this land, to prepare their
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hearts and be prepared in all things against the day when tribulation and desolation are
sent forth upon the wicked.43
In February of 1831, Joseph conveyed a series of laws similar to the Ten Commandments
to govern the Saints in their search for a New Jerusalem (first formalized as the Book of
Commandments, later the Doctrine and Covenants), and followers who disobeyed them were to
be expelled. One commandment demanded that “Thou shalt observe to keep the mysteries of the
kingdom unto thyself.”44 Together, the commandments delivered a year apart describe a mission
both of separation and acculturation: “to prepare their hearts” by a “gathering of the elect,” and
that the “mysteries of the kingdom” were not to be revealed to the larger world. Separation and
secrecy combined were integral practices for creating the cultural -- and legal -- space where a
sense of the sacred unique to Mormon culture could flourish, flourish to the point that the
doomed gentile world will soon be shocked by the temporal power of the Church and God’s
wrath towards those who refused to join. A revelation received in Kirtland on March 7th, 1831
prophesied that in the final battles of the imminent apocalypse the wicked shall avoid Zion “for
the inhabitants of Zion are terrible.” The Lord, therefore, commands that the founding and
fortification of Zion in Missouri -- “a land of peace, a city of refuge, a place of safety for the
saints of the most high God” -- must be done covertly. The Saints’ mission must not be revealed
until Zion is mighty enough to frighten away all aggressors:
And now I say unto you, keep these things from going abroad unto the world, until it is
expedient in me, that ye may accomplish this work in the eyes of the people, and in the
eyes of your enemies, that they may not know your works until ye have accomplished the
thing which I have commanded you:
That when they shall know it, that they may consider these things, for when the Lord
shall appear he shall be terrible unto them, that fear may seize upon them, and they shall
stand afar off and tremble: and all the nations shall be afraid because of the terror of the
Lord, and the power of his might; even so: Amen 45
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Echoing Rigdon’s testimony over early Mormon fears for safety, Joseph taught that
secrecy was required not only during the initially dangerous gathering of the elect to Zion, but to
conceal the growing strength of its inhabitants until they are “terrible.” At a conference of
Church elders in April of 1834, Joseph elaborated on the role Zion would play as both a refuge to
withstand the appalling destruction unleashed by the apocalypse, and as a place of sanctification
were faith in his revelations would deepen:
It is very difficult for us to communicate to the churches all that God has revealed to us,
in consequence of tradition; for we are differently situated from any other people that
ever existed upon this earth; consequently those former revelations cannot be suited to
our conditions; they were given to other people, who were before us; but in the last days,
God was to call a remnant, in which was to be deliverance, as well as in Jerusalem and
Zion. Now if God should give no more revelations, where will we find Zion and this
remnant? The time is near when desolation is to cover the earth, and then God will have a
place of deliverance in his remnant, and in Zion,
Take away the Book of Mormon and the revelations, and where is our religion? We have
none; for without Zion, and a place of deliverance, we must fall; because the time is near
when the sun will be darkened, and the moon turn to blood, and the stars fall from the
heaven, and the earth reel to and fro. Then, if this is the case, and if we are not sanctified
and gathered to the places God has appointed, with all our former professions and our
great love for the Bible, we must fall; we cannot stand; we cannot be saved; for God will
gather out his Saints from the Gentiles, and then comes desolation and destruction, and
none can escape except the pure in heart who are gathered.46
From Joseph’s perspective Zion -- “a place of deliverance” where the Saints can be
gathered out “from the Gentiles” -- was essential to the sanctification and very survival of the
Mormon people. In contrast, when seen from the position of Hobbes’s political theory, the
proto-nationalist drive to establish Zion, together with the promulgation of secret Mormon
doctrines, would provide incriminating evidence of the very type of insurrectionary civil groups
that Hobbes so feared. Secrecy and secession were dramatic examples of why, within Hobbesian
theory, the Hobbesian state demanded public transparency to prevent social conflict and civil
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wars. Operating outside of public accounting or the state’s explicit knowledge was a likely sign
of nefarious plots, a group’s inherent uncivilly.47
At times Joseph seems to have concluded that when secrecy failed, the very practice itself
incited more animus towards the Church than it was worth. Even within the Church, secrecy was
often controversial. In April of 1833, an Elder had written to Joseph complaining about “secrets
within the councils of Zion.” Joseph was dismissive, answering back that the concern was
“written blindly.”48 However, when imprisoned after the second Missouri conflict, Joseph
changed course, writing to his people from the Liberty jail in December of 1838 that: “We have
never dissembled, nor will we for the sake of our lives.”49 Still captive in March of 1839, he
protested in another missive that the Mormons were in fact just a beleaguered Protestant sect,
one being horribly persecuted for their traditionalist faith, and that he understood that secrecy
antagonized the gentile world. He suggested then that the secret practices associated with
Mormonism were actually not his, but emerged from the plots of the apostate Dr. Sampson
Avard, and thus were not truly endogenous to their faith:
And again, I would further suggest the impropriety of the organization of bands or
companies, by covenant or oaths, by penalties or secrecies; but let the time past of our experience
and sufferings by the wickedness of Doctor Avard suffice and let our covenant be that of the
Everlasting Covenant, as is contained in the Holy Writ and the things that God hath revealed
unto us. Pure friendship always becomes weakened the very moment you undertake to make it
stronger by penal oaths and secrecy. 50
Free in Nauvoo two years later, in December of 1841, Joseph again denied that
Mormonism kept any doctrine or revelation secret, stating that “The reason we do not have the
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secrets of the Lord revealed unto us, is because we do not keep them but reveal them; we do not
keep our own secrets, but reveal our difficulties to the world, even to our enemies, then how
would we keep the secrets of the Lord?”51 But in October of 1843, while compiling ever greater
mysteries and secretly marrying more wives, Joseph apparently felt secure enough in Nauvoo to
proclaim both his devotion to religious liberty and his Church’s growing reliance on subterfuge.
His resumption of secret doctrines and practices after many disavowals lends credence to
Moore’s proposition that Joseph engaged in a deliberate strategy of polarization; knowing that
secrecy “offended the openness of American democracy,” he proceeded as “part of his effort to
give his followers a sense of distinct identity. Those who knew the secret . . . were joined
together. Those who were excluded from the secret were invited to regard the Mormons as
mysteriously different.”52
In his sermon of October 15th, 1843 Joseph began with high praise of the American
constitution and its guarantees of religious freedom and threw in an odd endorsement of
Freemasonry towards the conclusion: “The secret of masonry is to keep a secret. It is good
economy to entertain strangers -- to entertain sectarians.”53 Though the early Mormon movement
originally condemned Freemasonry and secret societies (with the Book of Mormon being
described by Martin Harris as an “Antimasonick Bible”), Joseph began to formally switch tactics
in December of 1841, embracing Masonry and incorporating Masonic rituals into Mormonism.54
Shortly after he and some of his leading disciples became Masons and formed their own Grand
Lodge in Nauvoo in March of 1842, Joseph instituted another campaign to enforce loyalty and
confidentiality within the Church, this time more ceremoniously with new sacred rites containing
complex oaths, signs, symbols, and ritual drama of a distinctly Masonic aspect.55 Two year later,
while organizing his theocratic Council of Fifty Joseph recorded in his diary that he required, at
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the preliminary meeting “perfect secrecy” of all the participants. According to both apostates and
the official minutes of the council, members’ obligations demanded “secrecy, under the penalty
of death.”56 Quinn notes that the need for secrecy within the theocratic council made it “more
completely an extension of Freemasonry than any other dimension of Nauvoo society,” with
many of its members bound by overlapping oaths. By his calculations, at least fifteen percent
were constrained by secret oaths delivered under four different auspices: “Danite, Masonic,
endowment, and Council of Fifty.”57
In addition to undergirding his theocratic council with ritualistic practices, Masonry also
provided Joseph with unique theological precepts outside of conventional American Christianity.
Joseph’s initial rejection of Masonry, followed by his enthusiastic adoption, parallels the political
and religious utility in the covert craft that Maistre had also rediscovered decades earlier.
Despairing over the lasting repercussions of the Revolution upon an increasingly diminished
monarchy across Europe, Maistre’s later works returned to the Masonic millennialism of his
youth -- with its dense symbolic repertoire -- for an interpretive schema with which to generate
myths that “express an ontological order actually invested with historical efficacy.” He had
concluded that Catholic theology alone was insufficient and was looking for alternative modes of
mysticism to contest the Revolution. Armenteros writes that Maistre’s application of Masonic
semiotics was the “most important among his intellectual acquisitions from Freemasonry . . .
Insofar as Freemasonry was a philosophy, it could be broadly defined as a science towards
sacred symbols whereby every detail of every being in the world can, if interpreted right, yield
information about the divine.” Much like the Masonic content in Joseph Smith’s increasingly
theocratic revelations in Nauvoo, Maistre too believed these myths proclaimed that “knowledge
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of the divine government of the universe can aid us, as spiritual beings, in governing the world
spiritually ourselves.”58
Maistre was convinced that the French Revolution was a Satanic mutation evolved from
the errors of 18th century philosophy, historically destructive errors that were themselves the
teratogens of Protestantism. In reconciling the illuminist philosophies of his youth with key
features of his traditionalist Catholicism, he hoped to “shatter the logic of philosophie” with what
he considered the neglected religious strands of Enlightenment thought.59 Returning to Masonic
myths provided Maistre with the theoretical approaches to integrate the “hidden doxa” and
Neoplatonic cosmology of early Christian philosophers like Origen with his dreams of a revived
Catholicism, a revitalized religion capable of establishing a universal Christian order.60
Departing even further from Catholic theology however, Maistre perceived this revitalized
religion as an opportunity for “human moral enrichment, efficacious discipline, and the ascent
toward sainthood.” His intended universal religious order would ultimately unite a “perfected
humanity.”61 In his later years, Maistre could only wistfully reflect on his hopes of taking those
first steps of merging Masonic rites with the Christian world.62 Joseph Smith would actually do
it. Joseph’s transmutation of Masonry into an American religious idiom, according to Brookes,
was an integral source for his theology of perfectionism. “Masonic myths,” writes Brookes,
describe “priestly genealogies running back to Adam . . . [q]uite simply, the Adamic language
was the royal road to perfection, the “key to the mysteries.”’63 Theologically, both men
perceived Masonic myths as providing a tiered path to sainthood and human perfectionism, a
path that could, when pioneered by a prophet, be connected with Christianity.
Sociologically, Joseph’s promotion of Masonic rites and secrecy within the Church were
most concentrated at his elite theocratic council, but these practices could be also found in other
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Mormon institutions where transparency threatened the Prophet. According to Brooke, Joseph’s
demands for loyalty from the leading women of the Church helped drive his sanctification of the
recently formed Female Relief Society of Nauvoo during the spring of 1842. Caught between
incompatible organizational imperatives, the Society was founded on a peculiar combination of
charity work, communal policing, secrecy, and loyalty tests. Initially organized by a concerned
coterie of prominent women of the Church to help provide for the impoverished and needy,
Joseph wrote to them shortly after their formation that he hoped they were also “sufficiently
skill’d in Masonry to keep a secret.”64 Why the application of Masonic symbols and codes of
secrecy to Church institutions such as the Relief Society? The Society emerged during the
transitioning family structure of the mid-19th century, when fathers were increasingly assigned
the role as primary wage earners and mothers granted more moral authority in the domestic
sphere along with their assumption of greater household duties. The Mormon women behind the
Relief Society, according to the historian Merina Smith, were eager to acquire this virtuous
authority and extend it and their authoritative roles throughout the Mormon community, much
like analogous women’s Christian societies and national charity organizations. But they quickly
found themselves embroiled in a polygamy scandal that, by conventional American mores,
represented a “threat to the moral authority of women and the nuclear family.”65 Caught between
organizing philanthropic efforts similar to those in mainline churches and a socially explosive
new religious doctrine, part of their assigned work would have to be conducted covertly. In
addition to their public duties, the Relief Society was confidentially tasked by Joseph with
keeping secret that “some unprincipled men” were engaged in efforts to “deceive and debauch
the innocent . . . a private matter in your Society.” He noted that their ability to maintain such a
volatile secret would reveal “whether you are good masons.”66 To aid in their tasks, Joseph
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promised them that they would receive “keys to the kingdom,” similar to those bestowed on the
male priesthood, secret key words and holy signs – unknown to the devil -- that allowed the
initiate to “be able to detect every thing false.”67
The ritualized enforcement of silence among the women of the Relief Society was, by
Brooke’s account, “interwoven with a multilayered campaign of deception,” and when the
rumors of polygamy could not be contained, Joseph and his elders commissioned the Society to
take a leading role in rebutting them. Their first effort was a petition organized by the Society
and signed by over a thousand women attesting to the prophet’s “virtue integrity honesty”. 68
Emma, meanwhile, was quietly organizing investigative committees composed of her fellow
Society members to determine the truth of these rumors, unaware that some of her closest
colleagues and friends – including signatories of the anti-polygamy petition testifying to Joseph’s
monogamy -- were already married to Joseph.69 Eliza Snow, a close friend of Emma’s who lived
with the Smith family and was one of Joseph’s secret wives, would lament years later that the
introduction of the plural marriage principle was “a deep intricate puzzle, a tangle of strings.”70
That “intricate puzzle” was composed of interconnected doctrinal practices including
ritualized secrecy, public deception, and the plural marriage principle conveyed as an Abrahamic
test of faith; all pieces of a complex social construction that, when fit together, would form a
confidential bond among the Mormon elite and inspire deeper loyalty to Joseph. Extending Eliza
Snow’s mixed metaphor, we can analogize how the overlap and tight entanglement of these
peculiar doctrines would weave those who passed the loyalty tests into a new holy order tied
together through “celestial marriage,” the social basis of a theocratic council that would gather to
declare Joseph “King, Priest, and Ruler” of the emergent Kingdom of God on Earth shortly
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before his assassination.71 The string of secrecy that started with concealing the widening
practice of plural marriage ended in theocracy.

*

*

*

Rumors of licentiousness and polygamy haunted the early movement almost from its
inception in New York, even though the practice was initially condemned by the Book of
Mormon on pain of the Lord’s curse.72 In addition, a commandment recorded in the Doctrine and
Covenants in 1835 asserted: “Inasmuch as this Church of Christ has been reproached with the
crime of fornication and polygamy; we declare that we believe that one man should have one
wife; and one woman but one husband; except that in the event of death when either is at liberty
to marry again.”73 Though the historical record is ambiguous, there is strong evidence that
Joseph first engaged in a polygamous marriage in 1835 with a young woman living in the Smith
household who subsequently left the Church and remarried.74 From the abandonment of this
early, almost experimental effort in plural marriage, the historian Merina Smith concludes that
while in Ohio and Missouri in the 1830s, “Mormon life then was too unstable and volatile to
allow such an innovation.”75 After establishing greater political power and a large militia in
Nauvoo, Joseph’s campaign of and for plural marriage would resume in the spring of 1841, when
he secretly married again and revealed to select followers a “new and everlasting covenant” that,
theologically, was framed as a test of Abrahamic sacrifice. The reward for obedience was an
eventual cosmic kingdom of one’s own, where rule was established through eternal marriage
ties.76 Sociologically, acceptance of the astounding doctrine was both an explicit proof of loyalty
to Joseph and a signal of assimilation into an elite group who were promised sanctification above
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that of other members. After Joseph’s martyrdom, the elite practice would rapidly grow more
popular, becoming quickly integrated into the rest of Mormon culture as the first generation of
polygamous men and women – those secretly married in the early 1840s -- served as the Church
leaders for the next fifty years.77
Joseph offered many spiritual benefits to those women he first approached with the
doctrine.78 He informed Mary Lightener, who eventually agreed to become one of his wives, that
her acceptance of the principle meant her salvation was assured. Initially, in his polygamous
marriages, salvation was tied to Joseph through his singular role as God’s prophet without a
specific theology of exaltation, but with the arrival of his July 12th, 1843 revelation, Joseph
elaborated on the many glories that were far greater than simply ascension to conventional
conception of heaven.79 The bonds established through plural marriage were to extend beyond
mortal life. Plural marriages were made eternal though the practice of “priesthood sealing,”
whereby couples were bound together forever through the renewed authority of the ancient
Christian priesthood.80 Once sealed by priestly ordination, the revelation explained, their exalted
status would be divinely elevated far above those joined by mere worldly authority:
Then shall they be gods, because they have no end; therefore shall they be
from everlasting to everlasting, because they continue; then shall they be above all,
because all things are subject unto them. Then shall they be gods, because they have all
power, and the angels are subject unto them.81
United in the afterlife through plural marriage on earth, these celestial families would
form their own cosmic governments, their glories and realms of heavenly inheritance including
“thrones, kingdoms, principalities, and powers, dominions, all heights & depths.” Practicing
plural marriage on earth would both exalt the faithful and serve as preparation for a “heavenly
rule” in the afterlife that appears to be almost endlessly expansive in the scope of its power.82
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The penalties for denying the doctrine were eternal too. In the fourth line of the revelation
commanding obedience to the doctrine (of July 12th, 1843), Joseph announced: “I reveal unto
you a New and Everlasting Covenant and if ye abide not that Covenant, then are ye damned.”83
The stark severity of refusal never seemed to make the choice easier. Even in studies from
sympathetic historians, the shattering of the monogamous taboo is recorded as a shock for the
faithful. Bushman writes that “(t)he reaction was almost invariably negative. One young
woman, Lucy Walker, was struck with horror on hearing the doctrine. She was fifteen when the
Prophet invited her to in live in his house.”84 Fourteen years old when the proposal was made,
Walker was warned by Joseph that she must not dither in her decision or “the gate will be closed
forever against you.”85 She would later testify about the experience that, “I felt at this moment
that I was called to place myself upon the altar a living sacrifice – perhaps to brook the world in
disgrace and incure the displeasure and contempt of my youthful companions.”86 Her reaction
was typical; Joseph introduced plural marriage with an explicit emphasis on loyalty and the fear
of betrayal, according to the testimonies of many of the women he proposed to, and their
recollections of their reactions were frequently framed in terms of enduring trials and making
costly sacrifices. Phoebe Woodruff, the first wife of the Church’s Fourth President, Wilford
Woodruff, wrote, “I opposed it to the best of my ability until I became sick and wretched,” and
Eliza Maria Partridge Lyman, who married to Joseph sometime in 1843, complained that it “was
truly a trial for me.”87
Zina Huntington was taught the doctrine directly from Joseph and she resisted even after
he secretly proposed to her on three separate occasions. She would later record that she refused
out of respect for Emma, her belief in traditional monogamy, the radical peculiarity of the
doctrine, and out of suspicion of the furtive secrecy it required.88 Seven months after she married
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another man, she relented to Joseph’s fourth request when told that if he failed to establish
polygamy within the Church, an angel would deprive Joseph of “his position and his life.” Years
later Zina Huntington described her decision to enter into polyandry as a sacrifice: “I mad
[made] a greater sacrifice than to give my life for I never anticipated a gain to be looked upon as
an honerable women by those I dearly loved [but] could I compromise conscience . . . after
having been baptized by one having authority and covenanting to be obedient[?]”89 After
Joseph’s martyrdom, Zina would polyandrously marry Brigham Young.90
In addition to Huntington, Joseph told at least one other of his wives that an angel had
threatened his life if he did not abide by the principle, and he warned that the very existence of
the principle, as well as his marriage proposals, must be kept secret for his continuing physical
safety: “In revealing [the principle] to you I have placed my life in your hands, therefore do not
in an evil hour betray me to my enemies.”91 In instructing Mary Lightener, Joseph demanded to
know whether she would accept the principle and his offer or whether she “was going to be a
traitor.” According to Emily Partridge, before his proposal Joseph said, “Emily if you will not
betray me, I will tell you something for your benefit.” Emily’s sister, Eliza, was typical in her
testimony of the social costs inherent in maintaining such secrets, that plural marriage “was truly
a great trial for me but I had the most implicit confidence in him as a Prophet of the Lord . . .”92
Acceptance of the doctrine was a trial for the Mormon men, too. Brigham Young
lamented that upon learning of the commandment, he was so distressed that “(a)nd when I saw a
funeral, I felt to envy the corpse its situation, and to regret that I was not in the coffin.” Apostle
John Taylor, one of the Quorum of the Twelve at the time the revelation was delivered and the
third President of the Church, confessed that “It made my flesh crawl.”93 Orson Pratt, one of the
greatest of the early apostles of the faith, endured a near suicidal breakdown when informed that
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Joseph had secretly proposed plural marriage to Pratt’s wife, Sarah, in his absence.94 Brigham
Young wrote that Pratt’s “mind became so darkened by the influence and statements of his wife,
that he came out in rebellion against Joseph refusing to believe his testimony or obey his
counsel. He said he would be believe his wife in preference to the Prophet.” Joseph threatened
Pratt that if he chose to follow the testimony of his wife “he would go to hell,” and Pratt, after a
brief excommunication, soon relented, eventually accepting the doctrine and becoming an
enthusiastic polygamist.95 (Pratt was the Church official who would finally proclaim the doctrine
of plural marriage to the public from the relative safety of the Utah territory in 1852.96) In
addition to marrying polyandrous wives, Joseph occasionally made polyandrous request to test a
couple’s loyalty to, and faith in, him. The historian Spencer Kimball, writes of an episode
involving his ancestor, Heber Kimball, that:
[Heber] was introduced to the doctrine of plural marriage directly through a startling test
-- a sacrifice which shook his very being and challenged his faith to the ultimate. He had
already sacrificed homes, possessions, friends, relatives, all worldly rewards, peace, and
tranquility for the Restoration. Nothing was left to place on the altar save his life, his
children, and his wife. . . Joseph demanded for himself what to Heber was the
unthinkable, his [wife] Vilate. Totally crushed spiritually and emotionally, Heber touched
neither food nor water for three days and three nights and continually sought
confirmation and comfort from God.97

After three days of fasting, "some kind of assurance" becalmed Heber and he accepted
the principle and submitted to Joseph’s request. Upon telling Joseph of their acquiescence to the
new commandment, “(t)he Prophet wept at this act of faith, devotion, and obedience. Joseph had
never intended to take Vilate. It was all a test."98 (Joseph would shortly thereafter convince
Heber to marry an additional wife, though the Prophet cautioned him not to inform Vilate.99) The
many accounts of Nauvoo Mormons’ dismayed willingness to pay “the psychic cost” of
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obedience as “evidence of commitment” to the principle supports Daynes’s contention that the
initial anguish and eventual acceptance of the doctrine provided dramatic proof of loyalty to
Joseph.100
In addition to the testimonies of his wives and closest disciples, Joseph’s own public and
recorded statements would also link the highest degrees of heavenly salvation to the necessity of
sacrifices on earth. As early as the winter of 1834-35, in a remarkable parallel to the political
theology of Maistre, Joseph would profess the centrality of sacrifice for any enduring religion:
Let us here observe, that a religion that does not require the sacrifice of all things never
has power sufficient to produce the faith necessary unto life and salvation; for, from the
first existence of man, the faith necessary unto the enjoyment of life and salvation never
could be obtained without the sacrifice of all earthly things. It was through this sacrifice,
and this only, that God has ordained that men should enjoy eternal life; and it is through
the medium of the sacrifice of all earthly things that men do actually know that they are
doing the things that are well pleasing in the sight of God.101
In 1840 Joseph would further elaborate that sacrifice “has ever been connected and forms
part of the duties of priesthood. It began with the priesthood and will be continued untill [sic]
after the coming of Christ from generation to generation.” Anatomically similar to Maistre’s
linking of sacrifice with his political theological project of restoration, sacrifice and sacrificial
ceremonies were for Joseph an integral part of the full restoration of “the authority power and
blessings” of the restored priesthood, or “(e)lse how can the restitution of all things spoken of by
all the Holy Prophets be brought to pass(?)”102Just how many elements of ancient sacrificial rites
were to be restored before Christ’s return, as well as their specific ritualized forms, were left
vague by Joseph. Further elaboration of sacred ritual, as with revelation and doctrinal innovation,
appeared to be a continuous project103
The broad anthropological proposition that a more explicitly ritualized and personally
costly form of sacrifice is vital for the maintenance of true religion was in sharp variance with
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the critiques of sacrificial ritual made by Locke, and runs counter to the perspective on sacrifice
emerging from the mainstream of Protestant theology. In the early apostolic Christian Church,
Christ’s self-sacrifice was to be the final act of atonement for the redemption of sin, and, in
superseding the ancient Hebraic forms of sacrifice, the Christian faith was to be proclaimed
through a belief in Christ’s ultimate sacrifice through his role as messiah and son of God.104
Whereas most Christian theologies see Christ’s sacrifice as atonement for man’s sin, Joseph
taught that new rituals of sacrificial atonement were required as a “divinely intended strategy for
human progression,” a progression that moves beyond mortal life “onward toward endless
celestial schooling.”105 In August of 1843, one month after delivering the secret revelation on
plural marriage to a select few, Joseph would publically lecture that, “The sacrifice required of
Abraham in the offering up of Isaac, shows that if a man would attain to the keys of the kingdom
of an endless life; he must sacrifice all things. When God offers a blessing or knowledge to a
man, and he refuses to receive it, he will be damned.”106
From 1842 on, both publically and privately, Joseph would frequently evoke the example
of Abraham to explain God’s provision of specific trials to test the faith of his latter day Saints.
The primary referent for renewed rituals of sacrifice in Joseph’s private teachings, however, was
not to the offering up of Isaac, but to Abraham’s polygamy. The revelation on plural marriage,
which would eventually be published as number 132 in the Doctrine and Covenants, stated that:
This promise is yours also, because ye are of Abraham, and the promise was made unto
Abraham; and by this law is the continuation of the works of my Father, wherein he
glorifieth himself.
Go ye, therefore, and do the works of Abraham; enter ye into my law and ye shall be
saved.
But if ye enter not into my law ye cannot receive the promise of my Father, which he
made unto Abraham.
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God commanded Abraham, and Sarah gave Hagar to Abraham to wife. And why did she
do it? Because this was the law; and from Hagar sprang many people. This, therefore,
was fulfilling, among other things, the promises.107
In clearly associating the practice of polygamy with the covenantal promises received by
Abraham, Givens notes that for Joseph the confirmation of his prophetic righteousness included
similar rewards -- numerous blessings in his role as a biblical patriarch, and a “special status as a
conduit of God’s blessings to those multitude.”108 Givens argues, however, that in an intriguing
deviation from Judeo-Christian theology, the logic of Abrahamic sacrifice is supposed to be
temporally bounded, a test of “a person’s willingness to provisionally suspend a moral
imperative (do not practice human sacrifice) in deference to a divine mandate to perform an
ethically repugnant act.” The Abrahamic test, as portrayed in the book of Genesis, does not
overturn God’s law against murder forever. Joseph’s theology adds an innovative form of
sacrifice to the Protestant tradition it emerged from: instead of a temporary suspension of ethical
law, the revelation on plural marriage elevated a taboo act “into a supernal principle.”109 Joseph’s
transgression of monogamous marriage was open-ended and eternal. His revelation on the
principle states that Abraham was not under “condemnation” for polygamy because the Lord
“commanded it,” and in an echo of Joseph’s letter to Nancy Rigdon, in which Joseph explained
the highly situational context of God’s superseding commandments, the revelation on plural
marriage reiterates that God commanded Abraham to offer his son even though He had
previously commanded “Thou shall not kill.” Now, in the instance of plural marriage, any limit
on the singularity of the act of sacrifice is gone. In Joseph’s retelling, Abraham’s obedience,
regardless of past commandments, was the required sign of his righteousness, though there is a
clear slippage in the marriage revelation’s verses between the commands and promises made to
Abraham, references to his willingness to sacrifice Isaac, and the offering of Hagar to Abraham
made by Sarah. The sacrifice of a son as a temporary test quickly segues into polygamy as new,
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eternal, sacrificial practice. Sarah’s apparently selfless proposition from the book of Genesis is
subsumed, both textually and theologically in Joseph’s thought into Abraham’s offering of Isaac.
A narrative of an offer of polygamy initiated under Sarah’s own agency is transformed into one
of a sacrifice demanded by God.110
Emma, unlike the biblical Sarah, at first vigorously contested the very legitimacy of the
principle and never appears to have been at ease with it.111 She was not alone; as successive
revelations magnified Joseph’s spiritual and earthly powers, high ranking Church members
found the internal logic and theological consistency of Joseph’s revelations becoming more
frayed and implausible, in turn increasing Joseph’s demands for secrecy and obedience.112
Emma’s sporadic resistance to spiritual wifery led Joseph, in receiving the principle, to beseech
God for a specific message to convince her of its (and his) virtue. The divine response for Emma
was also couched in the language of an Abrahamic test and demands for sacrifice:
A commandment I give unto mine handmaid, Emma Smith, your wife, whom I have
given unto you, that she stay herself and partake not of that which I commanded you to
offer unto her; for I did it, saith the Lord, to prove you all, as I did Abraham, and that I
might require an offering at your hand, by covenant and sacrifice.113
Lacking references to what particular offers were made, the syntax is confusing. Joseph
was commanded by God to make an unspecified offer to Emma, and she was commanded to – or
already did -- “stay herself” and reject that offer, all of which the Lord devised as form of
Abrahamic test for them both. The sacrifices demanded by God in this moral drama were made
simultaneously to Joseph (“I commanded you to offer unto her”) and Emma, with both parties
blind to God’s commandment delivered to the other. Abrahamic tests of faith could be far more
convoluted and demanding in Joseph’s theology than that of conventional Christianity.
According to the Mormon scribe and member of the Council of Fifty, William Clayton, Emma
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had argued with Joseph near the end of June, 1843 that she too should be allowed to “indulge” in
polyandry if Joseph was doing so.114 The revelation Joseph received that July reassured him of
God’s favor, foretold that he would “rule over many things,” and also commanded Emma not to
marry other men, and if she did not accept Joseph’s other wives, conform to the principle of
plural marriage, and obey Joseph, she would be “destroyed”:
For I am the Lord thy God, and ye shall obey my voice; and I give unto my servant
Joseph that he shall be made ruler over many things; for he hath been faithful over a few
things, and from henceforth I will strengthen him.
And I command mine handmaid, Emma Smith, to abide and cleave unto my servant
Joseph, and to none else. But if she will not abide this commandment she shall be
destroyed, saith the Lord; for I am the Lord thy God, and will destroy her if she abide not
in my law.115
In an example of Joseph’s theocratic prerogatives ostensibly outpacing the normative
logic of his recorded revelations, the principle on plural marriage explicitly condemns polyandry,
stating that if it is undertaken the woman in the illicit relationship “would be destroyed.”116
Scholars differ on how many polyandrous wives Joseph had before his death, with common
estimates running from ten to fourteen.117 Aside from prohibiting polyandry, the revelation
requires that a wife grant her consent before her husband can take further polygamous brides, but
if she refuses -- as with Emma -- she will be “destroyed” and her husband can then proceed to
marry.118 In practice, like Emma, first wives in Nauvoo weren’t always notified before their
husbands took additional wives. Joseph’s (self-) sanction of these apparent contradictions
between the letter of the revelation and his divergent practices accentuate the ways that his
exceptional politics continually struggled to establish new normative grounds, grounds that, even
in the eyes of some of his closest followers, he appeared to be already transgressing.119
Though Joseph’s introduction of sacrificial rituals and the development of the Mormon
priesthood could not ultimately insure his own safety, both conventions left a lasting institutional
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and cultural legacy. Sociologically, scholars such as Brooke, Smith, Hill and Daynes have
linked Joseph’s intense emphasis on loyalty and enhancing Mormon solidarity with his Nauvooera religious innovations.120 Hill, for example, notes that “the doctrine of plural marriage
provided a means by which sex could be regulated under a new order and put to social
purposes,” particularly loyalty to the Prophet and the priesthood, a social function also noted by
the Mormon historian Kathyrn M. Daynes.121 Applying ideological strain theory developed by
the sociologist Robert Wuthnow, Daynes situates Joseph’s introduction of polygamy as a
response to crises of apostasy, disloyalty among the elders of the Church, and the intensified
persecution of the Saints after their second expulsion from Missouri: “The social problems
caused by disloyalty among church leaders are directly linked to the social solutions provided by
accepting new family forms with their accompanying covenants. . . In some cases, plural
marriages created family ties among church leaders, with strong moral responsibilities that attend
familial relationships; in all cases, entering plural marriage was a sign of loyalty to Joseph
Smith.”122
Plural marriage would transform political relations within the Mormon movement from a
selection of newly converted Church officeholders with their monogamous families to a uniquely
Mormon elite secretly united by the more intimate, almost tribal, bonds of shared ritual
sanctification and overlapping polygamous families.123 Just as Joseph saw priesthood as the
solution for theological confusion, plural marriage families would reduce the social atomization
on the American frontier and enhance solidarity within Mormon Zion. Bushman asserts that
Joseph did not polygamously marry for “human companionship,” but “to create a network of
related wives, children and kinsmen that would endure into the eternities.” Noting that the plural
marriage revelation provided a “hundred fold into this world, of fathers and mothers, brothers
166

and sisters, houses and lands, wives and children, and crowns of eternal lives in the eternal
worlds,” Bushman believes that “(l)ike Abraham of old, Joseph yearned for familiar
plentitude.”124 Polygamous familial ties, sealed for all eternity through the power of the Mormon
priesthood, would become the restored basis of patriarchal (Abrahamic) rule on earth, and in
death family relations would extend infinitely into endless celestial domains, a sort of dynastic,
cosmic imperialism.
Givens perceives the same drive for an expanded clan when he observes that Joseph’s
preachings on celestial marriage “reveal a kind of voracious appetite to expand his relations, far
beyond his immediate family,” but in an intriguing parallel to Joseph’s political maneuverings
and reliance on secrecy, he additionally cites that the gathering of a celestial family also relies on
cunning and subterfuge. In the King Follett sermon of March 10th, 1844 Joseph preached:
If you have power to seal on earth & in heaven then we should be Crafty, the first thing
you do go & seal on earth your sons & daughters unto yourself, & yourself unto your
fathers in eternal glory, & go ahead and not go back, but use a little Craftiness & seal all
you can . . . I will walk through the gate of heaven and Claim what I seal & those that
follow me and my council.125
Joseph’s acknowledgement for the need for craftiness to gain rewards in heaven is both a
tribute to the cunning required on the Mormon path to individual godhood and, in the earthly
realm, just how subversively his polygamous project struck against a “commitment to
monogamous marriage on a Christian model” that was “lodged deep in American political
theory”126
Nancy Cott and Michael Grossberg have written that at least since Montesquieu’s Persian
Letters, there has been an Enlightenment association of polygamy with despotism and
monogamy with the “government of consent, moderation, and political liberty.” Christian
monogamous marriage was considered by theorist and politicians as the social bedrock,
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foundational to the political and social stability of a modern Western republic.127 The 19th
century German-American political theorist Francis Lieber would iterate Montesquieu’s
concerns in his own trepidation that American liberty could still be susceptible to polygamy, and
that the return of the primitive practice “would reintroduce patriarchy and thus despotism into the
new republic.”128 Indeed, Lieber’s apprehensions of the resulting despotism and degeneration
extended beyond the health of the republic to that of the white race. He perceived monogamous
marriage as “one of the primordial elements out of which all law proceeds, or which the law
steps in to recognize and to protect. . . .It is one of the pre-existing conditions of our existence as
civilized white men . . . Strike it out, and you destroy our very being, and when we say our we
mean our race – a race which has its great and broad destiny, a solemn aim in the great career of
civilization.”129 Lieber’s critique of polygamy was typical of the dominant theoretic assumptions
that ensured that the federal government adopted the “Christian model of monogamy as the sine
qua non of civilization and morality.”130
So deep ran these tenets of monogamy within American political thought that Mormon
polygamy would be seen as a direct challenge to federal authority by a “Polygamic Theocracy,”
with the Mormon’s autonomous “control of marital practice denot[ing] incipient statebuilding,”131 In opposition to the dominant norm, utopian sects such as the Shakers, Owenites,
and Rappites viewed “monogamy and the private family to be impediments to human progress.”
Joseph held very similar views about the spiritual limits of monogamy, but his theological
conceptions of secrecy and sacrifice had the effect of making the private family even more
private, and whereas radical groups like the Owenites would attempt to dissolve patriarchal
prerogatives into the communal solidarity of socialist marriage, Joseph’s theology of spiritual
wifery was explicitly instituted to expand patriarchal power on earth and in the celestial
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kingdom.132 Where scholars like Cott, Grossberg, and Karen Orren see remnants of patriarchal
or feudal control in the legal privileges and structure of the family, Joseph advanced those
peculiar prerogatives a step further, demanding familial sacrifices for a theocratic king. 133 His
institution of polygamy was the most dramatic part of his effort to reformulate Mormon society
and make it suitable for theocracy.
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Chapter 7: “A Constitutional Right to be a False Prophet”

Like comparable religious originators outside the Protestant tradition, Joseph possessed
the amazing ability to explain and integrate unusual elements of the world around him through
and into myth. Nathan Hatch writes that "Mormons distinguished themselves from other
churches by claiming that mundane life was alive with" revelations, miracles, and wonders,
through which Joseph provided an "immediate access to the god-head."1 American land was not
the demon-haunted world of Puritanism, a savage place to be conquered and then overwritten
with new mythic narratives as described by Richard Slotkin, but a holy land overflowing with the
artifacts of ancient Israelis.2 The tattered papyri of a traveling Egyptian roadshow became the
lost “Book of Abraham;”3 an old skeleton unearthed in Missouri with an arrowhead embedded in
it was declared to be the warrior chieftain “Zelf,” a “Lamanite” so pure that “the curse of the red
skin was taken from him, or, at least in part;”4 Hebrew lessons from a Jewish scholar became an
“auxiliary to divine illumination.”5
These audacious prophecies and wondrous discoveries could fire the mythic imagination
and intensify life, preparing the receptive listener for an authority based on theocratic order,
discipline, and hierarchy. Joseph’s conflation of the cosmic with the quotidian, however, also
reveals to what extent the continual evocation of the sacred runs the risk of banality. The
sacrifices and gritty compromises demanded of his followers often fell short of traditional
conceptions of the heroic and into the contemporary realms of the petty and prurient. Terryl
Givens and Jan Shipps have analyzed the many ways that early Mormons thoroughly infused
their sense of the sacred into the banal -- and ran the resultant risks of sacralizing the banal and
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banalizing the sacred.6 Givens notes that Joseph would dictate poetic revelations revealing
elements of cosmic grandeur never before heard of in the Judeo-Christian tradition, such as “The
earth rolls upon her wings, and the sun giveth his light by day, and the moon giveth her light by
night and the stars also give their light, as they roll upon their wings in their glory, in the midst of
the power of God.” Yet, he would also “invoke the same revelatory power and authority to
declare in the voice of God, ‘let my servant Oliver Cowdery have the lot which is set off joining
the house, which is to be for the printing office, which is lot number one, and also the lot upon
which his father resides.’”7
Fawn Broadie perceived a similar conflation of the sacred and banal present in the
persona of the Prophet, writing that “Joseph’s character was the commonplace Yankee mixture
of piety and avarice,” and she cited a January 1841 revelation ordering the Saints to build a hotel
in Nauvoo that contained a jarringly specific rider that it be financed at “not less than fifty
dollars a share of stock.” Those Saints charged with its construction that failed to properly
appropriate the stock “shall be accursed,” and Broadie notes that the revelation “guilelessly”
granted “Joseph a suite of rooms in the hotel for himself and his posterity ‘from generation to
generation, for ever and ever.’”8 Joseph occasionally seemed aware of this deflationary danger,
voicing periodic concern about the vast chasm of decorum between the proper degrees of gravity
and gratitude expressed for the exaltations bestowed by God on his chosen people -- and their
hopelessly prosaic squabbles. Writing from the Liberty Jail in March of 1839, Joseph warned:
A fanciful and flowery an heated imagination beware of; because the things of God are of
deep import; and time, and experience, and careful and ponderous and solemn thoughts
can only find them out. Thy mind, O man! if thou wilt lead a soul unto salvation, must
stretch as high as the utmost heavens, and search into and contemplate the darkest abyss,
and the broad expanse of eternity—thou must commune with God. How much more
dignified and noble are the thoughts of God, than the vain imaginations of the human
heart! None but fools will trifle with the souls of men.
171

How vain and trifling have been our spirits, our conferences, our councils, our meetings,
our private as well as public conversations — too low, too mean, too vulgar, too
condescending for the dignified characters of the called and chosen of God, according to
the purposes of His will, from before the foundation of the world!9
“Too low, too mean, too vulgar” could well typify for many critics the numerous
commandments dealing with economic matters that appear trifling to modern sensibilities.
According to one researcher, 88 out of 112 revelations announced by Joseph “dealt partly or
entirely with matters that were economic in nature.”10 Susan Juster notes that as religion in
nineteenth century America “became more and more a commodity to be packaged and sold like
any other form of entertainment, the line between legitimate expressions of faith and cynical
manipulation was considerably blurred.” Recounting an apparently apocryphal meeting between
P.T. Barnum and Brigham Young, Juster writes that “Barnum made a career of fooling his
customers, usually with their tacit consent, by means not far removed from the occult practices
of early Mormons.”11 Aspects of this almost Barnumesque knowingness pervaded Joseph’s
portrayal of his own role as prophet, a tendency that, in his recorded words makes it difficult to
distinguish when he was being disconcertingly playful or outright cynical about his alleged
powers.12 In June of 1843, after foiling an attempt of a Missouri sheriff to extradite him, Joseph
preached to a hastily convened assembly in Nauvoo, and at the end of his lecture introduced an
allied Illinois politician to his faithful flock. According to accounts from Church newspapers:
“[Joseph] turned to him and said with a little smile: ‘These are the greatest dupes, as a body of
people, that ever lived, or I am not so big a rogue as I am reported to be.’”13
When the Boston Brahmins Josiah Quincy, Jr. and Charles Francis Adams visited
Nauvoo in May of 1844 to investigate the Mormon sect, Quincy found Joseph to be charismatic
and generous, but warned him that he had consolidated too much power for any one man. Joseph
retorted that in any ordinary man’s hands “so much power would, no doubt be dangerous. I am
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the only man in the world whom it would be safe to trust with it. Remember, I am a prophet!”
Quincy was skeptical and startled by Joseph’s sly tone, writing that, “The last five words were
spoken in a rich, comical aside, as if in hearty recognition of the ridiculous sound they might
have in the ears of a Gentile.”14
Not all of his Joseph’s commentary on his prophetic role was so confident and comical.
He complained in July of 1843 that: “It has gone abroad that I proclaimed myself no longer a
prophet. I said it last Sabbath ironically: I supposed you would all understand.” Since his
audience had missed the irony, Joseph found it necessary to explain his rather qualified
reasoning, “It was not that I would renounce the idea of being a prophet, but that I had no
disposition to proclaim myself such. But I do say that I bear the testimony of Jesus, which is the
spirit of prophecy.”15 That disposition was no longer in evidence in May of 1844 when Joseph
confronted charges from apostates that he had fallen: “My enemies say that I have been a true
prophet. Why, I had rather be a fallen true prophet than a false prophet. When a man goes about
prophesying, and commands men to obey his teachings, he must either be a true or false prophet.
False prophets always arise to oppose the true prophets and they will prophesy so very near the
truth that they will deceive almost the very chosen ones.”16 As intriguing as his near embrace of
the appellation of “fallen true prophet” is, Joseph’s condemnation of false prophets is more
noteworthy for his theory of religious liberty and the exceptional politics commanded by
revelation. For just a month prior, in his King Follett sermon of April of 1844, Joseph taught
that the American people should “meddle not with any man for his religion; all governments
ought to permit every man to enjoy his religion unmolested . . . . Every man has a natural, and, in
our country, a constitutional right to be a false prophet, as well as a true prophet.”17 In the final
months of Joseph’s life his dedication to the theocratic freedoms provided by religious liberty
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was so all-encompassing that the sincerity of belief did not matter, a startling proposition for a
prophet that had declared his church the only true one and all others “abominations.” Here, the
right to deceive the American public, “almost the very chosen ones,” was portrayed as a
fundamental religious liberty, a constitutional right. In this licensing of chicanery, we see a
uniquely American example of what Schmittian political theology, specifically in the form of
revelatory politics, looks like in political practice: both the Promethean heights of an exceptional
politics seeking power beyond all earthly law and how banal such a ceaseless politics must soon
become.
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Conclusion
Ultimately, “the covenants of loyalty were not enough” to protect Joseph’s life, and his
theocratic regime in Nauvoo was crushed shortly after his murder.1 Its protective charter was
quickly revoked by the Illinois legislature, its civil government was legally disincorporated, and
the Mormon movement fragmented amidst a leadership fight for a successor to the Prophet. The
bulk of the faithful abandoned Nauvoo to follow Brigham Young’s exodus to the Utah territory
in early 1846. Yet, in death and apparent defeat, Joseph’s theocratic project and its driving
political theology have had their triumphs. First, Joseph’s theology and the government he
formed in Nauvoo were the guiding inspiration and initial cadre for Brigham Young’s Deseret
Kingdom, a theocracy on the American frontier that lasted almost fifty years.2 Even after
renouncing polygamy and surrendering theocratic control to federal authority in return for full
statehood rights for Utah in the 1890s, the Latter-day Saint (LDS) Church retains a strong ethnoreligious identity, a belief in the singular authority of a prophet, and a penchant for secrecy in its
sporadic political campaigns. Second, Joseph’s legacy lives on in the forms of antagonistic
symbiosis adopted by new religions in America with theocratic tendencies, notably in their
doctrinal fluidity and their legal challenges made against the authority of the state while carving
out forms of local autonomy and demanding greater religious liberty.3 Third, cognates of the
theocratic strategies that Joseph combined in his political theology can be found in an arena he
excelled at: religious coalitional politics pushing for more theocratic control over individual
rights, on both the local and national levels. Seeking to circumvent secular constraints on
religious political activity, religious conservatives in recent decades have attempted to roll back
the advance of civil rights through secrecy and arguments for greater religious liberty.
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Joseph’s early Mormon movement, as a paragon American theocracy, carved out a place
within liberal pluralism through coalitional politics and its assertions of the liberal rights of
religious liberty, but the American state and culture ultimately disciplined the Mormon theocracy
through federal force and cultural coercion. The traditional liberal solutions for managing civil
disputes of negotiation, rational discussion, and the privatization of religion were insufficient to
quell the Mormon drive for theocratic separation within federal territory. Had he not first fled
from Kirtland, escaped from the Liberty Jail, and been martyred in Carthage, Joseph would very
likely have been criminally convicted for bank fraud in Ohio, treason in Missouri, or polygamy
and the destruction of private property in Illinois. The arc of the Mormon Church’s doctrinal
evolution since his death demonstrates a great deal of assimilation to the dominant political and
cultural norms it once contested. In the Utah territory, gradual accommodations to greater federal
oversight were first made after the occupation of Salt Lake City by federal troops in 1852.4 The
Church officially revoked the “eternal covenant” of polygamy as an actual practice in 1890, after
a decades-long legislative and federal prosecutorial campaign that imprisoned many of the
Mormon hierarchy.5
In response to the federal campaigns, the Church, according to Mason, retreated from the
synthesis of politics and theology “that characterized much of their early history, theodemocracy
had evolved from an explicit political philosophy to a depoliticized descriptor of Latter-day Saint
(LDS) ecclesiastical governance.” Mason perceives the “shift in the meaning and application of
theodemocracy” as a signal of accommodation, the Church being “forced to reckon with the
modern world;” yet it bears repeating that theodemocracy emerged from within the modern
world. The arc that Mason traces is similar to the R. Laurence Moore’s thesis that a strong,
manufactured difference must be asserted by new religious movements within American
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liberalism before a “reviled countercultural sect” can assume “the shape of an acceptable
American denomination.”6 In addition to its revocation of the practice of polygamy, another
notable concession to liberal society came in 1978, when LDS Church President Spencer W.
Kimball revoked the ban on African-American men serving in the priesthood, the last official
revelation made by a Church Prophet.7 However, there are still unique elements of prophecy and
secrecy present in the recent and contemporary politics of the LDS Church that are rooted in
Joseph’s political theology.
Joseph’s assertion of the absolute sovereignty of revelation still echoes in the modern
Church. In 1980, Ezra Taft Benson, who would become Church President (and Prophet) five
years later, reaffirmed the political power of the Mormon Prophet:
Some so-called experts of political science want the prophet to keep still on politics.
Some would-be authorities on evolution want the prophet to keep still on evolution. And
so the list goes on and on. How we respond to the words of a living prophet when he tells
us what we need to know, but would rather not hear, is a test of our faithfulness.8
Following closely to some of Joseph’s key formulations on the primacy of prophetic power,
Benson iterated that the Mormon faith still held that “the living prophet is more vital to us than
the standard works,” and that the temporal authority of the prophet is such that he “is not
required to have any particular earthly training or credentials to speak on any subject or act on
any matter at any time.” The power of revelation, he reminded his congregants “is not limited by
men’s reasoning.”9
In addition to the retention of the role of the prophet in guiding the faith, so integral was
the secrecy shrouding the revelation on the plural marriage covenant to the survival of Joseph,
and its sense of the sacred in a hostile gentile world, that the Church did not publically recognize
Joseph’s polygamous marriages until November of 2014. Up until then Joseph had been
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“portrayed in church materials as a loyal partner to his loving spouse Emma.”10 Beyond the
curious delay in acknowledging the well-established history of the Mormon founder’s many
wives, several scholars have documented the inherent secrecy in Mormon political campaigns
since the 1970s. When the Equal Rights Amendment passed Congress and began to circulate
among states for ratification, the Mormon Church initially issued no position on it. According to
the historian Neil Young, before the official Church delivered a statement in opposition to the
amendment, Mormon politicians in four states had helped to ratify the ERA, and a “majority of
candidates to the Utah legislature” regardless of party supported the measure. A poll of Mormon
voters taken by the Desert News in 1974 found that 63.1 percent of them favored passage of the
amendment. Young writes that “The day before the Utah legislature’s opening session in 1975,
the Mormon Church killed the ERA’s chances in Utah by publishing an anti-amendment
editorial in the “Church News” section of its Deseret News.”11 The official Church statement was
remarkably effective in rapidly swinging Mormon opinion and voters against the ERA, and a
funding campaign for an anti-ERA organization was secretly, and centrally, coordinated by
Church officials.12 Mormon dissidents who publically supported ERA were disciplined and a
dissident who publically revealed the extent of the Church’s involvement in fighting against the
amendment was excommunicated.13
Young writes that the success of the anti-ERA campaign “depended upon the effective
strategies of coalition politics. In its foray into New Right politics, the Mormon Church could
use the ERA battle to show its political allies the significant contribution it could make to a
national conservative coalition.”14 The Mormon Church’s contributions to coalitional politics
would again be pivotal in another Religious Right political campaign that the Church engaged
with similar strategies, the fight against same-sex marriage.15 The political scientists Elizabeth
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Gordon and William Gillespie note that the tactics the Church used in defeating the ERA by
“drawing on centralized authority, tapping into established volunteer and communications
networks, effectively channeling money and personnel to where they are most needed, and
engaging in stealth politics (obscuring the centralized nature of apparently spontaneous action)”
were repeated in the fight against same-sex marriage, particularly in the successful anti-same sex
marriage ballot initiative in California, Proposition 8.16 Church officials successfully organized
campaign efforts “at least in part, under the radar screen,” and went to great efforts to obscure
“the extent of financial involvement by the Church and by individual Mormons.”17 (The
Church’s covert funding efforts in California’s 2008 Proposition 8 campaign were particularly
fascinating for legal scholars for the almost open violation of the federal law prohibiting taxexempt organization from supporting or opposing political causes or candidates.18)
“Stealth politics” and the faith in the sovereignty of active revelation are not confined to
a singular religion in America. As we have reviewed in the scholarship of Lucas Swaine,
theocratic new religions still emerge from a tolerant society, the “new flora in the simple
pluralistic array.”19 New religions in America run a vast spectrum of beliefs and approaches to
secular society, but the more aggressive of those of a theocratic orientation have engaged in their
own forms of antagonistic symbiosis in contesting the state, modes that bear an elective affinity
to those pioneered by Joseph. Applying a positive frame of contestation and constitutional
development, Philip Jenkins has written that “By continually pressing the boundaries of
tolerance, and doing so in the name of religious liberty, new and emerging denominations have
found themselves in the vanguard of constitutional development.”20 A more thorough survey
would note not only constitutional development, but new religions have also been in the
vanguard of exploring and exploiting gray zones of legality. The novelty of these mixed forms of
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contestation and symbiosis can be truly remarkable. In 1973 for example, according the
journalist Lawrence Wright, the Church of Scientology launched a covert operation to preempt
legal action against it by infiltrating “five thousand Scientologists . . . in 136 government
agencies worldwide.” So vast was this undertaking that “Nothing in American history can
compare with the scale of the domestic espionage of [the operation],” dubbed “Snow White.”21
Even after discovery and the criminal prosecution of eleven high-ranking church officials,
a similar effort was maintained against the IRS to gain tax exempt status. An intensive multimillion dollar campaign of lawsuits was launched against the IRS in conjunction with the hiring
private investigators to research the private lives of IRS officials, and the pilfering of IRS files
and wiretapping of IRS meetings.22 Despite its clear record of past criminal activity and active
harassment of government officials, Scientology reached an accord with the IRS in 1993. The
final settlement, after an almost twenty-year campaign of provocation, granted “Scientology
financial advantages that were unusual, perhaps unique, among religions in the United States.”
For example, “schools using [Scientology’s founder L. Ron Hubbard’s] educational material
received tax exemption,” as did “Scientology publishing houses that were solely dedicated to
turning out Hubbard’s books, including his commercial fiction.” So expansive was the settlement
for granting exemptions to future organizational branches of the institutional church that “the
church could make its own decisions about which of its activities were exempt.”23
Other theocratic new religions in America, such as the Rajneesh movement, have also
possessed a doctrinal and ideological fluidity, one premised on the charisma of the movement’s
founder, that has proven mystifying to plural society and troublesome for liberal governance. 24
Famously, the movement was able to acquire a large degree of autonomy in a small community
in Eastern Oregon by buying all the available commercial property, encouraging the current
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residents to leave, and electing Rajneeshes to every public office.25 Long after Nauvoo, Zions for
other faiths continue to occupy isolated communities and attempt to displace the current
residents.
Doctrinal fluidity, strategies of subterfuge, and demands for greater religious liberty are
not limited to the antagonistic symbiosis of new religions contesting liberalism from within. The
coalitional politics of Religious Right also contain analogous elements according to the
historians of American religion like Randall Ballmer. As an example of doctrinal fluidity,
Ballmer has written that the focus on opposing abortion as the dominant reason behind the
mobilization of the Religious Right “serves as a convenient fiction because it suggests noble and
altruistic motives.” However, he finds it “highly disingenuous” because the primary motivation
for the formation of the movement was “for the purpose, effectively, of defending racial
discrimination at Bob Jones University and other segregated schools.”26
Intriguingly, denials of doctrinal fluidity and protestations of the sincerity of belief are
one measure of how far arguments of religious liberty have come to be adopted as a tool of
contestation against secular rights -- not just by small theocratic movements, but the larger
coalition of American conservatives. Indicative of this arc, in the 1990 Supreme Court case
Employment Division v. Smith involving a question of religious liberty, Justice Antonin Scalia
wrote for the majority opinion that “a person may not defy neutral laws of general applicability”
out of even a sincerely held religious belief. “To permit this,” he then argued “would make the
professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of the land, and in effect to permit
every citizen to become a law unto himself.” Scalia feared that if the exemption that the
respondents favored were to be granted, that it “would open the prospect of constitutionally
required religious exemptions from civic obligations of almost every conceivable kind . . .”27
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In response to the Smith ruling, the US Congress passed the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act in 1993, the foundation for the majority opinion in Hobby Lobby v. Burwell
(2014), which would uphold an employer’s religious exemption to the contraception mandate for
employees as provided by the Affordable Care Act. Justice Samuel Alito, writing for the
majority opinion (which included Scalia) in the Hobby Lobby case stated, “It is not for us to say
that their religious beliefs are mistaken or insubstantial,” as long as the employer insisted that the
belief was sincere and that accommodation posed an undue burden to his faith. The majority
opinion also ruled that the RFRA holds that corporations are “persons” and as such can hold
religious beliefs worthy of protection.28
Even the dissenting opinion in Hobby Lobby v. Burwell demonstrated that the minority
justices, much like John Locke’s arguments in his Letter on Toleration, were unwilling to have
the magistrates decide the legitimacy of belief. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, writing for the
minority, argued that there was an “overriding interest” in “keeping the courts ‘out of the
business of evaluating’ . . . the sincerity with which an asserted religious belief is held.” The
courts therefore, “must accept as true” any assertion that a respondent’s “beliefs are sincere and
of a religious nature” while assessing a RFRA claim.29 As Justice Scalia predicted in
Employment Division v. Smith, however, courts will have to evaluate a flood of claims if the
scope of future rulings on the applicability of RFRA claims isn’t substantially narrowed.
A year after the Hobby Lobby decision, a federal judge invoked the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act (RFRA) in his decision (Perez v. Paragon Contractors) that a member of the
Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints (FLDS) would not be compelled to
cooperate with a Department of Labor investigation into the abuse of child labor laws. The court
ruled that it could not question his assertion that “the identity of FLDS Church leaders, the
182

organization of the FLDS Church, and its internal affairs are sacred matters, designated so by
God, and that he has vowed or covenanted not to discuss sacred matters.” His testimony on how
officials of the FLDS Church had organized work gangs of children to pick pecans without pay
would constitute a “substantial burden” on sincerely held religious beliefs, and was therefore
excused.30 In these recent court rulings, we see the potential vanguard of theocratic development:
ever greater degrees of religious control over new spheres of private life. By asserting rights of
religious liberty, employers can now deploy a very American synthesis of corporate power and
religious belief to contest the rights of their employees in the field of labor law.
Joseph’s political theology left behind multiple legacies, in both the anatomy of modern
American theocracies and as a foreshadowing of the strategies utilized by the coalitional politics
of the Religious Right. This study has sought to demonstrate that whereas communitarians and
religious conservatives portray the value of the deep moral intuitions and “unexhausted force” of
timeless religious traditions that undergird communal life, Joseph’s political theology
exemplifies how theocratic traditions can be highly adaptive and rapidly revisable. Political
theorists should take note since much of American political theory still misperceives theocracy
as an archaic other, and has yet to engage with the real, peculiar nature of modern theocracy and
its curious relationship to pluralism.

183

Abbreviations Key:
BoM: The Book of Mormon
BoC: Book of Commandments
D&C: Doctrine and Covenants
HotC: History of the Church
PoP: People of Paradox
RSR: Rough Stone Rolling
TOTPOTC: JS: Teachings of the Presidents of the Church: Joseph Smith

Introduction
1

Klaus J. Hansen in Launius and Hallwas, eds. Kingdom on the Mississippi Revisited: Nauvoo in
Mormon History (Urbana, University of Illinois Press, 1996) pg. 62; Richard L. Bushman, Joseph Smith:
Rough Stone Rolling (New York, Vintage, 2007) pp. 137, 160, 370; Dan Erickson, As a Thief In the
Night: The Mormon Quest for Millennial Deliverance (Salt Lake City, Signature Books, 1998) pg. 134;
Joseph Fielding Smith, Teachings of the prophet Joseph Smith: Taken from his sermons and writings as
they are found in the Documentary history and other publications of the Church and written or published
in the days of the prophet's ministry (Deseret book, 1976) pp. 63, 234, 258, 385, 301.
2
Fawn Broadie, No Man Knows My History: the Life of Joseph Smith (New York: Vintage Books, 1945)
pg. 374; Bushman, RSR, pg. 538; Smith, Joseph Fielding. Teachings of the Prophet Joseph Smith: Taken
from his sermons and writings as they are found in the Documentary history and other publications of the
Church and written or published in the days of the prophet's ministry. Deseret book, 1976. v. 6. pp. 40809. https://byustudies.byu.edu/history-of-the-church
3
For the size of the Nauvoo Legion see Gardner in Launius, pg. 57. For the coronation of Joseph by the
theocratic Council of Fifty, see D. Michael Quinn, The Mormon Hierarchy: Origins of Power (Signature
Books, 1994) pg. 128.
4
ibid. pp. 10-11.
5
Palmyra, were Joseph lived when he first discovered the golden plates, is 27 miles from Seneca Falls,
New York.
6
Joseph de Maistre, Considerations on France (Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought,
Cambridge University Press, 1995) pg. 41. Joseph Smith, “The Government of God,” Times and
Seasons, July 15, 1842, pp. 855-58.
7
Gopal Balakrishnan, The Enemy: An Intellectual Portrait of Carl Schmitt (Verso, London 2000)
pg. 47.
8
See Habermas, “Religion in the Public Sphere: Cognitive Presuppositions for the Public Use of Reason
and Secular Citizens,” pp. 136, 142; Lucas Swaine, The Liberal Conscience: Politics and Principle in a
World of Religious Pluralism (New York, Columbia University Press, 2006) pg. 7.
9
Robert N. Bellah, “Civil Religion in America.” Daedalus 96 (1967): 1–21.
10
Richard T. Hughes and C. Leonard Allen, Illusions of Innocence: Protestant Primitivism in America,
1630-1875 (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1988) pg. 150.
11
Sacvan Bercovitch, The American Jeremiad (University of Wisconsin Press, 1978) p. 23.
12
Richard Slotkin, Regeneration Through Violence: The Mythology of the American Frontier 1600-1860
(Norman, University of Oklahoma Press, 1973) pg. 5.
13
Erickson, pg. 90, 102; and Grant Underwood, The Millenarian World of Early Mormonism (University
of Illinois Press, 1999) ch. 3.
14
David L. Bigler, Forgotten Kingdom: The Mormon Theocracy in the American West, 1847-1896,
(Logan, Utah; Utah State University Press, 1998) chs. 2, 4, 6 and 10 and Erickson, pg. 140.
184

15

Philip Jenkins, Mystics and Messiahs: Cults and New Religions in American History (New York:
Oxford University Press. 2000) pg. 5.
16
R. Laurence Moore, Religious Outsiders and the Making of Americans (Oxford University Press, 1987)
pg. xi.
17
Erickson, pg. 53.
18
Erickson, pg. 58. Underwood also notes how a “rhetoric of polarization” inspires a “siege mentality”,
pp. 44-45.
19
Robert Putnam and David Campbell, American Grace: How Religion Divides and Unites Us (New
York: Simon & Schuster, 2012) pg. 539.
20
Samuel Huntington, Who Are We?: The Challenges to America’s National Identity (New York: Simon
&Schuster, 2005) pg. 85.
21
Perez Zagorin, How the Idea of Religious Tolerance Came to the West (Princetone University Press,
2003).
22
Elizabeth Pritchard, Religion in Public: Locke’s Political Theology (Stanford University Press, 2013).
Chs 1-3.
23
Swaine, pg. 7.
24
This quote of Joseph’s describes the highly situational context in which revelation can supersede
revelation and will be discussed in depth in chapter four. Quinn, pg. 112; Bushman, RSR, pg. 441.
25
Sarah Song, Justice Gender and the Politics of Multiculturalism (Cambridge University Press, 2007)
pg. 7.
26
Bushman, RSR, pp. 327-28, 551-17; Allen in Neilson, Reid L., and Terryl L. Givens, eds. Joseph Smith,
Jr.: Reappraisals after Two Centuries (Oxford University Press, 2008) pp. 74, 80.
27
Bushman, RSR, pg. 174. The LDS Church provides a summation of Joseph’s thoughts on revision here:
In some instances, when a new revelation changed or updated what had previously been received,
the Prophet edited the earlier written revelation to reflect the new understanding. Thus, as his
doctrinal knowledge clarified and expanded, so did the recorded revelations. They were
characterized by the changing nature of his understanding of the sacred subject matter. The
Prophet did not believe that revelations, once recorded, could not be changed by further
revelation.
https://www.lds.org/ensign/2009/07/the-joseph-smith-papers-the-manuscript-revelation-books?lang=eng

185

Chapter 1: Political Biography
1

D&C 121: 39-40; Daynes in Launius, pg. 133.
Broadie, pg. 15.
3
Bushman, RSR, pp. 39-40; Hill, reflecting earlier scholarship and Joseph’s different versions of his first
vision, cites the year 1823, pg. 20.
4
Bushman, RSR, pp. 58-61.
5
Bushman, RSR, pp. 48-52; Edwin Brown Firmage and Rirchard Collin Mangrum, Zion in the Courts: A
Legal History of the Church of Latter-day Saints 1830-1900, pp. 48-51.
6
Bushman, pp. 109-11.
7
Broadie, pp. 244, 296.
8
Quinn, pg. 616.
9
Richard Bushman wrote in an email correspondence: “It is actually hard to pin down in the sources
exactly when that specific designation [the Garden of Eden] was made. The sources are all from a time
long after his death. It was implied in 1838 when Joseph declared that Adam built an altar in Davies
County, Missouri, after his expulsion from the Garden.” (4/11/14).
10
Erickson, pg.102.
11
Bushman, RSR, pg. 168.
12
Broadie, pg. 124, Bushman, RSR, pp. 191-192, D&C 87.
13
Erickson, pp. 44-58, 100-02.
14
BoC 44:32; in its later edited form: D&C 42: 39.
15
BoC 54:43; D&C 52:42. Bushman gives rough gloss on this passage in RSR, pg. 169.
16
Underwood, pp. 8-9, 43-46, 56.
17
Erickson, pp. 102-103.
18
Bushman, pp. 178-80.
19
Bushman, pp. 222-227.
20
TPJS, pg. 15.
21
D&C 98: 4-6; Bushman, RSR, pg. 226.
22
Bushman, RSR, pp, 226-27. See also Moore, Religious Outsiders, pp. 34-35.
23
Quinn pp. 80-86.
24
Hansen in Launius, pg. 62; Erickson, pg. 134.
25
See Firmage and Mangrum, chs. 3-5.
26
Abanes, pp. 134-9; Bushman pp. 328-332; Broadie pp. 194-202.
27
Broadie, pg. 195.
28
Abanes, pp. 141-2; Bushman, pg. 331, 340.
29
Bushman, pg. 349.
30
Jenkins, pg. 34. q.v. Mark Twain, Roughing It (Chicago: F.G. Gilman, 1872)
31
Bushman, RSR, pg. 349.
32
Quinn, pg. 103.
33
Broadie, pg. 354.
34
Hill, pg. 75.
35
Harper, pg. 293.
36
Hill, pg. 76, see also Bushman, pp. 350-2.
37
Quinn, pg. 99.
38
Bushman, RSR, pp 347-9, 350-1, Broadie, pg. 214-9; Erickson, pg. 118; Quinn, pg. 93, 95.
39
Daynes in Launius, pg. 132.
40
Bushman, RSR, pp. 356-57.
41
ibid., pp. 358-66.
42
ibid., pg. 362.
43
ibid,, pg. 365; Harper, pg. 293.
2

186

44

ibid., pp. 365-7.
Quinn, pg. 95.
46
Bushman, RSR, pg. 369.
47
ibid., pg. 372.
48
Broadie, pg. 246.
49
Mason, pg. 365.
50
ibid., pg. 366.
51
ibid., pg. 357.
52
John Reynolds, My Own Times: Embracing Also the History of My Life (Chicago: Fergus Printing,
1879), 367.
53
Bushman, pp. 392-393.
54
Bushman, pp. 397, 514.
55
James B. Allen, “Joseph Smith vs. John C. Calhoun: The States’ Rights Dilemma and Early Mormon
History,” in Neilson and Givens, pp.73-90.
56
Harper, pg. 296.
57
Harper, pp. 296-97.
58
Hill, pg. 106.
59
Hill, 111; Quin pg. 106.
60
Bushman, pg. 427.
61
Bushman, pg. 508.
62
D&C 124: 3.
63
Harper, pg. 297.
64
Quinn pg. 107.
65
Mason, pg. 368.
66
Quinn, pg. 111.
67
Bushman, pg. 433.
68
Broadie, pg. 356; Quinn pg. 116.
69
Bushman, pg. 443.
70
Bushman, pg. 437. Or perhaps, his third wife, as there is some evidence of his marriage to Fanny Alger
in 1835. See Bushman, pp. 323-7.
71
Bushman, pg. 644 fn 2.
72
Bushman, pp. 519-521.
73
Quinn, pg. 643.
74
Quinn, pg. 134.
75
Quinn, pg. 133-34; TJPS, pp. 334-335.
76
Timothy L. Wood, “The Prophet and the Presidency: Mormonism and Politics in Joseph Smith’s 1844
Presidential Campaign, pg. 187. Times and Seasons, Vol. 5, No. 8, April 15 1844, pp. 509-510.
http://contentdm.lib.byu.edu/cdm/ref/collection/NCMP1820-1846/id/8375
77
Mason, pg. 365.
78
Hill, pg. 137.
79
Quinn, pg. 136.
80
Mason, pg. 369; Harper pg. 301; Palmer, pp. 6-8.
81
Broadie, pp. 367-77; Wood, pg. 189; Bushman, pp 537-544.
82
For the size of the Nauvoo Legion see Gardner in Launius, pg. 57. For the coronation of Smith by the
Council of Fifty, see Quinn, pg. 128.
45

187

Chapter 2: American Theocracy and the Crisis of Pluralism
See, for example, Andrew March, “Theocrats Living under Secular Law: An External Engagement with
Islamic Legal Theory,” Journal of Political Philosophy, Vol. 19, No. 1, 2011, pp. 28-51; Klausen, Jytta,
The Islamic Challenge: Politics and Religion in Western Europe, Oxford University Press, 2008; Lucas
Swaine, The Liberal Conscience: Politics and Principle in a World of Religious Pluralism, Columbia
University Press, 2006; Robert B. Thigpen and Lyle A. Downing, “Rawls and the challenge of theocracy
to freedom,” Journal of Church and State, 40 (1998), 757–73.
2
Broadie, pg. 230-1.
3
John Hall, Apocalypse: From Antiquity to the Empire of Modernity (John Wiley & Sons, 2013)
pg. 94.
4
Swaine, pg. 27.
5
March, pp.50-51.
6
Luther, Freedom Of a Christian, in Dillenberger, ed Selections From His Writings (Anchor Library of
Religion, 1961) pg. 64.
7
Dillenbeger, Introduction in Martin Luther: Selections from His Writings, pp. xxxiii, 66.
8
Luther, Freedom Of a Christian, in Dillenberger, pg. 66.
9
Luther, Bondage of the Will, in Dillenberger, pg. 172.
10
Luther, An Appeal to the Ruling Class, in Dillenberger, pg. 475.
11
Richard Marius, Martin Luther: the Christian between God and death (Harvard University Press, 2009)
pp. 398-9.
12
Marius, pg. 401.
13
ibid., pg. 402.
14
ibid., pp. 424, 430-2.
15
Zagorin, pg. 16.
16
Zagorin, 289.
17
Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration, pg. 23.
18
Pritchard, Elizabeth Religion in Public: Locke’s Political Theology, pg. 2.
19
Ibid,, pg. 6.
20
ibid., pg. 11
21
ibid., pg. 18.
22
ibid., pg. 19.
23
ibid., pg. 132.
24
Locke, Letter on Toleration, pg. 44.
25
Locke, Human Understanding, pg. 23; cited in Pritchard, pg. 23.
26
Martin E. Marty, Religion and the Republic: The American Circumstance (Boston, Beacon, 1987) pg.
58.
27
Locke, Letter on Toleration, pg. 49.
28
For more on these radical sects, see Christopher Hill, The World Turned Upside Down: Radical Ideas
During the English Revolution, Penguin History, 1984.
29
Locke, Letter on Toleration, pp. 49-50.
30
“What if a Church be Idolotrous, is that also to be tolerated by the Magistrate? I answer. What Power
can be given to the Magistrate for the suppression of an Idolotrous Church, which may not, in time and
place, be made use of to the ruine of an Orthodox one?” Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration, pg. 42.
1

For a more contemporary example, see the reluctance of Justice Samuel Alito’s majority decision in
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby to probe the sincerity of a religious claim: “The companies in the cases before us
are closely held corporations, each owned and controlled by members of a single family, and no one has
188

disputed the sincerity of their religious beliefs. . . Here, in contrast, the plaintiffs do assert that funding the
specific contraceptive methods at issue violates their religious beliefs, and HHS does not question their
sincerity.” Pp. 35, 44: http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/13pdf/13-354_olp1.pdf
31
Hall, pg. 94.
32
Alexis Tocqueville, Democracy in America, Daniel J. Boorstin ed., Vintage Classics, 1990. pg. 302.
33
Tocqueville, pg. 303.
34
ibid., 7.
35
Stephen Harper, “Dictated by Christ”: Joseph Smith and the Politics of Revelation,” Journal of the
Early Republic, Vol. 26, No. 2 (Summer, 2006), pg. 277.
36
Hill, “Counter-Revolution: The Mormon Reaction to the Coming of American Democracy,” pg. 26.
37
For a comparison with the comparatively more limited range of Protestant theology in Canada, which
maintained closer ties to the Anglican Church, see Mark Knoll, America’s God, pp. 155-156.
38
Daniel Walker Howe, What Hath God Wrought: The Transformation of America, 1815-1848 (New
York: Oxford University Press, 2007) pp. 164-165.
39
Nathan O. Hatch, pp. 6-11.
40
Hatch, The Democratization of American Christianity, pg. 7.
41
Hatch, pg. 14.
42
Hill, Quest for Refuge, pg. 7.
43
Hatch, pg. 64.
44
Hill, Quest for Refuge, pg. xi.
45
ibid., pg. xii.
46
Bushman, pp.85-6.
47
Hill, pg. xix.
48
Hill, Quest for Refuge, pp. xi-xii, and Hill, Sunstone, 26
49
ibid., pg. xiii.
50
The first draft was probably recorded in 1832, the second, which would become The History of the
Church, was started in 1838. Bushman, pp. 39, 389.
51
Givens, pg. 54.
52
History of the Church (HotC) , Volume 1, Ch. 1: 8.
53
Hatch, pg. 114. For the economic trials of the Smith family, see Hill, Quest for Refuge, pp. 1-6,
Brooke, pg. 135, and Bushman, chapter 1-2. For the role of family socialization in millenarian
subcultures, see Barkun, pg. 94.
54
HotC,. Ch: 1:6.
55
HotC, V 1, Ch. 1:9-10, 19-20. Joseph himself was initially “partial to the Methodist sect,” and sided
with his father’s religious preferences over his mother’s dalliance with Presbyterianism. Bushman, pg. 37.
For the family’s generations long quest of seeking for religious certainty, see Bushman pp. 12-17 and
Broadie chapter 1. Part of the divide resulted from a Presbyterian minister implying that Alvin Smith,
Joseph’s eldest brother, was doomed to hell for not attending church before his death. Brooke, pg. 150.
56
Locke, The Reasonableness of Christianity, pp. 10-15.
57
Zagorin, pp. 97-144; Kaplan, pp. 17-21.
58
Pritchard, pg. 132.
59
Hill, Sunstone, pg. 26.
60
Givens, WtA, pp. 24-34.
61
Hill, Refuge, pp. 15-16.
62
Hatch notes that “If America was becoming a democratic marketplace of equally competing individuals
with interest to promotes, it is not difficult to understand the appeal of insurgent religious movements
who claimed to take a place at the center of culture by virtue of their popular following;” pg. 62. See also
the “common style and demeanor,” of these insurgent movements, pg. 67.
63
Hatch, pg. 116.
64
Book of Mormon, 1 Nephi, 13:6.
189

65

Hill, Refuge, pg. xii
Hatch, pg. 117. Richard Bushman writes: “Whole chapters of Isaiah are inserted into the text.”
Bushman, Rough Stone Rolling, pp. 99.
67
BoM; 3: Nephi 6:11-14.
68
Hill, Refuge, pg. 21.
69
BoM; Mormon 8: 33.
70
Bushman, pg. 203.
71
Lears, pp. xii, xv.
72
Givens, pg. 28.
73
Givens, pg. 30.
74
Givens, pg. 59.
75
Bushman, pg. 377. The evolution of Joseph’s stance can be traced throughout Rough Stone Rolling:
“The Book of Mormon was the seminal text, not the Constitution or the Declaration of Independence.”
Bushman, pg. 104; “The United States government in all of its democratic glory was not the model for
Zion; the value of the Constitution as the “law of man” was acknowledged only later, after the Missouri
persecution.” Bushman, RSR, pg. 168; “Instead of sound like scripture, the motto’s first line [of synoptic
Mormon teaching] was “The Constitution of our country formed by the fathers of liberty.” Bushman, pg.
349.
76
“The Government of God,” Times and Seasons, Friday, July 15, 1842.
77
ibid.
78
Juster, Doomsayers, pg. 184.
79
Givens, pg. 57.
80
Givens, pg. 58.
81
Broadie, pp. 140-42.
82
Hatch, pg. 119.
83
Hatch, pg. 14.
84
Hatch, pg. 120.
85
HotC, V 1, Ch. 1:22
86
Bushman, pp. 40-41.
87
Walzer, pp. 111-113.
88
Hatch, pg. 120.
89
Hill, pg, 33.
90
Bushman pp. 150-151.
91
Bushman, pg. 285.
92
Givens, pg. 10.
93
Hobbes, Leviathan, Part 3, Ch. 32.
94
Wolin, Politics and Vision: Continuity and Innovation in Western Political Thought (Princeton
University Press, 2006) pg. 136-38.
95
Marius, pg. 323.
96
Marius, pg. 324.
97
Marius, pg. 335.
98
Quinn, pg. 5.
99
Quinn, pp. 6-7.
100
Bushman, pp. 114, 121.
101
Quinn, pg. 8.
102
Bushman, pg. 120.
103
Quinn, pp. 8-9.
104
Givens, pg. xiv.
105
Bushman, pp. 120-121; Hill, pg. 27.
106
Quinn, pp 5-6.
66

190

107

Hill, Dialogue, 2006.
Givens, pg. 9.
109
HotC, V. 1, Ch. 5:387-388, 403.
110
Givens, pp. 9-10.
111
Quinn, pg. 9; Bushman, pg. 151.
112
Bushman, 175.
113
Brooke, pg. 192.
114
Underwood, pg. 221.
108

191

Chapter 3: Pluralism as Imaginative Resource: Mining and Refining the Mysticism of the
Radical Reformation
1

Taylor, Modern Social Imaginaries, pg. 52.
Givens, pg. 43.
3
Gordon Wood, “Evangelical America and Early Mormonism” (April 1980), in The Mormon History
Association’s Tanner Lectures: The First Twenty Years, ed. Dean L. May and Reid L. Neilson (Urbana
and Chicago: University of Illinois, 2006), 9-28.
4
For the lore of Radical Reformation, see Brooke, pp. xv-29.
5
Lhamon, Deliberate Speed, pp. xiii-xiv.
6
Hatch, pp. 4, 132.
7
Broadie, pg. 15.
8
Givens, pg. 59.
9
For the restoration of the monarchy by providence, see Maistre, Considerations, pp. 84-85, 105.
10
Armenteros dates Maistre’s more formal return to the illuminism of his youth, and his increasing hopes
for reconciling it to Catholicism, to 1809. Armenteros, pp. 157-8.
11
Armenteros, pp. 201-04.
12
Hatch, pg. 35
13
Hatch, pg. 196.
14
Howe, pp. 171-172; Hatch pp. 196-198.
15
Hatch, pg. 195.
16
Hatch, pp. 167-8.
17
Hatch, pg. 169.
18
Hill, pp. 16-17.
19
See Brooke chs. 1-2.
20
Marcus Rediker and Peter Linebaugh, The Many-Headed Hydra: Sailors, Slaves, Commoners, and the
Hidden History of the Revolutionary Atlantic, Beacon Press, 2013.
21
Wood, “Evangelical America and Early Mormonism” New York History 61 (1980): 359-86, pg. 364
22
Brooke, pp. 4, 19.
23
Brooke, pg. 129.
24
On Lucy Mack Smith, see Hill, Refuge, pg. 3. For Joseph Smith Sr., see Brooke, pp. 72, 77.
25
Bushman, pg. 147.
26
Brooke, pp. 38-39, pg. 59.
27
Brooke, pg. 270.
28
Brooke, pp. 133-34, 140-141.
29
Quinn, pp. 127-28.
30
Broadie, pg. 276; Brooke pg. 246. For the many ways in which Mormon theology transcended the Book
of Mormon, see Givens, WtA, pp. 8-10, and Bushman, pp. 199-200.
31
Givens, pg. 39.
32
Brooke, pp. 9-10.
33
Brooke, pp. 14-19.
34
Givens, pg. 70.
35
Armenteros, pp. 182, 193.
36
Armenteros, pg. 214.
37
Givens, pg. 57.
38
Brooke, pg. 101.
39
Brooke, pp. 102-104.
2

192

40

Brooke, pg. 262.
Brooke, pp. 34, 158, 256.
42
Brooke, pg. 266.
43
Quinn, pg. 130.
44
D&C 132: 46-49.
45
Brooke, pp. 267-8.
46
Quinn, pg. 123.
47
Bloom, pg. 49.
48
With renewed federal oversight, David Bigler dates the lifespan of the “Forgotten Kingdom” from
1847-1896.
49
Bloom, pg. 55.
50
Uday Mehta, The Anxiety of Freedom: Imagination and Individuality in Locke’s Political Thought
(Cornell University Press, 1992) pg. 76.
51
ibid., pg. 172.
52
ibid., pp. 114-18.
53
ibid., pg. 138.
54
Bushman, pg. 285 and Broadie, pg. 366.
55
Bushman, pp. 105, 107.
56
Mehta, pp. 47-48, 60.
57
Givens, WtA, pg. 21.
58
Bushman, pp. 132-33.
59
Givens, PoP, pp. 29-30.
60
Mehta, pp. 60, 67.
61
Mehta, pp. 124-25.
62
Bushman, pg. 484.
63
Bushman, pg. 285.
64
Mehta, pg. 171.
41

193

Chapter 4: Liberty for Theocrats: The Challenge of Apocalyptic Theocracies for Liberal
Pluralism
1

Isaiah Berlin, The Crooked Timber of Humanity: Chapters in the History of Ideas (New York: Knopf,
1991), pp. 12-13.
2
Patrick Buchanan, Suicide of a Superpower, pg. 317.
3
Mehta, pg. 21.
4
Mehta, pg. 118.
5
Jenkins, pg. 5.
6
Walzer, On Tolerance, pp. 66-70, 80-82.
7
Walzer, On Tolerance, pg. 66.
8
Moore, pp.31-33.
9
Swaine, pg. 80.
10
For the “tyranny” associated with the Catholic Church, see Bloch, pp. 57-63. For the populist
marketplace of American Protestantism, see Hatch, The Democratization of American Christianity, pp.
162-167.
11
Quong, “The Rights of Unreasonable Citizens,” The Journal of Political Philosophy, V 12, N 3, 2004,
pp. 314-335.
12
The choice of Walzer here is not indicative of any particularly egregious flaw in his arguments in
comparison with the larger array of pluralist theory, simply to show how well his work on the subject
embodies a general tendency in the literature.
13
Walzer, What It Means to be an American, pg. 8.
14
ibid., pp. 4-6.
15
ibid., pg. 7.
16
ibid., pg. 8.
17
ibid., pg. 10.
18
ibid., pg. 19.
19
Walzer, On Tolerance, pg. 80.
20
Moore, pg. xi.
21
Erickson, pp. 53-58.
22
See for example the “Book of Abraham” and the “Kinderhook Plates” in Bushman, RSR, pp. 720, 726.
23
Swaine, pg. 27.
24
The lineage runs not through genetic propinquity, but through the power of the Holy Ghost which
would transform the pious and “purge out the old blood & make him actually of the seed of Abraham.”
Richard Bushman writes that “Election in Joseph’s mind involved adoption into Abraham’s progeny and
gaining the resulting blessings of intelligence.” Bushman, RSR, pg. 387.
25
Song, pp. 1, 19-20.
26
Appiah “Identity, Authenticity, Survival: Multicultural Societies and Social Reproduction,” in Taylor,
Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition, pg 149.
27
Quinn, pp. 128-131.
28
Moore notes that Joseph publicized the fact that Mormonism contained secret doctrines, and that
“(r)ather than warding off the persecution of his ideas, Smith’s strategy of secrecy only intensified it and
gave total license to the imaginations of those who wrote anti-Mormon propaganda. Smith, therefore,
appears to have used secrecy for another reason, as part of his effort to give his followers a sense of
distinct identity.”(Moore, pg. 37)
29
Walzer, pg. 9.
194

30

Cite page on pluralist section.
Givens, PoP, pg. 56.
32
Scott Atran and Jeremy Ginges, “Religious and Sacred Imperatives in Human Conflict,” Science 18
May 2012: Vol. 336, Issue 6083, pp. 855-857.
33
Hill, pg. 14.
34
Erickson, pp. 44, 49; Smith, History of the Church, 2:323-24.
35
Bushman, pp. 227, 377.
36
Moore, pg. 39
37
Bushman, pg. 167.
38
Bushman, pp. 348-354, 377.
39
Michael Walzer, On Toleration, (Yale University Press, 1999), pp. 66-67.
40
Broadie, pg. 351.
41
Swaine, pg. 132.
42
ibid., pg. xv.
43
ibid., pg. 7.
44
ibid., pg. 8. Yet he also acknowledges that “the theocrat’s disaffection runs deeper [than mere policy
disagreements], reaching down to the very sea floor of liberalism and liberal governance itself. For the
theocrat’s dissent . . . tends to be based . . . on the very rejection of liberal values.” pg. 13.
45
ibid., pg. 158.
46
ibid., pg. 160.
47
ibid., pp. xvii, 161.
48
ibid., pg. xvii.
49
ibid., pg. 23.
50
ibid., pg. 66.
51
ibid., pg. 67.
52
ibid., pp. 81-87.
53
ibid., pg. 85.
54
ibid., pg. 72.
55
ibid., pg. 91.
56
ibid., pg. 89.
57
ibid., pg. 132.
58
V.S. Naipaul, Beyond Belief: Islamic Excursions Among the Converted Peoples, Abacus, 1998. Pg.
320.
59
“It is one of the first principles of my life and one that I have cultivated from my childhood . . . to allow
every one the liberty of conscience.” Faulring, pg. 420
60
Quinn, pg. 80 and BofC, 82; D&C 38: 21-22.
61
Quinn, pg. 86
62
Hatch, “Mormons and Methodists,” pg.43.
63
Swaine, pg. 8.
64
Swaine, pg. 23.
65
See, for example, Jesper Aagaard Petersen’s Contemporary Religious Satanism: A Critical Anthology,
Ashgate, 2009. Theologies containing conceptions of the good that are radically divergent from, or even
self-consciously oppositional to, more mainstream cultural formulations are more likely to contest the
very conventional premises of the good that Swaine assumes are a given.
66
Swaine, pg. 64.
67
ibid,, pg. 65.
68
ibid,, pp. 16-17.
69
ibid,, pg. 147.
70
For concerns over semi-sovereignty, see Swaine, pp. 92-93. For theocratic tribes such as the Pueblo,
see pg. 213.
31

195

71

Swaine, pg. 9.
Swaine, pg. 144.
73
Swaine writes that “The strength of his conviction in the truth of his doctrine and the fact that some
putative religious authority has given him a rendering of God’s commands together cannot suffice to give
the theocrat adequate reason to believe that God’s doctrine requires unmitigated theocratic governance.”
pg. 66. What Swaine seems to be projecting onto the theocrat is a degree of doubt sufficiently strong
enough to be swayed by liberal arguments that liberty of conscience must be maintained in order to
discover the good. He appears to reject the idea that for a theocrat, a strong enough conviction in
theocracy might indeed suffice as a reason to believe that God desires. . . theocracy.
74
Swaine, pg. 131.
75
Despite his consistent promotion of an education standard for children sufficient to inform them about
the principles of a liberty of conscience and their right to exit, earlier in his argument Swaine appears to
be wary of how comprehensive that education should be, or who would teach it: “Under a well-formed
schema for quasi-sovereignty, the educational baseline that liberal government may justifiably require of
theocratic communities would be considerably less comprehensive that that advocated by such liberals as
Amy Gutman or Stephen Macedo. Here it is important to be chary, however, since quasi-sovereign
communities may by their nature wish fully to prevent their children from having contact with outsiders.”
Public schools, therefore, are out of the question. Swaine, pp. 95-96.
76
Song, pp. 161-2. For Song, state-mandated education plays a vital role in protecting the rights of exit:
“Children should be taught about their basic constitutional and civic rights so they know that liberty of
conscience exists in their society and that apostasy in not a legal crime.” In addition, members should be
free from abuse and coercion, have decent health care, nutrition, and be provided “genuine alternatives
among which to make choices, including real access to a mainstream society to exit to.” As discussed,
this is not the society that Smith envisioned.
77
Swaine, pg. 161.
78
See Swaine’s example of child sacrifice or “free exercise for Aztecs.” pg. 95.
79
Habermas, “The Political: The Rational Meaning of a Questionable Inheritance of Political Theology,”
in The Power of Religion in the Public Sphere, pg. 25.
80
ibid., pg. 26.
81
Habermas, “Religion in the Public Sphere: Cognitive Presuppositions for the Public Use of Reason and
Secular Citizens,” pg. 143.
82
Habermas, “An Awareness of What is Missing,” pg. 17.
83
Habermas, “The Political: The Rational Meaning of a Questionable Inheritance of Political Theology,”
in The Power of Religion in the Public Sphere, pg. 25.
84
Terryl Givens writes that the revelation that Mormonism was “the only true and living church” in the
whole world was a truth that helped set Joseph and his church into an adversarial relationship with the
outside world. “What was different about Joseph’s posture was how effectively he imbued an entire
people with this same sense of hostile separation from the world.” Joseph’s successor, Brigham Young,
would maintain that oppositional posture, remarking that “I am satisfied that it will not do for the Lord to
make this people popular. Why? Because all hell would want to be in the church. The people must be kept
where the finger of scorn can be pointed at them.”
Givens, PoP, pp. 54-56.
85
Hill, Quest for Refuge, pp. xviii, xix, and 30.
86
Book of Commandments 44:32, http://josephsmithpapers.org/paperSummary/book-of-commandments1833
87
Doctrine & Covenants 52:42. For Joseph’s arrival in mid-July of 1831, see Bushman, RSR, pg. 162. For
Zion as a millenarian refuge for Momons, ibid. pp. 164-68. The June 6th prophecy on inheriting Missouri
from enemies that they had yet to meet was delivered in Kirtland Ohio; Doctrine & Covenants 63:31.
88
Brooke, pp. 222 and 225-26; Bushman, RSR, pp. 328-32, 334 and 340.
72

196

Allen, James B. “Joseph Smith vs. Kohn C. Calhoun: The States’ Rights Dilemma and Early Mormon
History” in Neilson and Givens, ed., pg. 83 and Quinn, pg. 121.
90
Quinn, pp. 105-06, 110.
91
Bushman, RSR, pp. 515, 521-24.
92
Bushman, RSR, pg. 348.
93
Bushman, RSR, pg. 348.
94
Habermas, “Religion in the Public Sphere: Cognitive Presuppositions for the Public Use of Reason and
Secular Citizens,” pg. 142.
95
ibid., pg. 136.
96
Givens, PoP, pg. 25.
89

197

Chapter 5: Joseph’s Exceptional Politics
1

Alasdair MacIntyre,, After Virtue, Notre Dame Indiana, University of Notre Dame Press, 1984. Ch. 18;
Neuhaus, Richard John, The Naked Public Square, Grand Rapids, MI: W.B. Eerdmans Publishing
Company, 1986.; Böckenförde, Ernst-Wolfgang, “Carl Schmitt Revisited,” Telos, 109 (Fall 1996), pp. 8486.
2
Heinrich Meier, The Lesson of Carl Schmitt: Four Chapters on the Distinction between Political
Theology and Political Philosophy (University of Chicago Press, 1998) pg. 67, 27, 66-68.
3
Meier, pg. 20.
4
Meier, pg. 66.
5
Meier, pg. 66.
6
Quoted in Ivan Strenski, Contesting Sacrifice: Religion, Nationalism, and Social Thought in France
(The University of Chicago Press, 2002. Chicago) pg. 39.
7
Maistre, Joseph and LeBrun, Richard A. (ed.), Considerations on France, pg. 41.
8
Armenteros, pg. 55.
9
Bradley, Owen. “Maistre’s Theory of Sacrifice,” in Joseph De Maistre’s Life, Thought, and Influence:
Selected Studies, Lebrun, Richard; ed. (McGill-Queen's University Press, 2001) pg. 68.
10
Bradley, “Maistre’s Theory of Sacrifice,” pg. 70. In his Consideration on France, Maistre also explored
this dynamic, proposing that “the innocent suffer for the benefit of the guilty.” Pg. 30.
11
Armenteros, pg. 164.
12
Strenski, pg. 38.
13
Armenteros, pp. 156, 165, 164-71, 178-81. See also Bradley, “Maistre’s Theory of Sacrifice,” pp. 7980.
14
D&C 132: 7:
And verily I say unto you, that the conditions of this law are these: All covenants, contracts,
bonds, obligations, oaths, vows, performances, connections, associations, or expectations, that are
not made and entered into and sealed by the Holy Spirit of promise, of him who is anointed, both
as well for time and for all eternity, and that too most holy, by revelation and commandment
through the medium of mine anointed, whom I have appointed on the earth to hold this power
(and I have appointed unto my servant Joseph to hold this power in the last days, and there is
never but one on the earth at a time on whom this power and the keys of this priesthood are
conferred), are of no efficacy, virtue, or force in and after the resurrection from the dead; for all
contracts that are not made unto this end have an end when men are dead.
15
Christopher Scott McClure, “Hell and Anxiety in Hobbes’s Leviathan,” The Review of Politics 73, No.
1 (2011).
16
Hobbes, Leviathan, Ch. 37, pg. 470.
17
Hobbes, Leviathan, Ch. 37, pg. 473.
18
Hobbes, Leviathan, Ch. 37, pg. 471.
19
Hobbes, Leviathan, Ch. 26, pp. 331-2.
20
Hobbes, Leviathan, Ch. 37. pg. 471.
21
Hobbes, Leviathan, Ch. 37. pg. 477.
22
Boyd, pg. 71, Hobbes, Leviathan Ch. 29, pp. 365-66
23
Boyd, pp. 72-74.
24
Hobbes, Leviathan, Ch. 26, pg. 332.
25
Schmitt, The Leviathan in the State Theory of Thomas Hobbes, pp. 54-55.
26
Meier, pg. 76.
198

Schmitt writes that the feudal order was based on the divine: “The state that came into being in the
seventeenth century and prevailed on the continent of Europe is in fact a product of men and differs from
all earlier kinds of political units.” The Leviathan in the State Theory of Thomas Hobbes, pg. 34. See also
pp. 53-54.
28
Schmitt, The Leviathan in the State Theory of Thomas Hobbes, pp. 56-57.
29
Schmitt, Leviathan, pg. 54.
30
Meier, pg. 108.
31
Schmitt, Leviathan, pp. 56-7.
32
Schmitt, Political Theology, pg. 14.
33
ibid., pg. 15.
34
ibid. pp. 15, 44, 65.
35
ibid., pp. 13-14.
36
Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Bk. IV, Ch. 18, no. 5; Ch. 18, no. 7; Ch. 19.
37
Boyd, pg. 110.
38
Locke, The Reasonableness of Christianity, pg. 84.
39
Locke, The Reasonableness of Christianity, sec. 240, pg. 59; Pritchard, pg. 75.
40
Pritchard, pp. 11-18.
41
Locke, The Reasonableness of Christianity, pg. 96. See also pp. 78, 83-84, 95.
42
ibid.pg. 90.
43
ibid., pp. 90, 88-99.
44
Richard Boyd, Uncivil Society: The Perils of Pluralism and the Making of Modern Liberalism
(Lexington Books, 2004) pg 111.
45
Locke, The Reasonableness of Christianity, sec. 238, pg. 57.
46
Locke, The Reasonableness of Christianity, sec. 241.2, pg. 60.
47
Locke’s commentary on Ephesians, quoted in Pritchard, pg. 74.
48
Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration, pg. 33.
49
Meier, The Lesson of Carl Schmitt, pg. 67
50
Meier, pg. 20.
51
ibid., pg. 66.
52
ibid., pg. 73.
53
ibid., pg. 66.
54
Meier, pg. 77. Meier notes that assertion was removed in subsequent editions of Schmitt’s text.
55
Balakrishnan, pg. 48.
56
See Balakrishnan, pg. 48 and Meier pg. 68. Perhaps this inability to link his eschatology to a more
distinct Christianity is an extension of his theory that the truly disruptive nature of the exception defies all
efforts to frame it, and conventional Christian theologies were still too rational and predictable. On the
other hands, exceptional moments could still ultimately lead to the apocalyptic narrative described in the
New Testament. For Schmitt’s postwar thoughts on apocalypticism, see The Nomos of the Earth in the
International Law of Jus Publicum Europaeum, Telos Press Publishing (2006).
57
Schmitt wrote of Maistre and Cortes: “What we immediately recognize in them is a conceptually clear
and systematic analogy, and not merely that kind of playing with ideas, whether mystical, naturalphilosophical, or even romantic, which, as with everything else, so also with state and society, yeilds
colorful symbols and pictures.” Political Theology, pg. 37. For Cortes and Maistre’s religious heterodoxy,
see Balakrishnan, pp. 48-50, for more in-depth examination of Maistre specifically, see Armenteros, pp
20-34, and ch. 3-5.For Schmitt’s religious thought, see Balakrishnan, pp. 49-50.
27

For more on Schmitt’s narrow approach to Christian theology and scant interest in the biblical tradition,
see Wolfgang Palaver, "Schmitt's Critique of Liberalism," Telos 102 (Winter, 1995), pg. 66.

199

Peter E. Gordon, “Political Theology and Political Existentialism,”
http://blogs.ssrc.org/tif/2011/08/26/political-theology-and-political-existentialism/; Meier, Heinrich, The
Lesson of Carl Schmitt, pp. xii –xviii; Balakrishnan, Gopal, pp.48, 50.
59
Böckenförde, “Carl Schmitt Revisited,” Telos, 109 (Fall 1996), pg. 86.
60
Meier, pg. 92.
61
Quoted in Meier pg. 95-96; Schmitt Concept of the Political, pg. 90.
62
Meier, pg. 68.
63
The Prophet Joseph Smith, pg. 17.
64
For Schmitt, see Political Theology, pg., 62, and Meier, The Lesson, pp, 68, and 72; for Joseph, see
Givens, PoP, pg. 14.
65
D&C 21: 4-6.
66
Juster, Doomsayers, pg. 46.
67
Harper, Stephen, “Dictated by Christ”: Joseph Smith and the Politics of Revelation, pg. 281.
68
Quinn, pg. 128.
69
HotC 6:304-5.
70
Meier, pg. 66.
71
Harper, pp. 287-288, 291; Erickson, pp. 44-58, 100-02.
72
Meier, pp. 66-71.
73
Underwood, pp. 8-9, 43, 56.
74
Underwood, pp. 44-46.
75
Bushman, 104; see also Hill, pg. 21
76
Quinn, pg. 79.
77
Michael Barkun, Michael, Disaster and the Millennium (Yale University Press, 1974) pp. 113,158.
78
Underwood, pg. 38; Quinn. Pg. 4.
79
Underwood, pg. 10.
80
Bushman, RSR, pg. 166, 152; Hill, pg. 35.
81
Bushman, RSR, pg. 191.
82
For a comparison with their “apocalyptic adversaries,” the Millerite movement, see Underwood, ch. 7.
83
Barkun, pg. 120.
84
Barkun, pp. 120-21.
85
See Bushman, a sympathetic biographer: pg. xxi, 174.
86
Hill in Launius, pg. 123 and Bushman, pg. 174.
87
Bushman, pg. 122.
88
For the postponement of Mormon millenarian timeline, see Hill, Quest for Refuge, pp. xix – xxii.
Gordon Haber, “Secular End Times and Apocalyptic ‘Roosters,” Religion Dispatches, September 13,
2011. http://religiondispatches.org/secular-end-times-apocalyptic-roosters/; Landes, Richard A. Heaven
on Earth: The Varieties of the Millennial Experience, Oxford University Press, Oxford (2011).
89
For the efforts to establish retroactive continuity in Church doctrines and scriptures, see Quinn, The
Mormon Hierarchy: Origins of Power, pp. 18-22. For an early doctrine proclaiming Joseph’s singular
authority see D&C 21:1-7. For Cowdery’s expulsion from the Church, see Bushman, RSR, pp. 347-351.
90
Schmitt, Political Theology, pg. 15.
91
Mason, pg. 367.
92
Quoted in Ezra Taft Benson, “Fourteen Fundamentals in Following the Prophet,” February 26, 1980,
https://www.lds.org/liahona/1981/06/fourteen-fundamentals-in-following-the-prophet?lang=eng
93
Quinn, pg. 112; Bushman, RSR, pg. 441. In 1980, five years before he himself ascended to the position
of President of the Church, the Apostle Ezra Taft Benson quoted portions of Joseph’s letter to Nancy
Rigdon to illustrate the importance of following the Church President in all revelations no matter previous
prophecies or scriptures. “Fourteen Fundamentals in Following the Prophet,” February 26, 1980,
https://www.lds.org/liahona/1981/06/fourteen-fundamentals-in-following-the-prophet?lang=eng
58

200

Mormon dissenters asserted that Joseph had made similar statements to those in the Nancy Rigdon letter
even earlier in career, in Kirtland in 1835, after the high-ranking Church members John Whitmer and
Benjamin Winchester complained of Joseph’s contact with a woman in the congregation. Winchester
wrote that Joseph asserted then that: “He was authorized by God Almighty to establish His Kingdom –
and that he was God’s prophet and God’s agent and that he could do whatever he should choose to do,
therefore the Church had NO RIGHT TO CALL INTO QUESTION anything he did, or to censure him
for the reason that he was responsible to God Almighty alone.” Quoted in Hill, Quest for Refuge, pg. 60;
Brooke, pg. 217.
94
Broadie, pg. 366.
95
Broadie, pg. 366.
96
Manuscript History of Brigham Young 1847-1850, pg. 158. Edited by William S. Harwell. (Collier’s
Publishing 1997). Young would trace this theological startegy of transgression and transcendence back to
Adam: “Father Adam,” he taught, “transgressed the law designedly.” Quoted in Givens, WtA, pg. 225.
97
Kaufman, Walter, Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist, ch. 3.
98
Political Theology, pg. 15.
99
Broadie, pg. 348.
100
Schmitt, Concept of the Political, pg. 32.
101
HotC, v. 6, pp. 408-409.
102
Wolin, Richard. "Carl Schmitt, political existentialism, and the total state." Theory and Society 19, no.
4 (1990), pg. 393.
103
Schmitt, Political Theology, pg. 13.
104
Bushman, RSR, pg. 293.

201

Chapter 6: The Peculiar Prerogatives of American Zion
1

The lineage runs not through genetic propinquity, but through the power of the Holy Ghost which would
transform the pious and “purge out the old blood & make him actually of the seed of Abraham.” Richard
Bushman writes that “Election in Joseph’s mind involved adoption into Abraham’s progeny and gaining
the resulting blessings of intelligence.” Bushman, RSR, pg. 387.
2
Walzer, Exodus and Revolution, pp. 127-8.
3
Walzer, Exodus and Revolution, pg. 12.
4
Campbell, Green, Monson, pg. 40.
5
Armenteros, pp. 174, 185.
6
Locke, The Reasonableness of Christianity, pg. 60. See also, Letter on Toleration, pp. 29, 33-34.
7
Locke, Letter on Toleration, pg. 28.
8
Locke, Letter on Toleration, pg. 49.
9
Locke, The Reasonableness of Christianity, pp. 12, 19, 38.
10
Pritchard, pg. 109.
11
Pritchard, pg. 75; Locke, The Reasonableness of Christianity, pp. 88-96.
12
Locke, The Reasonableness of Christianity, pg. 19.
13
Locke, The Reasonableness of Christianity, pg. 68.
14
Moore, pg. 36.
15
Pritchard, pg. 116.
16
Pritchard, pg. 108.
17
Campbell, Green, Monson, pg. 18.
18
Pritchard, pp. 52-53.
19
Armenteros, pg. 182.
20
Scott Atran and Jeremy Ginges, “Religious and Sacred Imperatives in Human Conflict,” Science 18
May 2012: Vol. 336, Issue 6083, pp. 855-857.
21
Givens, pg. 57.
22
Pritchard, pg. 80.
23
Bushman, RSR, pp 349, 157-160. See also Joseph’s establishment of priestly quorums in 1835: D&C
107: 27-30.
24
Bushman, RSR, pg. 436. See also Quinn, pg. 45.
25
TJPS, pp. 43, 96, 103,
26
Brooke, pg. 228.
27
Brooke, pp. 228-229. See also TPJS, pg. 227.
28
Hill, Quest for Refuge, pg. 113.
29
Quinn, chapters 1-4.
30
Quote in Hill, Dialogue, 2006, pg. 161. For Joseph, the reverse was also true: for those without the
Melchizedek priesthood there would only be chaos and no clear path to salvation: “Respecting the
Melchizedek Priesthood, the sectarians never professed to have it; consequently they never could save
any one, and would all be damned together.” TPJS, pg. 322.
31
Harper, pp. 284-5. See also Bushman, RSR, pg. 436, Quinn, pg. 45.
32
See Bushman, RSR, pp. 170, 350, 352-353, 531-532, 540.
33
TJPS, pg. 331.
34
For examples of the disruptions cause by apostates, see Bushman, RSR, pp. 169-170.
35
Taylor, The Secular Age, pg. 141.
36
After missionaries returned from Eastern cities To Kirtland, Ohio in September of 1832, a revelation
proclaimed:
202

Wo, I say again, unto that house, or that village or city that rejecteth you, or your words, or your
testimony of me; For I, the Almighty, have laid my hands upon the nations, to scourge them for
their wickedness. . .
Nevertheless, let the bishop (Newell Whitney) go unto the city of New York, also to the city of
Albany, and also to the city of Boston, and warn the people of those cities with the sound of the
gospel, with a loud voice, of the desolation and utter abolishment which await them if they do
reject these things. For if they do reject these things the hour of their judgment is nigh, and their
house shall be left unto them desolate.” D&C 84: 95-96, 114-15.
When visiting New York City the following month, Bushman writes that Joseph “felt like a Jonah or an
Amos, a wilderness prophet, warning the proud inhabitants of a decadent city.” (RSR, pp. 189)
37
Juster, pg. 266.
38
Bushman, RSR, pg. 168.
39
Hill, Quest for Refuge, pg. 30.
40
Cannon, George ed., The Latter-Day Saints’ Millenial Star, Volume XXIII, Liverpool, 1861. See also a
similar version quoted in Hill, Quest for Refuge, pg. xviii.
41
Hill, Quest for Refuge, pg. 30.
42
D&C 19: 21-22.
43
D&C 29: 7-8.
44
Hill, Quest for Refuge, pg. 36.
45
BoC 48: 59-69; D&C 45: 66-75.
46
TJPS, pp. 70-71.
47
Boyd, pp. 72-74.
48
TJPS, pg. 22.
49
TJPS, pg. 124.
50
TPJS, pg. 146.
51
TPJS, pg. 195.
52
Moore, pg. 37.
53
TJPS, pp. 326, 329; Faulring, pp. 420, 422.
54
Brooke, pp. 246-47. Bushman, RSR, pp. 449-451.
55
Brooke, pp. 247-48; Daynes in Launius, pg. 134. During the final two years of his life, Joseph would
still insist that the most important Mormon doctrines were taught publically: “I am bold to declare I have
taught all the strong doctrines publicly, and always teach stronger doctrines in public than in private.”
(June 16th, 1844) TPJS, pg. 370.
56
Quinn, pg. 128.
57
Quinn, pg. 131.
58
Armenteros, pp. 24, 176-177.
59
On Protestantism and the French Revolution, see Maistre, Considerations, pp. 27, 41, 45. For Origen
and illumism, see Armenteros, pg. 173.
60
Armenteros, pp. 174, 185.
61
Armenteros, pp. 193, 213.
62
Armenteros, pg. 185.
63
Brooke, pg. 196-7.
64
Brooke, pg. 247
65
Merina Smith, “Nauvoo Secrets and the Rise of a Mormon Salvation Narrative, 1841–1842,”
University of Colorado Press, Utah State University Press, pg. 96.
66
Brooke, pg. 264.
67
Brooke, pg. 247.
68
Bushman, pp. 462-83, 46.
69
Brooke, pg. 264; Bushman, RSR, pp. 447-48; Broadie pp. 305-06, 321.
203

70

Brooke, pg. 265.
Brooke, pg. 265; Quinn, pg. 128.
72
Bushman, RSR, pg. 323; BoM, Jacob 2: 27-30; Daynes in Launius, pg. 132.
73
D&C [1835] 101:4; Bushman RSR, pg. 323.
74
Bushman, RSR, 323-25.
75
Merina Smith, pg. 60.
76
Bushman, pg. 437; Doctrine and Covenants 132: 4.
77
Merina Smith, pg. 76.
78
For a thorough investigation of the spiritual and emotional logic of Mormon polygamy, notably as
practiced in the Utah territory, see Kathleen Flake, “The Emotional and Priestly Logic of Plural
Marriage,” Leonard J Arrington Mormon History Lecture Series No. 15, October 1, 2009, Utah State
University Press.
79
Merina Smith, pp. 77-78.
80
Bushman, pg. 443.
81
Doctrine and Covenants 132:20.
82
Bushman, RSR, pg. 445; Doctrine and Covenants 132:19.
83
D&C, 132: 4, Bushman, RSR, pg. 438, 491.
84
Bushman, pg. 491.
85
Bushman, pg. 492.
86
Broadie, pg. 337.
87
Hill, pg. 115.
88
Martha Sonntag Bradley and Mary Brown Firmage Woodward, “Plurality, Patriarchy, and the Priestess:
Zina D. H. Young's Nauvoo Marriages,” Journal of Mormon History, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Spring 1994), pg.
90.
89
Merina Smith, pg. 72.
90
Bardley and Woodward, pg. 103.
91
Bushman, pg. 438.
92
Daynes in Launias and Hallwas eds., pg. 138.
93
Daynes, in Launius and Hallwas eds., pg. 130.
94
Broadie, pg. 319; Bushman, RSR, pg. 466.
95
Bushman, pg. 457. Sarah Pratt, for her part, founded the Anti-Polygamy Society in Salt Lake City and
died a Mormon apostate.
96
David J. Whittaker, “The Bone in the Throat: Orson Pratt and the Public Announcement of Plural
Marriage,” The Western Historical Quarterly, Vol. 18, No. 3 (Jul., 1987), pp. 293-314.
97
Stanley Kimball, pg. 93 in Heber C. Kimball, Mormon Patriarch and Pioneer.
98
Kimball, pg. 93; Merina Smith, pp. 73, 80-82.
99
Smith, Merina, pp. 80-82. Heber Kimball would later insist that the principle was not only defensible
but eternal: “The principle of plurality of wives never will be done away although some sisters have had
revelations that, when this time passes away and they go through the veil, every woman will have a
husband for herself.” Quoted in Givens, WtA, pg. 287.
100
Daynes in Launius, pp. 134-38.
101
HotC 2:176.
102
Joseph spoke on the distinction and duties of the priesthood on October 5, 1840, appearing to leave
room for all previous forms of ritualized sacrifice, ordinances and duties being revived as a requirement
for the full restoration of God’s priesthood in the final days:
71

And God said unto Noah the end of all flesh is before me, for the earth is filled with violence
through them, and behold I will destroy them with the earth," thus we behold the Keys of this
priesthood consisted in obtaining the voice of Jehovah that he talked with him in a familiar and
friendly manner, that he continued to him the Keys, the Covenants, the power and the glory with
204

which he blessed Adam at the beginning and the offring of Sacrifice which also shall be
continued at the last time, for all the ordinances and duties that ever have been required by the
priesthood under the direction and commandments of the Almighty in the last dispensation at the
end thereof in any of the dispensations, shall all be had in the last dispensation. Therefore all
things had under the Authority of the Priesthood at any former period shall be had again—
bringing to pass the restoration spoken of by the mouth of all the Holy Prophets. . . .
And he shall sit as a refiner and purifier of Silver; and he shall purify the sons of Levi, and purge
them as gold and silver, that they may offer unto the Lord . . .
It will be necessary here to make a few observations on the doctrine, set forth in the above
quotation, As it is generally supposed that Sacrifice was entirely done away when the great
sacrife was offered up—and that there will be no necessity for the ordinance of Sacrifice in
future, but those who assert this, are certainly not aquainted with the duties, privileges and
authority of the priesthood. or with the prophets The offering of Sacrifice has ever been
connected and forms a part of the duties of the priesthood. It began with the priesthood and
will be continued untill after the coming of Christ from generation to generation—We
freequently have mention made of the offering of Sacrifice by the servants of the most high in
antient days prior to the law of moses, See which ordinances will be continued when 22 the
priesthood is restored with all its authority power and blessings. . .
It is a very prevalent opinion that in the sacrifices of sacrifices which were offered were entirely
consumed, this was not the case if you read Leviticus [2] Chap [2-3] verses you will observe that
the priests took a part as a memorial and offered it up before the Lord, while the remainder was
kept for the benefit maintenance of the priests. So that the offerings and sacrifices are not all
consumed upon the Alter, but the blood is sprinkled and the fat and certain other portions are
consumed
These sacrifices as well as every ordinance belonging to the priesthood will when the temple of
the Lord shall be built and the Sons Levi be purified be fully restored and attended to then all
their powers ramifications ramifications and blessings—this the Sons of Levi shall be purified. . .
It is not to be understood that, the law of moses will be established again with all it rights and
variety of ceremonies, ceremonies, this had never been spoken off by the prophets but those
things which existed prior Mose's day viz Sacrifice will be continued —It may be asked by some
what necessity for Sacrifice since the great Sacrifice was offered? In answer to which if
Repentance Baptism and faith were necessary to Salvation existed prior to the days of Christ what
necessity for them since that time — [emphasis added in bold] Smith, Ehat, Cook, Words of
Joseph Smith, pp. 51-52.
103
Ehat and Cook, the editors of The Words of Joseph Smith, remark that “There are also other allusions
by Joseph in this discourse to certain elements of priesthood doctrine—teachings as he put it "that have
been kept hid from before the foundation of the world from the wise and prudent"—ordinances not
previously performed in this dispensation that would be institutionalized in the Church by way of the
temple endowment. For example, the Prophet alludes to the reinstitution of the Law of Sacrifice—that
part administered by the Melchizedek Priesthood before the Law of Moses.” n15, Smith, Ehat, Cook, pg.
54.
104
Guy G. Strousma, The End of Sacrifice: Religious Transformations in Late Antiquity, University of
Chicago Press, 2009, pp. 73-73; Givens, WtA, pp. 222-24.
105
Givens, WtA, pg. 225.
106
TPJS, pg. 322.
107
D&C: 132: 31-34.
205

108

Givens, pg. 281.
Givens, WtA, pg. 287.
110
D&C 132: 35-37. Genesis 16:2 has Sarai/Sarah initiating the offer of her handmaiden, Hagar.
111
Bushman, RSR, pp. 490-99.
112
The Mormon historian and theologian Terryl Givens remarks on D&C 132 that “Confusion arises from
the fact that the revelation ranges over a few interrelated principles, using vocabulary that is fraught with
ambiguity and multiple meanings.” Givens, WtA, pg. 286. For examples of high ranking members who
denied the legitimacy of the plural marriage principle, see Daynes in Launius, pp. 139-141.
113
D&C 132: 51.
114
Bushman, pg. 495. In addition to Clayton’s diary entries on Emma’s argument with Joseph, see also
the testimony of Joseph H. Jackson in Grant Palmer, “Why William and Jane Law Left the LDS Church
in 1844,” pp. 4-6. It is Palmer’s contention that Joseph may have offered a polyandrous relationship to
Emma to win her compliance with the principle, and then retracted the offer.
115
D&C: 132: 54
116
D&C: 132: 41-42 and 61-63.
117
Bushamn in RSR counts ten polyandrous wives (pg. 439) , while Merina Smith cites a scholarly debate
ranging from eleven to fourteen (pg.73). Most, perhaps all, of Joseph’s polyandrous wives were married
to him before the revelation on plural marriage, though Brigham Young continued the practice after
Joseph’s death (see Merina Smith, “Nauvoo Secrets”). If there was a prior revelation sanctifying
polyandrous marriage, it has not been canonized.
118
D&C 132: 61, 64-65.
119
Daynes in Launius, pp. 140-42.
120
Bushman also notes that “as the years went by, and one stalwart after another deserted him, Joseph
came to value loyalty above every other virtue.” RSR, pg. 170; Daynes in Launius, pp. 130-42.
121
Hill in Launius, pg. 124.
122
Daynes in Launius, pp. 131-2.
123
Bushman, RSR, pg. 444.
124
Bushman, pg. 440.
125
Quoted in Givens, WtA, pp. 281-82.
126
Cott, pp. 22-23.
127
Grossberg, pg. 120, chapter 1.
128
Grossberg, pg. 120.
129
Quoted in Cott, pg. 115.
130
Cott, pg. 26.
131
Cott, pg. 111.
132
Grossberg, pg. 121; for the more constrained views of eighteenth century Anglo-American prophets,
see Juster, pp. 101, 113-14.
133
Cott, pp. 14-15; Grossberg, pp. 106, 211-213; Orren pp. 3-4, 72.
109

206

Chapter 7: “A Constitutional Right to be a False Prophet”
Hatch, “Mormon and Methodist” pg. 40.
See Richard Slotkin, Regeneration Through Violence (1975).
3
Bushman, pp. 285-90.
4
Broadie, pg. 149.
5
Louis C. Zucker,”Joseph Smith as a Student of Hebrew,” Dialogue, Volume 3, Number 2, (1968). pg.
47.
6
Givens, PoP, pp. 42, 46-47.
7
Givens, PoP, pp. 46-47; D&C 88:45 and D&C 104:28 respectively.
8
Broadie, pg. 263; D&C 124: 56-83.
9
TJPS, pg. 137.
10
Dean D. McBrien, “The Economic Content of Early Mormon Doctrine,” Southwestern Political and
Social Science Quareterly 6 (1925): 180. Cited in Givens, PoP, pg. 47.
11
Juster, pg. 269.
12
See Bushman, RSR, pp 483-84 for an analysis of, and cultural context for, Joseph’s penchant for
frontier-style boasting.
13
Quoted in Brodie, pg. 295. See also, History of the Church, Vol. V, pg. 472.
14
Quoted in Bushman, RSR, pp, 6-7.
15
TPJS, pg. 315.
16
TPJS, pg. 365.
17
HotC 6, 304.
1
2

207

Conclusion
1

Daynes in Launius and Hallwas, pg. 141.
See Bigler, Forgotten Kingdom: The Mormon Theocracy in the American West, 1847-1896.
3
For a more general overview of new religions and local control in the 21st century, see José Casanova,
"Religion, the new millennium, and globalization." Sociology of religion 62, no. 4 (2001): 415-441. Pp.
429, 437-441.
4
Bigler, chs. 2-4.
5
Cott, pp. 111-20; Grossberg, pp. 120-26.
6
Mason, pg. 350.
7
Armand L. Mauss, "The Fading of the Pharoah's Curse: The Decline and Fall of the Priesthood's Ban
against Blacks." Dialogue: A Journal of Mormon Thought 14.
8
Ezra Taft Benson, “Fourteen Fundamentals in Following the Prophet,” Address delivered at Brigham
Young University, February 26, 1980. https://www.lds.org/liahona/1981/06/fourteen-fundamentals-infollowing-the-prophet?lang=eng
9
ibid.
10
Laurie Goodstein, “It’s Official: Mormon Founder Had Up to 40 Wives,” New York Times, November
10, 2014.
11
Neil J. Young, “‘The ERA is a Moral Issue’: The Mormon Church, LDS Women, and the Defeat of the
Equal Rights Amendment” American Quarterly, Volume 59, No. 3, September 2007, pp. 626-27.
12
Elizabeth Ellen Gordon and William L. Gillespie. "The Culture of Obedience and the Politics of Stealth:
Mormon Mobilization Against ERA and Same-Sex Marriage." Politics and Religion 5, no. 02 (2012):
343-366. pg. 344.
13
Young, pp. 636-39; Gordon and Gillespie, pg. 353.
14
Young, pg. 629.
15
Jesse McKinley and Kirk Johnson. "Mormons Tipped Scale in Ban on Gay Marriage." New York Times
14 (2008).
16
Gordon and Gillespie, pg. 343.
17
ibid. pp. 355, 357.
18
See the opinions of Brian D. Galle, “The LDS Church, Proposition Eight, and the Federal Law of
Charities” Northwestern University Law Review Colloquy, FSU College of Law, Public Law Research
Paper No. 327, December 30 (2008); and David Lourie, "Rethinking donor disclosure after the
proposition 8 campaign." Southern California Law Review. 83 (2009): 133; and Monica Youn,
“Proposition 8 and the Mormon Church: A Case Study in Donor Disclosure,” George Washington Law
Review, Volume 81, No. 6, November 2013.
19
Swaine, pg. 27.
20
Jenkins, pg. 237.
21
Lawrence Wright, Going clear: Scientology, Hollywood, and the Prison of Belief. Vintage, 2013. pp.
122-23.
22
ibid., pp. 226-30.
23
ibid. pg. 232.
24
The sociologist Lewis Carter described the difficulty in even studying the movement thus:
The analytic task is complicated by the changing and inconsistent nature of the Rajneesh
movement which makes no claim to consistency of ideology. Further, beliefs, practices and goals
are extremely changeable, though a few enduring patterns can be abstracted. The Rajneesh
movement appears to be totally "manufactured" in the sense that beliefs, practices, corporate
identities, and physical location may be changed quickly to suit necessities and convenience of
the moment. Just as Sannyasin are urged to live in the "here and now," their social systems and
legal identities are very impermanent. . . Further difficulty is introduced by the fluidity of
2

208

Rajneesh practices, with a pronouncement in the name of the Bhagwan having been sufficient to
cause abandonment of old practices and acquisition of new ones.
Lewis F. Carter, "The" New Renunciates" of the Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh: Observations and
identification of problems of interpreting new religious movements." Journal for the Scientific Study of
Religion (1987): 148-172. pp. 149-52.
25
Carter, pg. 159.
26
Randall Ballmer, Thy Kingdom Come: How the Religious Right Distorts Faith and Threatens America,
New York: Basic Books, 2006. pp. 16-17. The historian Rick Perlstein has made a similar observation,
tying the early Mormon strategy to that of the modern Religious Right:
Religious traditions suffused with a sense of millennial stakes often have subrosa discourses akin
to what the Mormons call “lying for the Lord.” Pentectostal missiologist C. Peter Wagner, for
example, has written, “We ought to see clearly that the end does justify the means.... If the
method I am using accomplishes the goal I am aiming at, it is for that reason a good method.”
Lying for the Lord has its concombinants on the political right. Jerry Falwell has argued for the
elimination of all public schools. Nothing wrong with making that argument. But in 1998, when
confronted with a quote, he denied making it, and denied having anything to do with the book in
which it appeared. It was from a book of transcriptions of his sermons.
Rick Perlstein, “‘I Didn’t Like Nixon Until Watergate’: The Conservative Movement Now,” The
Huffington Post, December 5, 2005. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/rick-perlstein/i-didnt-like-nixonuntil-_b_11735.html
27
See Supreme Court of the United States, “Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of
Oregon v. Smith No. 88-1213, Argued Nov. 6, 1989, Decided April 17, 1990.
https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/494/872/case.html
28
Supreme Court of the United States, “BURWELL, SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERVICES, ET AL. v. HOBBY LOBBY STORES, INC., ET AL.” October Term, 2013.
https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/13pdf/13-354_olp1.pdf
29
Ben Adams and Cynthia Barmore, “Questioning Sincerity: The Role of the Courts After Hobby Lobby,”
67 Stanford Law Review Online 59, November 7, 2014.
https://www.stanfordlawreview.org/online/questioning-sincerity-the-role-of-the-courts-after-hobby-lobby/
30
Kara Loewentheil, “Code of Silence: RFRA Protects Religious Refusal To Testify,” Public Rights,
Private Conscience Project, Columbia Law School, September 17, 2014.
http://blogs.law.columbia.edu/publicrightsprivateconscience/2014/09/17/code-of-silence-rfra-protectsreligious-refusal-to-testify/; Hamilton, Marci A. "The Case for Evidence-Based Free Exercise
Accommodation: Why the Religious Freedom Restoration Act Is Bad Public Policy." Harvard Law &
Policy Review 9 (2015). pp. 140, 145, 160.

209

Bibliography
Abanes, Richard. One Nation Under Gods: A History of the Mormon Church, New York, Four
Walls Eight Windows, 2002.
Adams, Ben and Cynthia Barmore. “Questioning Sincerity: The Role of the Courts After
Hobby Lobby,” 67 Stanford Law Review Online 59, November 7, 2014.
https://www.stanfordlawreview.org/online/questioning-sincerity-the-role-of-the-courtsafter-hobby-lobby/
Armenteros, Carolina. The French Idea of History: Joseph de Maistre and His Heirs, 1794–
1854. Cornell University Press, 2011.
Atran, Scott and Jeremy Ginges, “Religious and Sacred Imperatives in Human Conflict,”
Science 18 May 2012: Vol. 336, Issue 6083, pp. 855-857.
Augustine. The City of God against the Pagans (edited by R.W. Dyson), Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1998.
Baehr, Peter. Caesarism and the Fading Roman World: A Study in Republicanism and
Caesarism, New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1998.
Balakrishnan, Gopal. The Enemy: An Intellectual Portrait of Carl Schmitt, Verso, London
2000.
Ballmer, Randall. Thy Kingdom Come: How the Religious Right Distorts Faith and Threatens
America, New York: Basic Books, 2006.
Barkun, Michael, Disaster and the Millennium, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974.
Bellah, Robert N. “Civil Religion in America.” Daedalus 96 (1967): 1–21.
Benson, Ezra Taft. “Fourteen Fundamentals in Following the Prophet,” February 26, 1980,
https://www.lds.org/liahona/1981/06/fourteen-fundamentals-in-following-theprophet?lang=eng
Bercovitch, Sacvan. The American Jeremiad, Madison, University of Wisconsin Press, 1978.
Berlin, Isaiah. The Crooked Timber of Humanity: Chapters in the History of Ideas, New York:
Knopf, 199.
Bigler, David L. Forgotten Kingdom: The Mormon Theocracy in the American West, 18471896, Logan, Utah; Utah State University Press, 1998.

210

Bloom, Harold. The American Religion: The Emergence of the Post Christian Nation, New
York, Simon and Schuster, 1992.
Bloch, Ruth H. Visionary Republic: Millennial Themes in American Thought, 1756-1800,
Cambridge University Press, 1985.
Böckenförde, Ernst-Wolfgang, “Carl Schmitt Revisited,” Telos, 109 (Fall 1996), pp. 84-86.
Boyd, Richard. Uncivil Society: The Perils of Pluralism and the Making of Modern Liberalism,
Lexington Books, 2004.
Boyer, Paul. When Time Shall Be No More, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Belknap Harvard,
1992.
Bradley, Martha Sonntag and Mary Brown Firmage Woodward, “Plurality, Patriarchy, and the
Priestess: Zina D. H. Young's Nauvoo Marriages,” Journal of Mormon History, Vol. 20,
No. 1 (Spring 1994)
Brodie, Fawn. No Man Knows My History: the Life of Joseph Smith, New York: Vintage
Books, 1945.
Brooke, John J. The Refiner’s Fire: The Making of Mormon Cosmology, 1644-1844,
Cambridge University Press, 1994.
Buchanan, Patrick J. Suicide of a Superpower: Will America Survive to 2025? Thomas Dunne
Books, 2011.
Bushman, Richard L. Joseph Smith: Rough Stone Rolling, New York, Vintage, 2007.
Campbell, David E., John C. Green, and J. Quin Monson. Seeking the Promised Land:
Mormons and American Politics. Cambridge University Press, USA, 2014.
Carter, Lewis F. "The" new renunciates" of the Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh: Observations and
identification of problems of interpreting new religious movements." Journal for the
Scientific Study of Religion (1987): 148-172.
Cohn, Norman. The Pursuit of the Millennium. Fair Lawn, NJ: Essential Books, 1957.
Cott, Nancy F. Public vows: A History of Marriage and the Nation. Harvard University Press,
2009.
The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, The Book of Mormon: Another Testament of
Jesus Christ; https://www.lds.org/scriptures/bofm?lang=eng
The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, The Doctrine and Covenants of The Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints Containing Revelations Given to Joseph Smith, the
211

Prophet with Some Additions by His Successors in the Presidency of the Church;
https://www.lds.org/scriptures/dc-testament?lang=eng
Erickson, Dan. As a Thief In the Night: The Mormon Quest for Millennial Deliverance, Salt
Lake City, Signature Books, 1998.
Feldman, Noah. “What Is It About Mormonism?” The New York Times, January 6, 2008.
Galle, Brian D. “The LDS Church, Proposition Eight, and the Federal Law of Charities”
Northwestern University Law Review Colloquy, FSU College of Law, Public Law
Research Paper No. 327, December 30, 2008.
Givens, Terryl. People of Paradox: A History of Mormon Culture. Oxford University Press,
USA, 2007.
Givens, Terryl. Wrestling the Angel: The Foundations of Mormon Thought: Cosmos, God,
Humanity. Vol. 1. Oxford University Press, USA, 2014.
Gordon, Elizabeth Ellen, and William L. Gillespie. "The Culture of Obedience and the Politics
of Stealth: Mormon Mobilization Against ERA and Same-Sex Marriage." Politics and
Religion 5, no. 02 (2012): 343-366.
Gordon, Peter E., “Political Theology and Political Existentialism,”
http://blogs.ssrc.org/tif/2011/08/26/political-theology-and-political-existentialism/
Goodstein, Laurie. “It’s Official: Mormon Founder Had Up to 40 Wives,” New York Times,
November 10, 2014
Grossberg, Michael. Governing the Hearth: Law and the Family in Nineteenth-Century
America. Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1988.
Firmage, Edwin Brown and Mangrum, Richard Collin. Zion in the Courts: A Legal History of
the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints 1830-1900. Urbana and Chicago:
University of Illinois, 2001.
Habermas, Jürgen. "‘The Political’: The Rational Meaning of a Questionable Inheritance of
Political Theology." The Power of Religion in the Public Sphere, Eduardo Mendieto,
(ed.) A Columbia/SSRC Book, 2011: 15-33.
Hamilton, Marci A. "The Case for Evidence-Based Free Exercise Accommodation: Why the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act Is Bad Public Policy." Harvard Law & Policy
Review 9 (2015). pp. 140, 145, 160.
Hammerton-Kelly, Robert and Johnsen, William (eds.) Politics and the Apocalypse (Studies in
Violence, Mimesis and Culture), East Lansing; Michigan State University Press, 2007.

212

Hall, John R. Hall, John R. Apocalypse: From Antiquity to the Empire of Modernity. John
Wiley & Sons, 2013.
Harper, Stephen. “Dictated by Christ”: Joseph Smith and the Politics of Revelation,” Journal of
the Early Republic, Vol. 26, No. 2 , Summer, 2006.
Hatch, Nathan O. “Mormon and Methodist: Popular Religion in the Crucible of the Free
Market,” Journal of Mormon History, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Spring 1994), pp. 24-44.
———. The Democratization of American Christianity. New Haven: Yale University Press,
1989.
Hartz, Louis. The Liberal Tradition in America: An Interpretation of American Political
Thought Since the Revolution. San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1991.
Harwell, William S. ed. Manuscript History of Brigham Young 1847-1850, Collier’s
Publishing, 1997.
Herf, Jeffrey. Reactionary Modernism: Technology, culture, and politics in Weimar and the
Third Reich, Cambridge University Press, 1984.
Hill, Christopher. The World Turned Upside Down; Radical Ideas during the English
Revolution. New York: Viking Press, 1972.
Hill, Marvin. Quest for Refuge: The Mormon Flight From American Pluralism, Salt Lake City:
Signature Books, 1989.
___________. “Counter-Revolution: The Mormon Reaction to the Coming of American
Democracy,” Sunstone, June 1989, pp. 24-33.
Hobbes, Thomas. Leviathan, New York: Penguin Classics, 1985
Howe, Daniel Walker. What Hath God Wrought: The Transformation of America, 1815-1848.
New York: Oxford University Press, 2007.
Hughes, Richard T. and Allen, C. Leonard. Illusions of Innocence: Protestant Primitivism in
America, 1630-1875, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988.
Jakobsen, Janet and Pellegrini, Ann. (Ed.) Secularisms, Duke University Press, 2008.
Juster, Susan. Doomsayers: Anglo-American Prophecy and the Age of Revolution,
Philadelphi:, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2003.
Jenkins, Philip. Mystic and Messiahs: Cults and New Religions in American History, New
York: Oxford University Press, 2000.
213

Kaufman, Walter. Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist, Princeton University Press,
2013.
Kaplan, Benjamin J. Divided by Fiath: Religious Conflict and the Practice of Toleration in
Early Modern Europe, Harvard University Belknap Press, 2007.
Klausen, Jytta, The Islamic Challenge: Politics and Religion in Western Europe, Oxford
University Press, 2008
Kirn, Walter. “Latter-Day Saint,” New York Times, January 16, 2006.
Kymlicka, Will (ed.). The Rights of Minority Cultures, Oxford University Press, 1996.
Landes, Richard. Heaven on Earth: The Varieties of the Millennial Experience, New York,
Oxford University Press, 2011.
Launius, Roger D. and John E. Hallwas, eds. Kingdom on the Mississippi Revisited: Nauvoo in
Mormon History, Urbana, University of Illinois Press, 1996.
Lears, Jackson T.J. No Place of Grace: Antimodernism and the Transformation of American
Culture, 1880-1920, University of Chicago Press, 1994.
Lebrun, Richard A. Joseph De Maistre’s Life, Thought, and Influence: Selected Studies,
McGill-Queen's University Press, 2001.
Lhamon, William T. Deliberate Speed: The Origins of a Cultural Style in the American 1950s.
Harvard University Press, 2002.
Linker, Damon. The Theocons: Secular America Under Siege, New York, First Anchor Books,
2007.
Locke, John and Kenneth P. Winkler (ed.), An Essay Concerning Human Understanding,
Hackett Publishing Company, 1996.
Loewentheil, Kara. “Code of Silence: RFRA Protects Religious Refusal To Testify,” Public
Rights, Private Conscience Project, Columbia Law School, September 17, 2014.
http://blogs.law.columbia.edu/publicrightsprivateconscience/2014/09/17/code-ofsilence-rfra-protects-religious-refusal-to-testify/
Lourie, David. "Rethinking donor disclosure after the proposition 8 campaign." Southern
California Law Review. 83, 2009: 133.
Luther, Martin. Selections From His Writings; Ed By John Dillen Berger, Anchor Library of
Religion, 1961.
MacIntyre, Alasdair, After Virtue, Notre Dame Indiana, University of Notre Dame Press, 1984.
214

deMaistre, Joseph and Richard A. Lebrun (Ed.). Considerations on France, Cambridge Texts
in the History of Political Thought, Cambridge University Press, 1995.
Mauss, Armand L. "The Fading of the Pharoah's Curse: The Decline and Fall of the
Priesthood's Ban against Blacks."." Dialogue: A Journal of Mormon Thought 14.
March, Andrew. “Theocrats Living under Secular Law: An External Engagement with Islamic
Legal Theory,” Journal of Political Philosophy, Vol. 19, No. 1, 2011.
Marius, Richard. Martin Luther: the Christian between God and death. Harvard University
Press, 2009.
Marty, Martin E. Religion and the Republic: The American Circumstance. Boston, Beacon,
1987.
Mehta, Uday Singh. The Anxiety of Freedom: Imagination and Individuality in Locke's
Political Thought, Cornell University Press, 1992.
Mendieta, Eduardo and Jonathan Vanantwerpen, (eds.) The Power of Religion in the Public
Sphere, Columbia Univeristy Press/SSRC, 2011.
McBrien, Dean D. “The Economic Content of Early Mormon Doctrine,” Southwestern
Political and Social Science Quareterly 6 (1925): 180.
McClure, Christopher Scott. “Hell and Anxiety in Hobbes’s Leviathan,” The Review of Politics
73, No. 1 (2011).
McKinley, Jesse, and Kirk Johnson. "Mormons Tipped Scale in Ban on Gay Marriage." New
York Times 14, 2008.
Meier, Heinrich. Carl Schmitt and Leo Strauss: the Hidden Dialogue. University of Chicago
Press, 1995.
_____________.The Lesson of Carl Schmitt: Four Chapters on the Distinction Between
Political Theology and Political Philosophy. University of Chicago Press, 2011.
Moore, Robert Laurence. Religious Outsiders and the Making of Americans. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1986.
Morone, James A. Hellfire Nation: The Politics of Sin in American History. New Haven, CT:
Yale University Press, 2003.
Naipaul, V.S. Beyond Belief: Islamic Excursions Among the Converted Peoples, Abacus, 1998.
Neilson, Reid L., and Terryl L. Givens, eds. Joseph Smith, Jr.: Reappraisals after Two
Centuries. Oxford University Press, 2008.
215

Neuhaus, Richard John. The Naked Public Square: Religion and Democracy in America.
Grand Rapids, MI: W.B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1986.
Orren, Karen. Belated Feudalism: Labor, the Law and Liberal Development in the United
States, Cambridge University Press, 1999.
Petersen, Jesper Aagaard. Contemporary Religious Satanism: A Critical Anthology, Ashgate,
2009.
Perlstein, Rick. “‘I Didn’t Like Nixon Until Watergate’: The Conservative Movement Now,”
Huffington Post. December, 2005. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/rick-perlstein/ididnt-like-nixon-until-_b_11735.html
Putnam, Robert D., and David E. Campbell. American Grace: How Religion Divides and
Unites Us. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2010.
Pritchard, Elizabeth. Religion in Public: Locke's Political Theology. Stanford University Press,
2013.
Quinn, D. Michael. The Mormon Hierarchy: Origins of Power, Salty Lake City, Utah;
Signature Books, 1994.
Quong, Johnathan. “The Rights of Unreasonable Citizens,” The Journal of Political
Philosophy, Vol. 12, No. 3, 2004, pp. 314-335.
Rediker, Markus and Peter Linebaugh. The Many-Headed Hydra: Sailors, Slaves, Commoners,
and the Hidden History of the Revolutionary Atlantic, Beacon Press, 2013.
Reynolds, John. My Own Times: Embracing Also the History of My Life, Chicago: Fergus
Printing, 1879.
Robin, Corey. The Reactionary Mind: Conservatism from Edmund Burke to Sarah Palin, New
York, Oxford University Press, 2011.
Schmitt, Carl. Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty (1922/34),
Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1985.
___________. The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy (1923), Cambridge, The MIT Press,
1985.
___________. The Concept of the Political (1929/32), Chicago, University of Chicago Press,
1996.

216

___________. The Leviathan in the State Theory of Thomas Hobbes: Meaning and Failure of a
Political Symbol, Greenwood Press, Contribution in Political Science, Number 374,
1996.
Slotkin, Richard. Regeneration Through Violence: The Mythology of the American Frontier
1600-1860, Norman, University of Oklahoma Press, 1973.
Smith, Merina. “Nauvoo Secrets and the Rise of a Mormon Salvation Narrative, 1841–1842,”
University of Colorado Press, Utah State University Press,
Smith, Joseph. History of the Church, BYU Studies Quarterly, Brigham Young University;
https://byustudies.byu.edu/hc/hcpgs/hc.aspx
____________.“The Government of God,” Times and Seasons, July 15, 1842, pp. 855-58.
____________. The Book of Commandments, 1833, The Joseph Smith Papers:
http://www.josephsmithpapers.org/paperSummary/book-of-commandments-1833
Smith, Joseph, and Brigham Henry Roberts. History of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter
Day Saints: 1873-1890. Vol. 5. Board of Publication of the Reorganized Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, 1911.
Smith, Joseph Fielding. Teachings of the Prophet Joseph Smith: Taken from his sermons and
writings as they are found in the Documentary history and other publications of the
Church and written or published in the days of the prophet's ministry. Deseret book,
1976. https://byustudies.byu.edu/history-of-the-church
Smith, Rogers M. “Beyond Tocqueville, Myrdal and Hartz: The Multiple Traditions
in America” The American Political Science Review, Vol. 87, No. 3. Sep. 1993.
Song, Sarah. Justice Gender and the Politics of Multiculturalism, Cambridge University Press,
2007.
Strenski, Ivan. Contesting Sacrifice: Religion, Nationalism, and Social Thought in France, The
University of Chicago Press, 2002.
Supreme Court of the United States. “BURWELL, SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVICES, ET AL. v. HOBBY LOBBY STORES, INC., ET AL.” No. 13–
354. Argued March 25, 2014—Decided June 30, 2014, October Term, 2013.
https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/13pdf/13-354_olp1.pdf
___________________________. “Employment Division, Department of Human Resources
of Oregon v. Smith No. 88-1213, Argued Nov. 6, 1989, Decided April 17, 1990.
https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/494/872/case.html

217

Swaine, Lucas. The Liberal Conscience: Politics and Principle in a World of Religious
Pluralism, New York, Columbia University Press, 2006.

Taylor, Charles. Modern Social Imaginaries, Durham North Carolina, Duke University Press,
2007.
_____________. A Secular Age, Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2008.

Taylor, Charles et al. Multiculturalism: Examining the politics of recognition Edited by Amy
Gutman, Princeton University Press,1994.
Thigpen, Robert B. and Lyle A. Downing, “Rawls and the challenge of theocracy to freedom,”
Journal of Church and State, 40 (1998), 757–73.
Tocqueville, Alexis. Democracy in America, Daniel J. Boorstin ed., Vintage Classics, 1990.
Tuveson, Ernest Lee. Redeemer Nation: The Idea of America’s Millennial Role, Chicago,
University of Chicago Press, 1968.
Underwood, Grant. The Millenarian World of Early Mormonism. University of Illinois Press,
1999.
Walzer, Michael. Exodus and Revolution. New York: Basic Books, 1985.
_____________. What It Means To Be An American: Essays on the American Experience, New
York, Marsilio Publishers, 1996.
_____________. On Toleration. Yale University Press, 1999.
Wolin, Richard. "Carl Schmitt, political existentialism, and the total state."Theory and
Society 19, no. 4 (1990): 389-416.
Wolin, Sheldon. Politics and Vision: Continuity and Innovation in Western Political Thought,
Princeton University Press, 2006.
Wood, Gordon. “Evangelical America and Early Mormonism” (April 1980), in The Mormon
History Association’s Tanner Lectures: The First Twenty Years, ed. Dean L. May and
Reid L. Neilson (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois, 2006),
Wood, Timothy L. “The Prophet and the Presidency: Mormonism and Politics in Joseph
Smith’s 1844 Presidential Campaign,” Journal of the Illinois State Historical Society,
Vol. 93, No. 2, 2000.

218

Wright, Lawrence. Going Clear: Scientology, Hollywood, and the Prison of Belief. Vintage,
2013.
Youn, Monica. “Proposition 8 and the Mormon Church: A Case Study in Donor Disclosure,”
George Washington Law Review, Volume 81, No. 6, November 2013.
Young, Neil J. “‘The ERA is a Moral Issue’: The Mormon Church, LDS Women, and the
Defeat of the Equal Rights Amendment” American Quarterly, Volume 59, No. 3,
September 2007, pp. 623-44.
David J. Whittaker, “The Bone in the Throat: Orson Pratt and the Public Announcement of
Plural Marriage,” The Western Historical Quarterly, Vol. 18, No. 3 (Jul., 1987), pp.
293-314.
Zagorin, Perez. How the idea of religious toleration came to the West. Princeton University
Press, 2003
Zucker, Louis C. “Joseph Smith as a Student of Hebrew”, Dialogue Vol. 3, No. 2, Summer
1968.

219

